Sirajul Haq Khan & Others v. the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U.P. & Others

Judgment

S.C.R. SIRA~UL HAQ KHAN & OTHERS '!I, THE SUNNI CENTRAL BOARD OF W AQF, U. P. & OTHERS (V'ENXATARAMA ArYAR, GAJENDRAGADXAR itnd A. K. SARKAR JJ.) W a,qf-Suit against Central Board- Noticc-Limitation- United Provinces Muslims Wa,qf Act (U. P. XIII of r936), ss. 5, 53-The Indian Limitation Act (IX of r908), s. r5. The respondent No. I, a Central Board constituted under the United Provinces Muslims Waqf Act, 1936, by a notification under s. 5(1) of the Act dated February 26, 1944• took into management the properties of a Darga Sharif and on October 18, 1'446, the appellants, three of the five members of the Managing Committee of the said Darga Sharif, brought the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration that the Darga properties did not constitute a waqf within the meaning of the Act and that the respondent No. l had no lawful authority to issue the notification and assume management of the said properties, It was urged on behalf of respondent No. I that the sait had not be.en brought within one year as prescribed by s.

5(2) of the Act, and was as such barred by !imitation; and, that since the notice prescribed bys. 53 of the Act had admittedly not been served on the respondent, the suit was incompetent. It "'as found that in an earlier suit, Jjrought with the sanction of the Advocate General, against the Managing Committee for their removal and the framing of a fresh schejlle, ji decree had been passed against the appellants on October i6, 1941, and it directed them not to interfere with the affairs of the Darga as members of the said Committee and to comply with the direction removing them from office. On appeal the said decree was set aside by the Chief Court on March 7, i946. It was contended on behalf "f the appellants that s. 5(2) of the Act had no application and even if it had, the suit was within time by virt11e of the provisions of s. 15 of the Limitation Act. Held, that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants must be negatived.

The expression "any person interested in a waqf" used in s. 5(2) of the United Provinces Muslims Waqf Act, 1936, properly construed, means any person interested in a transaction that i&,held to be waqf by the Commissioner of \Vaqfs appointed under the Act and as such the appellants fell within that category. Where a literal construction defeats the.object.of the statute and makes part of it meaningless, it is legitimate to adopt a liberal coiostruction.that gives a meaning to the entire provision• and makes it effective. Septemb~r zlS. SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS [1959] Chalurb/mf Moha11/al \', Bhicam Chand Choro~a & So11s, (r948) 53 C.\V.N. 410, Jlatlm K11tty v. Varoe K11lt)'. A.l.R. 1950 Mad. S11•J1<l Haq Kha 11 64 and Lal Chand v. Messr1. Bl1sanla Ma! Devi Dayal & Ors., 6- Others (HJ47) 49 P.L.R. 246, referred to. Th s v •. C 1 1 Rules of limitation are arb;trary in nature and in construing u~ui1 lveii ;(1 thcrn it is ~ot pcrmissihlc to import equitable considerations, Uoo; ;

0,:q · and eff<!ct must he gi,·en to the strict grammatical meani'ng of "' the words used. Sectio11 15 of the Limitation Act can be attracterl only \\·here a suit has h::!r.n stayed by au injunction or order a11<l the test would be whether its institution would or would not be an act in contempt of the court's order. ;\'agendra Satlz Dey'" Suresh Chandra Dey, (1932) 34 Born. L. R. rn65, Narayan }ivan[;ouda v. Pu.ttabai, (1944) 47 Born. L.R. I, /icli Maharmii , .. The Collector of Etau,a/z, (1894) l.L.R. 17 All. 198 and Sundaramma v. Abdul J{!radcr, (1932) l.L.R. 56 }lad. 490, relied on. Musommat Basso Kaur v. Lala Dhua Si1'gh, (1888) 15 l..l. 211, held mapplicahle. The order of tl:r court in the earlier suit was neither an injunction nor a11 order of the 11at11rc eontemplatecl bys. 15 of the I.imitation Act and so that section was inapplicable.

Offerings made fro1n tin1e to tin1c by the dc\·otccs Yisiting the Dorga Sharif were by their very nature a~ income of the i)arga. ancl failure to mention them in the notification under s. 5(1) of the Act, did not render the notificotion defective. 'fhc pro\'ision as to 11 1)tice.u!1der s. 53 of the .Act \\·as applicable to suits in respect of acts of the Central Board as well as suits for any relief in respect of the waqf. C1v1r. APPEr.L'.\TE ,JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1955. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated April 22, 1953/24th February, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in F. C. Appe!i.l No. 50 of lll4 i, arising out of the judgment a nil decree dat~d April 15, 1947, of tho Court of the Civil Judge, Bahrnich, in Hegular Suit Xo. 25 of 1946. S. K.. Dar, Ch. Akhtar Hussain and C. P. Lal, for the a ppollan ts . Ch. NiyamatuUah, Onkar Nath Srivastava, .!. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for respondent ~o. l;

1'958. .Sep tern her 16. \vas delivered by The Judgment of the Court S.C.R. GAJENDRAcfADKAR J.-The suit from which this r958 appeal arises relates to a ~hriotie and tomb known as 5 . . 1-H Kh ~' J d Gh . d. iraJU aq an Darga Hazarat Syed Salar 1Yia isoo az1 situate .,_Others, in the village of Singha Parasi and properties appurtenant to it. The plaintiffs who have preferred this The Sunni Central appe!tl are members of the Waqf Committee, 'Darga Board of Waqf, Sharif, Bharaich, and, in their suit, they have claimed a u. P. &- Othm declaration "that the properties in suit were not covered Gajendragadl<a 1 by the provisions of the United Provinces Muslims r Waqfs Act (U. P. XIII of 1936) (hereinafter described as the Act). T_he declaration, the consequential injunction and the two other ·subsidiary reliefs are claimed primarily against respondent l, the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

Two trustees who did not join the appellants in filing the suit are impleaded as pro forma defendants 2 and 3 and they are respondents 2 and 3 before us. It appears that respondent 1 purported to exercise its authority over the properties in suit under the .11rovisions of.the Act and that led to the present suit which was filed on October 18, 1946 (No. 25 of 1946). The appellants' .case is that the properties in suit are outside the operative provisi<lns of the Act and not subfect to the jurisdiction of respondent 1, and so, according to the appellants, respondent 1 has acted illegally and without jurisdiction in assuming' authority over the management of the said properties. That is the basis of the reliefs claimed by the appellants in their plaint. The a:iirellants' claim was resisted by respondent 1 on several grounds. It was alleged that the properties in suit. did form a waqf as defined by the Act 'and were covered by its operative provisions.

