Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rependra Deb Raikot

Judgment

Civil Jurisdiction. This application was heard by Banerjee J. sitting singly and by his order dated the 25th of April, 1949, the learned Judge allowed the application, substantially on the ground that having regard to the atmosphere of prejudice that was created in the locality by supporters of the defendant, who wielded I [1953] considerable influence in the district, the plaintiff might Asrurnati Debi have a legitimate apprehension that' he would not get fair trial in the district court. Kumar Rupendra Against this decision the defendant No. 1 took an Deb Raikat appeal to the Appellate Bench of the High Court of and Others. Calcutta and the learned Judges (Tr~vor Harries C. J. Mukherjea J. and Das J.) dismissed the appeal on the ground that the order appealed againt was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this appeal.

The High Court of Calcutta in holding the appeal before it to be incompetent based its decision entirely upon an earlier pronouncement of a Division Bench of the same court, where it was held by MookerjeeA.C.J. sitting with Fletcher J. that an order for transfer of a suit made under clause 13 of the Letters Patent was not a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 (1 ). Reliance was placed by the learned Judges for this view upon the pronouncement of Sir Richard Couch C. J. in the well-known and often cited case of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company ('), where the learned Chief Justice said as follows:- "We think that 'judgment' in clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability.

It may be either final or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined." The identical question, whether an order for transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is a 'judgment' for purposes of appeal, was pointedly raised before the Madras and the Rangoon High Courts, and while the Madras High Court (3) answered the question in the affirmative, a definitely negative answer was given by (1) See Khatizan v. Sona.irain, I.L.R. 47 Cal. r104. (2) 8 Ben. L.R. 433. (3) Vide Krishna Reddi v. '1.Thanikachala, I.L.R. 47 :i.\Iad. 1,36. I S.C.R. the Rangoon High Court('). The Madras decision purports to be in accordance with the view enunciated by A.s1 u1nafi Debi a Full Bench of that court in T,uljaram v. Alagappa(') where Sir Arnold \Vhite C, J. sitting with Krishna- Kumar Rupendra swami Aiyar and Ayling JJ. formulated a definition Deb Raikot of 'judgment' in a comprehensive manner differing from and Othera, the wide interpretation put upon the term in the earlier case of DeSouza v. Coles(').

"The test seems to Mukherjea J, me," thus observerl the· learned Chief Justice, "to be not what i8 the form of the adjudication, but what is its effect on the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause." This decision, it may be pointed out, has not only been adhered to in Madras since then without any comment, but the Calcutta High Court has in several instances manifested a marked leaning towards it (').

On the other hand, a Full Bench ( 1) of the Rangoon High Court presided over by Page C.J. took a view altogether different from that of the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts as regards the meaning of the word ' judgment' in clause 13 of the Rangoon Letters Patent, whioh corresponds to clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts. It was held by the Full Bench of the Rangoon High Court that the term ' judgment ' in the Letters Patent means and is a decree in a snit by which the rights of the parties in the suit are determined. In other words, a ' judgment ' is not what is defined in section 2 (9) of the Civil Procedure Code as being the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree (1) Dayabha.'i v. J'\,Jurugappa (}hettiar, 13 Rang. 457 (F.B.). (2) 35 Mad,' (F,R), (3) ~ 11,H,C, R, 384, (4) \Tide 1l1.athura Sundari v. Haran Ohandra I.L.R. 43 Cal. 857; Chandi Charan v. Jnanendra 29 C.L.J. 225 at 229; Lta Badin v. Upendra llfohan Rov Ohaudhury, 39 C.\V. ~.

155. I [1953] or order, but is a judgment in its final and definitive . sense embodying a decree. A final 0 judgment is an Asrumati ,,ebi d' d" h" h 1 . l d a JU ica .10n w 10 cone us1 ve y etermmes t e rig ts Kumar Rupeudra of the parties with regard to all matters in issue in the Deb Raikot suit, whereas a preliminary or interlocutory judgment and Others. is a decree by which the right to the relief claimed in the suit is decided but under which further proceedings Mukherjea J. are necessary before a suit in its entirety can be disposed of. Save and except final and preliminary judgments thus defined, all other decisions are ' orders' and they do not come within the description of 'judgments' under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent. No 'order ' is appealable unless an appeal is expressly provided against it by the Oivil Procedure Code or some other Act of the Legislature.

In this view an 'order' for transferring a suit from a subordinate court to the High Court could not possibly be regarded as a ' jndgment ', and consequently no appeal would lie against such an order. This definition of' judgment' has been accepted in several cases by the Nagpur High Court (1 ), and substantially this seems to be the view of the Allahabad High Court also (2). A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court("), however, has refused to accept this view and has preferred to follow the tests enumerated by the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts. The Bombay High Court accepted the Calcutta view from the very beginning (4).

