Supreme Court of India
in Re the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the Times of India and in Re Aswini Kumar Ghose and Another v. Arabinda Bose and Another
| Decided | 12-12-1952 |
|---|---|
| Bench | Mehr Chand Mahajan |
| CNR | ESCR010000221953 |
Judgment
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 160 of 1952. Contempt of Court proceedings against the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the "Times of India" (Daily), Bombay and Delhi, for publishing a leading article in their paper of October 30, 1952, entitled " A Disturbing Decision". M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (P. A. Mehta, with him) (amicus curiae). N. C. Chatterjee (Nur-ud-Din Ahmad and A. K, Dutt, with him) for the contemners. 1952. December 12. 'fhe Order of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J.-In its issue of the 30th October, 1952, the "'.I. 1imes of India", a daily newspaper publisb'ed in Bombay and New Delhi, a leading article was published under the beading "A disturbing decision".
The burden of it was that in a singularly oblique and infelicitous manner the Supreme Court bad by a majority decision tolled the knell of the much maligned dual system prevailing in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts by holding that the S.C.R. right to practise in any High Court conferred on advocates of the Supreme Court, made the rules in r H' h C n re The Editor orce m t ose 1g our s reqmrmg a vacates P . 1 appearing on the Original Side to be instructe!l. by p;;~se;e:'~1 attorneys inapplicable to them. The article con- "The Times of eluded with the fol(owing passage:- India". " The fact of the matter appears to be that in the Maha,ian J. higher legal latitudes at New Delhi and elsewh~re, the dual system is regarded as obsolete and anoJhalous.
There is a tell-tale note at the top of the rules framed by the Supreme Court for enrolment of advocates and agents to the effect that the rules were subject to re· vision and the judges had under consideration a proposal for abolishing the dual system. Abolish it by all means if the system has outgrown its usefulness and is found incongruous in the new setting of a democratic Constitution. But to achieve a dubious or even a laudable purpose by straining the law is hardly edifying. Politics and policies have no place in the pure region of the law; and courts.of law would serve the country and the Constitution better by discarding all extraneous considerations and uncompromisingly observing divine detachment which is the glory of law and the guarantee of justice." No objection could have been taken to the article had it merely preached to the courts of law the sermon of divine detachment.
But when it proceeded to attribute improper motives to the judges, it not only transgressed the limits of fair and bona fide criticism but had a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court. The article in qusst~on was thus a gross contempt of court. It is obvious that if an impression is created in the minds of the public that the judges in the highest court in the laud act on extraneous considerations in deciding cases, -the confidence of the whole community in the administration of justice is bound to be undermined and no greater mischief than that can possibly be imagined. It was for this reason that the rule was issued against the respondents. [1953j J95a We are happy to find that the Editor, Printer and I 7 Ed"t the Publisher of the paper in their respective affin re," '°''d "t. fil d.
Printer and av1 s e m t ese procee mgs ave frankly stated p,.blisher of thau they now realize that iu the offending article "The Times of they had exceeded the limits of legitimate criticism in India''. that words or expressions which can be construed as casting reflection upon the court and constituting Mahajan J. contempt had crept into it. They have expressed sincere regret and have tendered unreserved and unqualified apology for this first lapse of theirs. We would like to observe that it is not the practice of this Court to issue such rules except in very grave and serious cases and it is never over-sensitive to public criticism; but when there is danger of grave mischief being done in the matter of administration of justice, the animadversion cannot be ignored·and viewed with placid equanimity. In this matter we are of the same opinion as was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Andre Paiil v. Attorney-General of Trinidad('), where they observed as follows:- " 'fhe path of criticism is a public WJ1Y: the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration ·of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.
Justice is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though outspoken comments of ordinary men." In view of the unconditional apology tendered by the respondents and the undertaking given by them ·to gi.ve wide publicity to_ their regret, we have decided to drop further proceedings and we accept the apology and discharge the rule without any order as to costs. Ritle discharged. Agent for the contenmers: Rajiiider Narain. (!/A.LR. 1936 P.C. 141.