It was urged that respondent 1 was a duly constituted Sunni Central Board and it was authorised to exercise supervision over the management of the said waqf. The case J.or respondent 1 also was that the appellants' suit was barred by limitation and was incompetent inasmuch as before the filing of the suit the appellants had not given the statutory notice as"requ!red by s. 53 of the A~t. On these pleadings severa! issues were, framed by the I [1959] learned trial judge; but the principal p11ints in dispute were three : Si,.ajul llaq Kliati .s. othm (l) Arc the properties in Huit go\'erncd by the Act? Thi Sunni Ce,Jlral Board of W "qf, U. f'. 6- Others (2) Is the suit in time ? and (:f) Is the suit maintainable without notice as required by s. 53 of the Act? Gajmd,agadk"' J. The learned trial judge held that tho properties in suit cannot be held t-0 be waqf as defined by the Act.

In his opinion it wa.s not the villa.ge Singha Parasi but its profits free from land revenue that had been granted in trust for the shrine and its khadims; and since the usufruct of the profits was subject t-0 the condition of resumption and since the profits had not been vested in the Almighty, the grant cannot be c01istrued to be a waqf as contemplated by :'lfohammada.n Law. On the question of limitation the learned judge held that s. 5(2) of the Act applied to the suit; but, according to him, though the suit was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by tho saiO. section, it was within time having regard to the provisions of s. 14 of the Limitation Act. The plea raised by respondent l under s.

53 of the Act was partly upheld by the learned trial judge; he took the view that the first three reJief.~ claimed b,v the appellants were barred but the fourth was not. ln the result the learned judge granted a decbration in favour of the appellants to the effect that "Lhc shrine in queotion together with its attached buildings and the Chharawa were not waqf properties wit-hi11 the meaning of the ;\ct." As a consequence, an iujunct-ion was issued restraining respondent l from removing or dissolving th~ committee of management of the appellants and respondents 2 and 3 "uot otherwi8e than provided for under s. 18 of the Act in so far as the management and supervision of those properties a.re concerned in respect of which the appellants were not being gran!ed a· clecree for a declaration sought for by Lhem in view of the absence pf thll notice under s. 53 of the Act". The rest' of the appellants' claim was dismissed. This tlecree was passed on April 15, 1947. S.C.R. Against thisedecree respondent 1 preferred an appeal r958 in the High Court of Judiootu~e at Allahabad (Luck- 5 ..

1- Kh now Bench) and the appellants filed cross objections. "" 7~ %,~;,, an The High Court has reversed the finding of the trial court on the question as to the character of the pro- The Sunni Central perties in suit. According to the High Cout't the Boord of Waqf'. said properties constituted waqf as defined by the Act. u. P. & Others The High Court has also held. th~t the suit filed by ~he Gajendragadkar ]. appellants was barred by lmntatwn and was also mcorn petent in view of the fact that the statutory notice required by s. 53 of the Act had not been given by the appellants prior to its institution. As a result of these findings the appeal preferred by respondent 1 was allowed, the appellants' cross.objections were dismissecl. the decree passed by the trial court was set aside and the appellants' suit dismissed (April 22, 1953). The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court to prefer an appeal to this Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.

That is how this appeal h~ come to this Court. ·Though the dispute between the parties raises only three principal issues, the facts leading to the litigation are somewhat complicated; a~d it is necessary to menti!m them in order to get a clear picture of the background of the present dispute. It is believed that Syed Salar Mahsood Ghazi was a nephew tf Muhammad Ghazni and he met his death at the hands of a lo~al chieftain when he paid a visit to Bahraich. Ou his death his remains were buried in village Singha Parasi by .his followers and subsequently a tomb was constructed. In course of time this tomb became an objeet of pilgrimage and veneration. Urs began to' be held at the shrine every year and it was attended by a large number of devotees who made offerings before the shrine. It is partly from the income of these offerings that the tomb is maintained.

Certain properties. were endowed by the Emperors of Delhi in favour of this tomb and acuretions were made to the said properties by the savings from the income of the endowed properties and the offerings" brotigh_t by the devotees. • SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1959] The tomb was managed by a body of~ersons known Sirajul Haq [(h•n as Khuddams of the .Darga.. This body had been c;. Others looking after the Darga and the performance of ceremonies a.nd other services at the shrine. Whilst The Sunni Centml the management of the Darga. was being thus carried ~oard of Waqf. on, Otidh came to be annexed in 1856 a.nd the proolama- . P. 6- Others t' d b Lo d C fi d II ion rnsue y r annmg con 1scate a private Gaj,,idra~adkar J. propertied and inams in the said State. The properties attached to the Darga. were no exception. Fresh settlements were, however, subsequently made by the Government as a. result of which previously existing rights were revived usually on the same terms a.s before.

This happened in regard to the properties appertaining to the Darga.. lt would appear that in 1859 or 1860 a Sauad h1>d been granted to Fa.kirulla who was the head of the kha.dims in respect of rent-free tenure of the village Singha. Para.si. The grantee was given the right to collect the usufruct of tho village which was to be appropriated towards the maintenance '1f the Darga. The grantee's sou Ina.ya.tulla was apparently ·not satisfied with the limited rights granted under the Sa.natl and so he brought an action, Suit No. I of 1865, claiming proprietary rights in the said propertiL"S. Inayatulla's suit was substantially dismissed on November ll, 1870, by the Settlement Officer. It was held that the proprietary rights of the Government in respect of the properties had been alienated for ever in favour of the charity and so the properties were declared to vest in the endowment. Inayatulla's right to manage the said properties under the term~ of the gritnt was, however, recognized.