In view of this wide divergence of judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this court at some time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which the different views mentioned above purport to be based and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word ' judgment ' as it occurs in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of the other High Courts. We are, however, relieved from embarking (I) Vide Kunwa:r Lal Singh v. U1na De1li, A.LR. I945 Nag. 156; Shankar Deo v. f(alyani, A.LR. 1948 Nag. 85. (2) Vide Shahzadi Begam. v. Alakhnath, 57 All. 983 (F.B.) (3) Shaw Hari v. Sonah 1lfol Beli Rarn, I.L.R. 23 Lah, 491. {4) Vide•Soneba.i v. Ahtnedbhai, 9 Born, H.C.R. 398 .

I v S.C.R. on such enqqiry in the present case as we are satisfied that in none of the views referred to above could A~~~ an order o the character which we have before us, be regarded as a 'judgment ' within the meaning of Kumar;~pendra clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Deb Raikot Couch C.J., as said already, defined 'judgment' to be a decision which determines some right or liability affecting the merits of the controversy between the parties. It is true that according to the learned Chief J"ustice an adjudication, in order that it might rank as a ' judgment', need not decide the case on its merits, but it must be the final pronouncement of the court making it, the effect of which is to dispose of or terminate the suit or proceeding. This will be apparent from the following observations made by Couch C.J. in the course of his judgment in the case referred to above:

"It is, however, said that this eourt has already put a wider construction upon the word ' judgment' in clause 15 by entertaining appeals in cases where the plaint has been rejected as insufficient, or as showing that the claim is barred by limitation, and also in oases where orders have been made in execution. These however are both within the above definition of a judgment, and it by no means follows that, because we hold the order in the present case not to be appealable, we should be bound to hold the same in the oases referred to. For example, there is an obvious difference between an order for the admission of a plaint and an order for its rejection. The former determines nothing, but is merely the first step towards putting the case in a shape for determination. The latter determines finally so far as the court which makes the order is concerned that the suit, as brought, will not lie. The decision, therefore, is a judgment in the proper sense of the term."

It cannot be said, therefore, that according to Sir Richard Couch every judicial pronouncement on a right or liability between the parties is to be regarded lfjf and Other:;, M ukher jea J. [1953] as a 'judgment', for in that case there would be any . number of judgments in the course of a suit or pro- Asntmati llel>t cceding, each one of which could be challenged by way Kumar ;·upe11dra of appeal. The judgment must be the final pronounce- Deb Raikot mcnt which puts an end to the proceeding so far as a 11d Other.. the conrt dealing with it is concerned. It cnrtainly involves the determination of some right or liability, MttklterJea J. though it may not be necessary that there must be a decision on the merits. This view, which is implied in the observations of Sir Richard Couch C.J. quoted above, has been really made the basis of the definition of 'judgment ' by Sir Arnold White C.J. in the Full Bench denision of the Madras High Court to which reference has been made (1).

According to White C.J. to find out whether an order is a 'judgment' or not, we have to look to its effect upon the particular suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect is to terminate the suit or proceeding, the decision would be a 'judgment' but not otherwise. As this definition covers not only decisions in suits or actions but 'orders' in other proceedings as well which start with applications, it may be said that any final order passed on an application in the course of a suit, e.g., granting m· refusing a party's prayer for adjournment of a suit or for examination of a witness, would also come within the definition. This seems to be the reason why the learned Chief Justice qualifies the general proposition laid down above by stating that "an adjudication on an application, which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit, is not a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent."

As stated already, it is not our purpose in the present ease to frame an exhaustive definition of the word ' judgment' as used in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. vVe have indicated what the essential features of a ' judgment' are according to both the Calcutta and the Madras High Courts and all that we need say is that, in our opinion, an order under clnuse 18 of the Letters Patent does not satisfy the tests of a ' judgment' as· fonnulateci by either of these High Courts, (T) Vide T1tljara111 v . .'!l(lgoppa, 35 ",\Jad, r, s.c.:R. SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S The questipn that requires determination in an I9b3 application under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is, h th Id b d f" As,.,nnati Debi w e er a partrcu ar smt s iou e remove rom any v court which is subject to the superintendence of the"""'"' R 0 nvend·ra High Court and tried and determined by the latter as Deb Raikot a court of extraordinary original jurisdiction.

It is nnd Other.,. true that unless the parties to the suit are agreed on .11uklwrjea ,l. t 1s pomt, t ere must arise a controversy etween t em which has to be determined by the court. In the present case, a single Judge of the High Court has decided this question in favour of the plaintiff in the suit; but a decision on any and every point in dispute between the parties to a suit is not necessarily a ' judgment'. The order in the present case neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself, nor does it terminate or dispose .of t.he suit on any ground. An order for transfer cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting a plaint or one dismissing a suit on a preliminary ground as has been referred to by Couch C.J. in his observations quoted above. An order directing a plaint to be rejected or taken off the file amounts to a final disposal of the suit so far as the court making the order is concerned.