Soon aft9r this decision, it was brought to the notice of the Chief Commi8oioner in 1872 that the khadims at the Darga were mismanaging the properties of the Darga and were not properly maintaining the Darga itself. On recci> - ing this complaint a committee of mussalmans was appointed to examine tho affairs of the Darga 'lrnd t-0 make a report. The committee submitted its report on. February 20,• 1877, and ma.de recommendations for the imptovement of the management of the Darga. • and its properties. According to the t:ommitt~e. it was S.C.R. necessary to ajpoint a jury of five persons· including x95& two khadims to manage th~ Da.rga and its properties. Sfrajul Haq Khan Meanwhile some of the land!l appurtenant to the °"Others Darga h11d been sold and offerings made by the devotees as well as other properties had become the The Sunni Central subjeat-matter of attachment. In the interest of the Board 0! Waff. d 'd d t t k U. P. 11"

Others arga, overnmen t en ec1 e o a e possess10n o the properties under the provisions of Pensions ActGajendragadkar J. (XXIII of 1873.) This decision was reached after the Government had considered the report made by the Deputy Commissioner on August 31, 1878. The result of declaring that the properties were governed by the provisions of the Pensions Act was to free the properties from the mortgages created by the khadims. The m'inagement of the Darga and its properties by the Government continued until 1902. During this period Inayatulla attempted to assert his rights once more by instituting a suit in the civil court in 1892. In this suit Inayatullah and two others who hasJ joined him claimed possession of the • Dri.rga together with the buildings a ppurten11nt thereto and village Singha Parasi. Their claim was decreed by the trial court; but on appeal the said decree was set aside on July 20, 1897.

The appellate court of the Judicial Commissioner held that Inayatulla's allegation that the proprietary interest in the propocties vested in him was not justified. Even so, the appellate court observed that it was not proper or competent for the Government to interfere in the management of the waqf and its properties; the Dari,ga was a religious establishrrtent within the meaning of Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863) and the assumption of the management of the Darga and its properties was unauthorised and improper. As a result of these observations the Legal Remembrancer to the Government of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh filed a suit, No. 9 of 1902, under s. 539 ('present s. 92) of the Code of Civil Procedure. This suit ended in a decree on December 3, 1902. By the decree the properties in suit were dec;lared " to vest in the trustees when appointed ".

The decree further pr"vided for a scheme for the management of • I SUPHEME COURT REPORTS (1959) r958 tho .Dnrga and its properties. The scheme thus . ,-H •. h framed came int<> operalion and the trustees appoint- ,,o;u aq n a11 d e. Othm un er it egan to' manage t e arga and its properties. The •cheme appears to have worked The Sunni C"'trarnmoothlv until l!lil4. In 1934 Ashraf Ali and others Board 0 1 Woqf. claime<i°(Snit. N'o. I of 1934) that llll injunction should u. P. & Oihm he issued rest-raining the defendants from taking part Gaj,.d•agadk°' J. in the management of the affairs of the Darga. The plaintitfa also prayed that the defendants should bo prohibited from spending monies belonging to the waqf on fri,·olous litigations due to party feelings. On ~lay 7, 1934, tho learned District Judge expresse<l his regret that animosity and party feelings should find their way in the management of a trust and issued an order directing t.he defendant committee that.

JlO money out of the Darga funds should be spent either in the litigation pending before him, or in any other litigation, without the sanction of the court. }'or nearly six years after the date of this order the Darga and its properties appear t-0 li,ave been free from any litigation. This peace was, however, aga'in • disturbed in 1940 when a suit was filed (No. l of 1940) with the sanction of the Advocate-General by five plaintiffs against tho nmna-ging committee and its tru5tees for their removal and for tho framing of a fresh schcJ11c. • On October 16, 1941, the Auit was decreed. The managing committee and the trustees, however, challenged the said decree by preferring an appeal to the Chief Court. Their appeal succeeded and on ~larch 7, 1946, the decree under appeal w11.s set aside, though a few minor amondmonts were made in 'tho original scheme of management. Whilst this litigation was pending between the parties, the United Provinces llluslim Waqfa Act (U.P. XIII of 1936) was passed in 1936 for better governance, administration and supervision of tho specified muslim waqfa in U. P. ln pursuance of the pr~visions of the Act, respondent l was constituted and, under s.

5(1), it issued the notification on :February 26, 1944, d~claring ~ho jll"Operties in suit to be a Sunni Waqf under the Act-. After this notification was issued, res- • pondent l called upon the committeEl'of mamtgement of S.C.R. 1'295 the waqf to submit its annual budget for a.pproval and i958 to get its accounts audited.by· jts auditors. Respondents' . ,-H ··xh i1-a1u~ aq an I also purported to levy the usual contnbut1ons & others against the waqf under s. 54 of the Act. The members of the committee of management and the trustees The Sunni CenlYal with the exception of two persons held that the pro- Board 01 Waqf, perties in suit did not constitute a waqf within the u. P. <!'>· Others meaning of the Act and that respondent 1 had no Ga ·sna:;;g-;dkai 1. authority or jurisdiction to supervise the management 1 of the said properties. That is how the appellants came to institute the present suit on October 18, 1946, against respondent 1.

That in brief is the background of the present dispute. For the appellants Mr. Dar has raised three points l:vifore us. He contends that the High Court was in error in coming to the. conclusion that the properties in suit constituted a waqf over which respondent I can exercise its authority or jurisdiction and he argues that it was erroneous to have held that the appellants' svit was barred by s. 5(2) and was incompetent under s. 53 of the Act. Mr. Dar has fairly conceded that if the finding of the High Court on the question of limitation or on the question of the bar pleaded under s. 53 was upheld, it would be unnecessary to consider the merits of his argument about the character of the properties in suit .• SiJJ.ce we have reached the conclusion that the High Court was right in holding that the suit was barred under s. 5(2) and was also incompetent under s.

53 of the Act, we do not propose to decide the question as to whether the properties in dispute are waqf within the meaning of the. Act. The plea of limitation under s. 5(2) as well as the plea of the bar under s. 53 are in substance preliminary objections to the maintainability or competence of the suit and we propose to deal with these objections on the basis that the properties in dispute are outside the purview of the Act as alleged by the appellants. Before dealing with the qnestion of limitation, it would be useful to refer to the re]e..,.ant. part of, the scheme of the Act. Section 4 of the Act pr.,vides for the sur1ey of W'aqfs to be made by the Commissioner' (1959] z958 of Waqfs appointi>d under sub-s. (l·) .pf s. 4. Suhs. . 1-1, section (3) requires the <:ommis.~ioner to ascertain and lrOJU aq nan d S , .s.

Uthe., etermme 111ter a 1a tire num er o b1a and Sunni Waqfs in the district, their nature, the gross income The su .. ni c,.,,.., of the properties comprised in them as well as the Board 0! w .. qf. expenies incurred in the realisa1.ion of the incom~ and u. l'. ''°Others the pay of the mntawa.lli. The Commissioner has also G<1jcndra~adkar 1 . to ascert<>in and determine whether the waqf in question is one of those exempted from the provisions of the Aet under s. 2. The result. of this enquiry has to be indicated by the Commissioner in his report to the State Govt>rnmcut under sub-s. (5). Section 6 deals with the establishment of two separate Boards to be called tbe Shia Central Board and the Sunni Central Board of \V aqfs. Section 18 defines the functions ~f the Central Boards and confers on them general powers of superintendence ornr the management of the waqfs under their jurisdiction.

After the Boa.rds are constituted a copy of the Commissioner's report received by the State Government is forwarded to them 1md, under s. 5, sub-s. (I}, each Central BoarJ is required a8 soon as possible to notify in the official gazette the waqfs rela.ting to the particular sect to which, according to the said report, the' provisions of the Act appl)'. It is after the prescribed notification is issued by the Hoard t.hat. i~ can proceed to exercise its powers under s. 18 in respect of the waqfs thus notified. Jt iH the notification issuer! hy respondent under s. 5 (1) and the s11Lse411ent steps taken by it in exercise of its authority that lmve led tn the pre8eut snit. l\Ir. Dar contends that the provisions of s. '5 (2) do not 'apply t<> t.he present suit, and so the argpment that t.hc suit is barred bv limitation under tho said seetion cannot succeed. it is clear that the notification was issued on Februarv 26, 1944, and the suit has been filed on October 18, 1 U46.

Thus there cu.11 bo no doubt that if the one yea.r's limitation prescribed by A. 5 (2) applies to tho present suit it would he barred hy time unless the appellants are able to invoke the assi~tancc of s. H> of tho Limitation Act. But, according to :11r. Dar, t.he present suit is outside s. 5 (2) S.C.R. altogether an~ so there is no question of invoking the z958 shorter period of limitati011 p~scribed by it. . 1 H Kh h h. I ,,.,.a;u aq an Let us then proceed to constder w et er t 1e present & Othm suit falls within the mischief of s. 5 (2) or not. Section 5 (2) provides that: The Sunni Central 'l The mutawalli of a waqf or any person interest- Board of Waqf. ed in a waqf or a Central Board may bring a suit in a u.

P.~thers civil court of comp~tent jurisdiction for a ~ec!aration Gajendragadkar 1. that any transact10n held by the Commrns10ner of waqfs to be a waqf is not a waqf, or any transaction held or assumed by him not to be a waqf is a waqf, or. that a waqf held by him to pertain to a particular sect does not belong to that sect, or that any waqfreported by such Commissioner as being subject to the provisipns of this Act is exempted under section 2, or that any waqf held by him to be so exempted is subject to this Act." The proviso to this section prescribes the period of one year's limitation to a suit by a mutawalli or a person interested in, the waqf. Sub-section (4) of s. 5 lays dbwn that the Commissioner of the waqfs shall not be made a defendant to any suit under sub-s. (2) and no suit shall be instituted against him for anything done by him in good faith under cc1lour of this Act, The appellants' argument is that before s.

5 (2) can be applied to their suit it must be shown that the suit is filed either by a mutawalli of a waqf or any person interested in the waqf. The appellants are neither the mutawa!lis of the waqf nor are they persons interested in the waqf. Their case is that the properties in snit do not coi'J.stitute a waqf under the Act but are held by them as proprietors, and that the notification issned by respondent 1 and the authority purported to be exercised by it in respect of the ·said properties are wholly void. How can the appellants who claim a declaration and injunction against respondent l on these allegations be said to be persons interested in the waqf, asks Mr. Dar. The word ' waqf' as used in this sub-section must be given the meaning attached to it by the definition in s. 3 (1) of the Aat and since t)le appellants totally deny the existence of such a waqf they canrtot be said to be interested in the' waqf '.

The • [1959] r958 argument thu~ presented appears pti•m facie to be 1 attractive and plausible; btl.t on a close examination of Siraj1'1l/aaI\.1'111 (2 . Id & 011,;,, s. n ) 1t won appea\· clear that the words "any person interested in a wa<1f" c'rnnot be construed in TheS"""' Con1rn1their strict literal meaning. If the said words ;1re given Hoard~! Waqf. their f<t.rict literal me;111ing, suits for a declara.tioa that u. P. "' 01•"' any transaction hcdd by the Commissioner to he a waqf Gaj,,,dragadkar /.is not a waqf can ne1·er be flied by a mutawall1 of a waqf or a µerson interested in a waqf. The scheme of this sub-section is clear. When the Cent.ral Board assumes jurisdict.ion over any waqf un<ler the Act it proceeds to do so 011 the decision of three points by the Commissioner of \Vaqfa. lt assumes that the prupcrty is a waqf, that it is either a Sunni or ;t Shia waqf, and t.hat it is not a waqf which fall.> within the exceptioljs mentioned ins.