That suit is completely at an end and it is immaterial that another suit could be filed in the same or another court after removing the defects which led to the order of rejection. On the other hand, an order of transfer under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is, in the first place, not at all an order made by the court in which the suit is pending. In the second place, the order does not put an end to the suit which remains perfectly alive aucl that very suit is to be tried by another court, the proceedings in the latter to be taken only from the stage at which they were left in the court in which the suit was originally filed. Mr. Chatterjee in the course of his arguments pfo,eed considerable reliance upon t,Jrn pronouncement of the Calcutta High Court in Hadjee Ismail v. Hadjee 1lf ahomed ( 1 ), where it was held by C'ouch c .. J. and (I) 13 Beng. L.R. 91. 8UPREME COURT HEPOR'l'8 [i953]

Pontifex J. that an order refus1ng to .rescind leave Asrumati Debi to sue granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent was a ' judgment ' under clause 15 and could be Kumar Rupendra challenged by way of appeal. This decision was Deb Raikot followed by the Bombay High Court in Vaghoji v. an.d Othm. Oamaji( 1); and it is argued by Mr. Chatterjee that there is no difference in principle between an order of Mukherjea J. that description and an order transferring a suit under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee undoubtedly receives support from the judgment of the Madras High Court in Krishna Reddy v. 'l'hanikachala('), where precisely the same line of reasoning was adopted.

In our opinion, this reasoning is not sound and there is an essential difference between an order rescinding or refusing to rescind leave to sue granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one removing a suit from a subordinate court to the High Court under clause 13 of the Letters Patent, and this distinction would be apparent from the observations of Sir Arnold White C.J. in the Madras Full Bench case( 3) mentioned above, to which sufficient attention does not appear to have been paid by the learned Judges of the same court who decided the later case. Referring to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vaghoji v. Oamaji( 1), White C.J. observed as follows: "As regards the Bombay authorities I may refer to Vaghoji v. Oamaji( 1), where it was held that an appeal lay from an order dismissing a Judge's summons to show cause why leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent should not be rescinded and the plaint taken off the file.

Here the adfudication asked for, if made, u;ould have disposed of the suit. So also would an order made under an application to revoke a submission to arbitration. I think such an order is appealable." Leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent constitutes the very foundation of the suit which is instituted on its basis. If such leave is rescinded, the ( ') l.L.R. z9 Born. 2l9. (2) I.L.R. 47 ;\lad. 136. (3) Vide T11ljaram v, Alagappa, 35 Mad. I (F.B.) . I s.c . .R. SUPREME COURT REPOR'L'S li69 suit automatiqally comes to an end and there is no doubt that such an order would Le a judgment. If, 011 . D .

I Asrumatt ebi t e ot er iau , an or er IS ma e 1sm1ssmg ·. ie Judge's summons to show cause why the leave shouldKumarRupendm not be rescinded, the result is, as Sir Lawrence Deb Raikot Jenkins pointed out(1), that a decision on a vital point and Others. adverse to the defendant, which goes to the very root of the suit, becomes final and decisive against him so Mukherjea ·'· far as the court making the order is concerned. This brings the order within the category of a 'judgment' as laid down in the Calcutta cases. 'Ve need not express any final opinion as to the propriety or otherwise of this view. It is enough for our purpose to state that there is a difference between an order refusing to rescind leave granted under clause 12 of the Letters Patent and one under clause 13 directing the removal of a suit from one court to another, 11nd there is no good reason to hold that the principle applicable to one applies to the other also.

The result, therefore, is that, in our opinion, the view taken by the High Court is right and this appeal should fail, and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. · Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose. Agent for the respondent No. 1: Sukimwr Ghose for P. 0. Dutt. BRAHMA PRAKASH SHARMA AND O'L'HEHS 19o3 1lfay 8 THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH. [PATANJALI SASTRI c. J., MUKHERJEA, s. R. DAS, GHULAJVI HASAN and BHAGWA'l'l .JJ.] Oontenipt of Oonrts Act, 1926, s. 3 -Reflection on conduct or character of Judicial OJ)ir-ers - When wnonnts to contempt of court -Contempt proceedings-Guiding principles - Jlc!tters to be considerecl- Relevancy nf S1tj'·rounrlin.q circnni.~tanre.fj-J11risrl.iction to be spa.ringly exercised. (1) 'Tide Vaghoji v. Ca1naji, I.L,H. 29 Born. 149 .