2. ft is in respect of each one of these deeisions that a suit is contemplated hy s. 5, sub-8. (2). lf the decision is that the property is not a wa<1f or that it is a waqf falling within the exceptions mi,ntinned by s. 2, the Centml Board may hav~ occasion to bring a suit. Similarly if the decision i8 that. the wacJf i• Sltia and uot Sunni, 11 Sunni Central Bimrd may hiH"e occasion to bring a suit anti ,·ice ,·ers;1. Likewise the deci8ion that the pro·pcrty i.> a waqf may be chailcnged by a person who disputes the correctness of the said decisio1•. :fhe decision that a property does not fall within the exceptions mentioned bys. 2 may also be challenged by a person who claims that the waqf attracts the pro;·isions of s. 2. If that; be the nature of the scheme of suits contemplated bys.

5 (2) it would be difficult to imagino how the mutawalli of ii. wa,1f or an.'' person interested in 11 waqf can ever s111; for a declarntion that the trnnsaction held by the Commitisioner of the waqfs 1.0 be a waqf i;; not",1 waqf. That is why we thi11k that the literal construction of the expression " any person interested in ti waqf" would render a part. of the sub-section wholly mca11ingless and ineffective.

The legi:ilature has dcfinit<>ly contempl:itod that tho decision of the Commissioner of the Waqfa thl\t a partK,ula1• transaction is a waqf C(lll lie challenged by persons who do not accept the correctness of the 0 said decision, and it is this class of•persona\vho are S.C.R. obviously int•nded to be covered by the words "any '958 person interested in a waqf ".• It is well-settled that .Sirajul Haq Khan in construing the provisions ofa statute courts should & Others be slow to adopt a construction which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective; an The Sunni Cenlral attempt must always be made so to reconcik the Board 0! Woqf. relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended u. P.!:.!!thers by the statute. In our opinion, on a reading of the Gajendmgadkar. J .. provisions of the relevant sub-section as a whole there can be no doubt that the expression "any person interested in a waqf" must mean "any person interested in what is held to be a waqf ".

It is only persons who are interested in a transaction which is held to be a waqf who would sue for a declaration that the de,pision of the Commissioner of the Waqfs in that behalf is wrong, and that the transaction in fact is not a waqf under the Act. We must accordingly hold that the relevant clause on which Mr. Dar has placed his argument in repelling the application of s. 5 (2) to tho present suit Q:rnst not be strictly or literally con- • strued, and that it should be taken to mean any person interested in a transaction which is held to be a waqf. On this construction the appellants are ol:Tviously interested in the suit properties which are notified to be waqf by the notification issued by respondent 1, and so the suit instituted by i!hem would be governed by s. 5, sub-s. (2) and as such it would be barred by time unless it is saved under s. 15 of the· Limitation Act. In this ,connection, it may be relevant to refer to the provisions of s.

33 of the Indian Arbitration Act (X of 1940). This section provides that any party 'to an arbitration agreement desiring to challenge the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement shall apply to the court and the court shall decide the question on affidavits. It would be noticed that the expressj.on " any party to an arbitration agreement " used in the section poses a similar problem of construction. The party applying under s. 33 may dispute the very existence of the agreement> and yet the appHcant is descri~ed by the section as a party to the • SUPRE:\IE COURT REPORTS [1959) agreement.. If the expression " any ~awty to an arbis . . 1 H Kh tration agreement" is litcr1dlv construed it would bo HO)lf aq an d'ffi .,_ oihm 1 cult to conceive 01 a case where the existence of an agreement can be impeached by a proceeding Th• s"""i c,,,,,.1 under s. 33. The material clause must therefore be B0••d 0! Waqf, read fiberally and not literally or strictlv. It mtJst be u. P. 6 oihm taken to mean a person who "is alleged to be a party to G•i••d••gadkar J. an arbitration agreement; in other words, the clause must be construed to cover cases of persons who are alleged to be a party to an arbitration agreement but who do not admit the said allegation and want to challenge the existence of the alleged agreement itself.

This liberal construction has been put upon the clause in several judicial decisions: Chaturbhuj MoharUo.l v. Bhicam Chand Chororia & Sons (l); Mathu Kutty v. Varoe KuUy ('); Lal Chand v . . Messrs. Basanta Mal Devi Dayal & Ors.('). \Ve may also point out incidentally that in dealing with an application made under s. 34 of the Arbitration Act, it is incumbent upon the court to decide first of all.whether there is a binding agreement for arbitration between the parties ; in other words, the allegation by one party against another that tliere is a valid agreement of reference between them does not preclude the latrer party from disputing the existence of the said agreement in pr6cee"dings taken under s. 34.

These decisions illustrate the principle that where the literal meaning of the words used in a statut-0ry provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it mcaningloss and ineffective, it is legitimate .and even necessary t-0 adopt the rulo of liberal construction so as' to give meaning to all parts of tho provisio.Q and to make the whole of it effective and operative. Before we pa.rt with this part of the appellants' case it is necessary to point out that the argument urged by )fr. Dar on the construction of s. 5(2) is really inconsistent with the appellants' pleas. in the trial court. The material allegations in the plaint clearly amount to an admission that the Darga. and it~ appqrtenant" properties constitute a waqf under the (1) (1948) 53 C.W.X. 410. (z) .A.I.R. 195 .. Mad. 64 . (3) (1947) 49 P.L.R. 246 . S.C.R. Act; but it is ilrged that they do not attract its pro- '958 visions for the reason that.the. waqf in question falls 5 . .

1 H Kh within the class of exemptions 'lmumerated in s. 2 (ii)( a) "" 1 ~ 01Z;,s an and (c) of the Act. "The Darga waqf ",says the plaint in para. 11, "is of such a nature as makes it an excep- The Sunni Central tion from the purview of the Act as provided ey s. 2 Board of Waqf. of the Act ". Indeed, consistently with this part of u. P. & Others the appellants' case, the plaint expressly admits, thatGajendragadkar 1. the cause of action for the suit accrued on ]ebruary 26, 1944, and purports to bring the suit within time by relying on ss. 14, 15, 18 and 29 of the Limita· tion Act.

In their replication filed by the plaintiffs an attempt was made to explain away the admissions contained in the plaint by alleging that "if ever in apy paper or document the word 'waqf' had been used as a routine or hurriedly then it is vague and of no specific meaning and its meaning or connotation is only trust or amanat ".;_and yet, in the statement of the case by the appellants' counsel, we find an express admission th:i.t the subject-matter of the suit is covered oy the exemptions of s. 2, els. (ii) (a) and (ii) (c). Thus, on the pleadings there can be no doubt that the appellants' case was that the Darga and its properties no croubt constituted a waqf um!er the Act, but they did not fall within the purview of the Act because they belong to the category of waqfs which 11re.excepted by s. 2(ii) (a) and (c). The argument based on the application of s.

2 has not been raised before us and so on a consideration of the pleadings of the appellants it would be open to respondent l to contend that the a ppellant"s are admittedly interested in the waqf and their suit falls within the mischief of s. 5 even if ·the words " any person interested in a waqf" are literally and strictly construed. The next question which calls for our decision is whether the appellants' suit is saved by virtue of the provisions of s. 15 of the Limitation Act. That is the only provision on which reliance was placed before us by Mr. Dar on behalf of the appellants.

Section 15 provides for " the exclusion of time d,uring which proceedings are suspended " and it lays down that " in computing the pc;riod of limitation ~rescribed for any• [1959] suit or application for the execution •oi a decree, the Sira1,.1 Haq Kha" institution or execution.of which has been stayed by ,, oo.,,, an injunctiou or order,' the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued 1 he su.,., c,.,,.,., or made and the day on which it was withdrawn, 0 "'/ nf Woqf. shall be excluded". It is plain that, for excluding the · ·~'h"' time under this section, it must be shown that the GaJ•"d'-c•dkar 1. institution of the suit in question had been stayed by an injunction or order; in other words, the section requires an order or an injunction which stays the institution of the suit. And so in cases falling under s. 15, the party instituting the suit would by such institution be in contempt of court.

If an express order or injunction is produced by a party that clearly meets the requirements of s. 15. Whether the requir,,. ments of s. 15 would be satisfied by the production of an order or injunction which by necessary implication stays the institution of the suit is open to argument. \Ve arc, however, prepared to assume in the present case thats. 15 would apply even to cas"s where the institution of a suit is stayed by necessary implication of the order passed or injunction issued in the previous litigatiou. But, in our opinion, there would be no justification for cxtendii1g the application of s. 15 an the ground that the institution of the subsequent suit would be ineon3istent with tho spirit or substance of the order passed in the previous litigation.

It is true that rules of limitation are to some extent arbitrary and :may frequently lead to hardship; bnt there can be no doubt that, in construing provisions of limitation, equitable considerations are immaterial and irrelevant, and in applying them effect must be given to th\' strict grammatical meaning of the words used by them: Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (1). In considering the effect of the provisions contained in s. 15, it would be useful to refer to the deci~ion of the Privy Council in Namyan Jivangouda v. futtabai (').. This case was an offshoot of the well-known case of Bhimabai v. Gurunathgouda (3). It is apparent tha>t the ~isputc between Narayan and Gurunathgouda (l) (1932) 34 Born. L.R. 1o65. (2) (1944) 47 Bom .• L.R. l. (3) (1932) 35 Bom. L. R. 200 P.C . S.C.R. ·ran through 41. ·Jong and protracted course and it '958 reached the Privy Council twice. The decision of the 5 . . 1 H Kh Privy.

Council in Bhimabai's' case(') upholding the ""J~.ot;;,, an validity of N arayan's adoption no doubt led to a radical change in the accepted and current view about the The Sunni Central Hindu widow's power to adopt in the State of Bombay, Board of Waqf. but this decision was of poor consolation to Narayan u .. P. & Others because the judgment of the Privy Council in NarayanGajendra$ad!wr 1, Jivangouda's case (') shows that Narayan's subsequent suit to recover possession of the properties ·in his adoptive family was dismissed as barred by tii:ne.' The . dispute was between Narayan and his adoptive mother Bhimabai on the one hand and Gurunathgouda on the other. On November 25, 1920, Gurunathgouda had sqed Bhimabai and Narayan for a deClaration that he was in possession of the lands and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession.

On the same day when the suit was filed, an interim injunction was issued against the defendants aQd it was confirmed when the suit was • d'ecreed in favour of Gurunathgonda .. By this injunction the defendants were ordered " not to tiike the crops from the fields in suit, not to interfere with the plaintiff's wahiwat to the saicI lands, not to take rent. notes from the tenants and not to obstruct the plaintiff from taking the crops raised by him or.from taking monies from his . tenants" .. Two important issues which arose for decision in the suit were whether :Narlj.yan had been duly adopted by Bhimabai in fact and whether Bhimabai was competent to make the adoption. 'These issues were answered against Narayan by theprial court. Bhimabai and Narayanappealed_to the Bombay High Court, but their appeal failed and was dismissed: Bhimabai v. Gur~nathgouda ('). There was a _further appeal by the said parties to the Privy Council.

The Privy Council held that the adoption of Narayan was valid and so the appeal was allowed and Gurunathgouda's suit was dismissed with costs throughout. In the result the injunction granted by the courts below was dissolved on N o-vemJ.ier 4, 1932. On (r.) (1932) 35 Born. L. R. 200 P. C. (2) (1944) 47 Bom: 'L.R. I. ~3) (1928) 30 Bom. L. R. 859. [1959] r958 Xovember 25, 1932, Narayan and Bh~bai filed their S . . ,- 11 Kh suit to recover possesiion, of the properties from 1ta;u aq an G Th c;. 011.,,. urunat gou a. ey l;oug t to rmg t e smt w1thm time inter alia. on the ground that the time taken up The su,.ni Cen1,,.1 in litigating the former suit or at least thn period Hoard of Waqf. com1ll!'lwing from the grant of temporary injunction u. P. &- Others on February 25, 1920 to X ovember 4, 1932, when the Gaiendragad«., J. injunction was dissolved by the Privy Council, should be excluded under s. 15 of the Limitation Act.

This plea was rejected by the trial court and on appeal tho same view was taken by the Bombay High Court. Rangnokar J. who delivered the principal judgment exhaustively considered the relevant judicial decisions bearing on the question about the construction of s. 15 and held that the injunction issued against :--;ara.y~n and Bhimabai in Gurunathgouda's suit did not help to attracts. 15 to the suit filed by them in 1932: Narayan v. Gurunathgouda ('). The matter was then taken to the Privy Council by the plaintiffs; but the Privy Council confirmed the view taken by thi: High Court of Bombay and dismissed tho appeal: Narayan v. • Puttabai (').

In dealing with the aupellant;' argumcn t that the injunction in the prior suit had been issued in wide terms and in substance it precluded the plaintiffs from filing their S'Uit; their Lordships observed that there was nothing in the injunction or in the decree to support their case that they were prevented from institut. ing a suit for possession in 1920 or at any time before the expiry of the period of limitation. I~ appears from the judgment that Sir Thomiis Strangman strongly contended before the Privy Council tha.t since the title of the contending parties was involved in tho suit, it would have been quite futile to institute a suit for possession. This argument was repelled by the Privy Council with the observation that " we are unable to appreciu,te this point, for the institutiOJl of a suit. can never be said to be futile if it would thereby prevent the running of limitation". There can be lit~e doubt· that:', if, on considerations of equity the application of s.

15 could be extended, this was pre. \l) (1938) 40 !lo!"' L.,R. u31. (2) (l9H) 17 Dom. L. R. l . S.C.R. eminently a Cise for such extended application of the r95B said provision; and yet tije Rrivy Council construed 5 . . 1 H Kh ira;u aq an the material words used in s. 1'5 in t elf strwt gram- .,, Others matical meaning and held that no order or injunction as required by s. 15 had been issued in the earlier The Sunni Central litigation. We would like to add that, in dealing with Board 01 Waqf. this point, their Lordships did not think it necessary u. P.!:_oihers to consider whether the prohibition required by s. 15 Gajendragodkar ]. must be express or can even be implied. There is another decision of the Privy Council to which reference may be made. In Beti Maharani v. The Collector of Etawah (1), their Lordships were dealing with a case where attachment before judgment under s.

485 of the Code of Civil Procedure had been issued by the court at the instance of a third party prohibiting the creditor from recovering and the debtor from paying the debt in question. This order of attachment was held not to be an order staying the institution of a subsequent suit by the creditor under. s, 15 of Limi\ation Act of 1877. "There would be no • violation of it" (said order), observed Lord Hobhouse, " until the restrained creditor came to receive his debt from the restrained debtor. And the institution of a suit might for more than oiie reason be a very proper proceeding on the part of the restrained creditor, as for example in this case, to a void the ear by time, though it might also be prudent to let the court which had issued the order know what he was about". In Sundaramma v. Abdul Khader (') the Madras High Court, wpile dealing withs.

15 of the Limitation Act, has held that no equitable grounds for the suspension of the .ca use of action can be added to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. It is true that in Musammat Basso Kaur v. Lala Dhua Singh (') their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that it would be an inconvenient state of th,. law if it were found necessary for" a man to institute a perfectly vain litigation under peril of losing his property if he does not ; but this observation must be read in the context of-factswith wb.ich (1) (18\ljl) I.L.R. 17, All. 198. 2rn, 2rr. (2) (1932) I.L.R. s6 Mad. 490. • (3) (1888) 15 I.A. 2u. [1959] 7 958 the Privy Council was dealing in thi~ •ase. The res· . 1- 11 pondent who was a deb~or Qf the appellant had agreed ""J" 1'"' < '"" ft. h d b 6 . 0,,,., to con'l'ey ccrtam prope,·ty to um settmg o against part of the price.

Xo money was paid by the Th• s ... ,,,. c'"''"' respondent and disputes arose as to the other terms fiO•,d 0i w .. qf. of thc.agre1>ment. The respondent Rl!Pd to cnfor~e the u. 1'· ·" 01""' terms of the said agreemeut but did not succeed. Gajuid·a~odko, 1 A~terward~ when. he s1~c<l for the debt he was met · 1nth tho pleii of hm1tat10n. The Pn1·y Council held tlmt the decree dismissing the respondent's suit was the starting point of limitatiou. The ~aid decree imposed on the respondent a fresh obligation to pay his debtR under R. 65 of the l ndian Contract Act. It was also held alternatively that the said decree imported within the meaning of Art. 97 of Limitation Act of 1877.a failure of the consideratiou which entitled him to retain it. Thus it is clear that the Privy Council was dealing with the appellants' rights to sue which had accrued to him on the dismissal of his action lo enforce the terms of the agreement.

It i~ in reference to this right that the Privy Council made the obscrva·. tions t-0 which we have already referred. These obscrYations are clearly obiter and they cannot, in our opinion, be of any nssislal1ce in interpreting the word8 in s. 15. It is in the light of this !~gal posit.iou thM we must examine the appellants'· case that the iustitution of the present suit had been stayed by an injunction or order issued against. them in the earlier litigation of 1940. We have alreadv uoticed that Civil Suit :No. l of 1!)40 had beeu instituted against the ajipellants with the sanction of the Advocate-General for their !'CinOYal a!lll for the Settlement Of a fresh Scheme. The appellants were ordered to be removed by the learned trial judge Oil October Hi, 1941; but Oil appeal the decree of the triiil court was set aside on .March 7, 1946. It is' the period between October 16, 1941, and March 7, !D46, that is sought to be excluded b'Y the 1Lppellants uncler s. 15 of the Limitation Act. J\Ir.

Var conj.emlH that thi> orcler passed by the trial judge on October Hi, 1941, lli!Lde it impossible for the appellants to file the present suit until the final• decisiotl of the S.C.R. appeal. By ~i§ order the appellants were told that r958 they should not in any way interfere with the affairs f h D Sh ·r "tt d Sfrajul Haq Khan o t e arga an as mem ers o t e comm1 ee an &- Oth should comply with the decree of the court by which v."' they were removed from the office. It is obvious that The Suuni Central this C!rder cannot be construed as an order or "an in- Board of Waqf, junction staying the institution of the present suit. In u. P. '"'Others fact the present suit is t.he result of the notification G . d-dk 1 a;en raga ar issued by respondent 1 on :February 26, 1944, and the subsequent steps taken by it in the purported exercise of its authority under the Act. The cause of action for the suit has thus arisen subsequent to the making of the order on which Mr. Dar relies; and on the plain construction of the order it is impossible to hold that it.is an order which can attract the application of s.

15 of the Limitation Act. We have already held that the relevant words used in s. 15 must be strictly construed without any consideration of equity, and so construed, we have no doubt that the.order on which Mr. Dar has placed reliance before us is wholly outsides. 15 of the Limitation Act. We would, however, like to add that this order did not even in substance create any difficulty against the institution of .the present suit. The claim made by the appellants in the present suit that the properties in suit do not constitute a waqf and the declaration and· injunction for which they have prayed do not infringe the earlier order even indirectly or remotely. We must accordingly hold that the High Court was right in taking the view that s. 15 did not apply to the present suit and that it was therefore filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by s. 5(2) of the Act. That takes us to the consideration of the next preliminary objection against the competence of the suit under s.

53 of the Act. Sectjon 53 provides that "no suit shall be instituted against a Central Board in resp'1ct of any act purporting to be done by such Central Board under colour of this Act or for any relief in respect of any waqf until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing "has be~1 delivered to the Se.cretary, or left at the office of such , [1959] Central Board, st.a.ting the ca.use of aMion, ·the name, description and place of• residence of the plaintiff and s""J"I Haq lihan I 1. f I . I h .._ Oth t lC re 1c w uc l c1a1ms; an the plamt shall v."' contain a statemcn1, that such notice has been so The 5,,.,.; Cent•al delivered or left". This Hection is similar to s. 80 Boa•d of Waqf. of the" Ci l"il Procedure Corle. It is conceded by l\In Dar U. /'. '"'Orhm that if s. li3 applies to the present suit the decision . d -d' . J of the High Court cannot be successfully challenged a;e,1 ragu 11ar because the notice reqmrcd by s.

53 has not been given by the appellants before the institution of the present suit. His argument, however, is that the notification issued by respondent 1 on February 26, 1944, did not refer t-0 the Darga and offerings made by the devotees before the Darga. and he contends that tho present suit in respect of these properties is 011.tside the provisions of s. 53 and cannot be held to be barred on the ground that the requisite notice httd not been given by the appellants. We are not impressed by this argument. Column l of the notification in question sets out the name of tho creat(\l' of the wa9f a.s Shahan-e-Mugha.Jia and the name of the waqf a.s • Syed Salar :lfahsood Ghazi. In col. 2 the name of the mutawalli is mentioned while col. 3 describes the properties attached t-0 the waqf. The tomb of Syed Sa Jar i\fahsood Ghazi which is the object of charity in the preMnt case i8 expressly mentioned in col.

1 and so it is futile to suggest that the tomb or Darga had not been.notified as a waqf by respondent l under s. 5(1). In regard to the offerings we do not sec how offerings could have been mentioned in the notification. They are made from time t{) time by the devotees who visit the Darga and by their very. nature they constitute the income of the Darga. It is unreasonable to assume that offerings which would be made from year t-0 year by the devotees should be specified ip the notification issued under s. 5(1). We must, therefore, reject the argument that any .of the suit properties have not been duly notified by respondent l under s. 5(1) of the Act. If t.hat be so, it was incumbent· upofl the appellants to have given tho • requisite notice under s. 53 before instituting the present suit. The requirement as to "notice applies to S.C.R. suits against :e Central Board in respect of their acts r9ss as well as to suits for any.relief in respect of any 5 .. ,-H Kh l ira;u~ aq an .waqf.

It 1s not demed that 'the present smt wou d & Others attract the provisions of s. 53 if the argument that the Darga and the offerings are not notified is rejected. The Sunni Central The rnsult is that the suit is not maintainabl~ as a Board 01 Waqf, result of the appellant's failure to comply with the u. P. & Others requirements of s. 53. We would accordingly con- Gajendragadkar J. firm the finding of the High Court that the appellaints' suit is barred by time under s. 5(2) and is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the appellants have not given the requisite notice under s. 53 of the Act. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed w,i.th costs. Appeal dismissed .. RADHA SUNDAR DUTTA v . • MOHD. JAHADUR RAHIM AND OTHERS (VENKATARAMA AIY.AR, G.AJENDRAGADK.AR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)

Grant-Construction-Patni settlement-Chaukidari Chakaran lands-Resumption and transfer to Zamindar-Grant of the lands by the Zaminditr on Patni to person who held the village in Patni settlement-Distinct Patni-Sale of lands for arrears of revenue-V.ali- . dity-Bmgal Patni Taluks Regulation, I8I9 (Ben. Regulation VIII. of I8I9), ss. 8, I4-Village Chaukidari Act, I870 (Ben. VI of I870~, SS. 48, 50, 5I. The lands in question are situate in lot Ahiyapur which is one of the viJlages forming part of the permaneptly settled estate of Burdwan and had been set apart as Chaukidari Chakar~n lands to be held by the Chaukidars for rendering service in the village as watchmen. At the time of the permanent settlement the income fro1n these lands was not taken into account in fixing the jama payable on the estate. Some time before the enactment of the Bengal Patni Taluks ~egulation,, 1819, the e~tire village of Ahiyapur was _granted by the then September L8.