State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar

Judgment

S.C.R. since affirmed.by the House of Lords and they quoted r958 with approval the followtng 'passage from the judg- T Offi ment of Romer L. J., at p. 13-of the earlier report: a es " The short answer is that a Court of Equity Mukundlal Sarnf cannot say that it is equitable to compel a person to pay •moneys in respect of a transaction whitih as Bhagwati J. against that person the Legislature has declared to be void." That ratio was applied by their Lordships to the . facts of the case before them and the contention was negatived. Merely because the State of U. P. had not retained the monies paid by the respondent but had spent them a way in the ordinary course of the business of the State would not make any difference to the µpsition and under the plain terms of s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act the respondent would be entitled to recover back the monies paid by it to the State of U. P. under mistake of law.

The result, therefore; is that none of the contentions vrged before .us on behalf of the appellants in regard • to the non-applicability of s. 72 of the Indian Contract Act to the facts of the present case avail them and the 'appeal is accordingl.Y, dismissed with costs. · Appeal dismissed. 8TATE OF MADHYA PRADESH REV ASHANKAR (.JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR JJ.) Contempt of Court-Ouster of High Court's jurisdiction-Test September 24. -Contempt of Courts Act, I952 (XXXII of I952), s. "J(2)-Indian Penal Cwie, I86o (XLV of I86o), s. 228. The respondent, who h~d filed a complaint in respect of an alleged offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate' of I1\dore, macfe a number of aspersions against the Magistrate in in a·pplication Slate of .\fadhya Prade.>h Re~·ashatikay SUPREME COURT REPORTrf [1959] made to him uncler s. 528 of the Co<le of Crimi!lil Procedure, two of which were of a serious ch!trac<er.

It was alleged that the !\lagistratc \\.·as a party tu a.conspiracy \\'ith certain others the> ohjt>ct of \\'hich 1,1,·as t\\·o implicate the complainant in a false casr of theft anrl that a lawyer appearing for the accr.sed persons, to whom the ~!agistrate was favourably inclined, had declar<!tl that he had paid a sum of Hs. 500 to the Magil;tratc. Those allegations were later on repeated in an affida~it. The ~lagistrate reported the matter to the J{egi;trar of the High Court for necessary action. The High Court called upon the respondent to show cause why he shoulcl not be proceeded against in contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The .Judges of the Di,·ision Bench who hearcl the matter, without going into the merits of the case. hrld that, prin1': facif, the offence ,., .. as one of intentional in~ult under s. 228 of the l ndian Penal Coric ancl, cunsequrutly, the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted under s.

3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. /Icld, that the lligh Court had taken au erroneous \·iew of the 1natter and it:; orcler n1ust he set aside. The ITI.:!re existence of an clement of insult in I he alleged act of conten1pt \\'as not conclusi,·e as to the applicahility of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code so as to oust lhc jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Court'; Act. \Vhilc Judges and Courts arc not beyond critU:isrn, and there are v.·ell-recognisecl linWts to such critic:istn, and contctll..Pt proceedings arc not n1eant to shield .Juclges fro1n µcr~onal insul1s, there can he no question that \vhcre defan1atory aspersif,ns are cast upon the.cha<acter and ability of individual Judges or of Courts in general, which in substancr. scandalise the Court itself and have the effect of undermining the confidence o·,: the public in it and thus hinder <lue achninistration of justice, t:he contcrnpt is of a kind which exceeds the limits of s.

228 of the Indian Penal Code. 'fhc true test, therefore, is: is the act compl;incd of an off«nce un<lcr s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code, ;)f son1cthing tnore than that? If it is sornething 1nore, the jurisdii.c:tion of the High Court is not oustec:\ by s. J(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. So jo<lgr.cl, there could be no cloubt that the aspersions cast in the present case arnountecl to scandalising the con rt itself, and \\"ere no mere personal insults, and the lfigh Court had.jurisdiction to take cognizance of the satne. Hathi11a Ramkrishna Reddy v. T)1c State of /,fadras, [1952] S. i;:. K 425 a,n<l Br.ahma l'rakash Shanna v. '/'he State of Ullar Pradesh, [19581 S.C.K u69, relied on. Ambard v. Allonrey-G·c11eralfor Trinidad. a11d J'o<Jago, [1936] A.C. 322, rc!erre~ to, I S.C.R. \SUPRE:\\iE COURT REPOR'JIS The question whether an insult offered to a public servant is intentional so"as to attrac1; s. •28 of the Indian Penal Code has to be decided on the facts of each particular case and it is neither necessary nor advisable•to lay down any hard and fast rule.

Narotam Das v. Emperor, A.LR. 1943 All. 97, Queen Empress v. Abdullah Khan, (1898) A.W.N. 145 and Emperor v. Mu1li Dhar, (1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284, considered. · CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1956. H. J. Umrigar and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellant. The sole question arising for determination is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the High Court was correct in holding that the act of the respondent complained of constituted an offence under s~ 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and. the jurisdiction of the High Court was, therefore, ousted by reason of the provision of s. 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The High Court in coming to this conclusion appears to have relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court-[1952] S.C.R. 425 and [1953] S.C.R. ll69. The facts in the two Supreme Court cases were quite different and they do not, in any way justify the view taken by the High Court.

It will be my submission that the allegations made in the so-called transfer application as also the affidavit are o( su.ch a serious nature that they are not a mere personal insult to the Magistrate, but go far beyond ; they scandalise the Court in such a manner as to create distrust in the minds of the public, and pollute the stream of justice, and in sdch cases the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted (Reads out portions of the transfer apJllicationrand the affidavit in support). :From a perusal of the extracts which have been read, it will be seen that the aspersions made against the Magistrate are of a very serious nature alleging criminal conspiracy, and also that he had taken a bribe of Rs. 50Q from the opposite side. So far as the offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the first esfl()ntiaJ ingredient is that there must be an "intention " to• insult.

In the affidavit filed in the High Court in reply to the• r Slate of Madhya Pradesh Revashanka,- S/11/t of .~fadhy<i Pradesh Ret:asllanhar SUPREME COURT R~:I>ORTs/ [1959] show cause· notice the respondent had ~t/ited that there \HIS no intention to insnrt CJf show disrespect to the lllagistrate. [lnwin .J.-I cannot agree with that, the lauguagc used in the application and affidavit is such that intentio1t to insult was clearly there.] That may be true, but there arc several earlier decisions of the Albhabad High Court whi<h have been referred t.o in the case relied upon by the High Court-Naro/am Das v. The Emperor, A.LR 1943 All. 97, wherein it was held that where scandalous allegations were incorporated in a transfer applicat.i• .. n, there was not necessarily an intention to insult, as the primnry object was to seek a transfer and not to insult the Court.

So far as the decisions are concerned, they support my contention that when scandalous allegations are made agninst a l\lngistrate in a transfer application they would not necessarily constitute an ~ffence under s. 228 of the Indian Pcrnd Code and could be punishecl by the High Court. Jn I.L.R. 1941 Nagpur 304, the Judge, who was seizec.l of the case, made a cc1mpl:Liut to the High Court about ~ Jetter sent to him by one ef the parties, and it was there held that the sender of the Jetter co.uld.be punished for Contempt of Court by the High Court. It is true that there is no di8cussion about s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code hut in the course of the judgment the case of Emperor v. Jagnath Prasad Swadhiry, I.L.R. 1938 All. 548, was mentioned. In the Alhthahad case a person during the pen<lency of .a suit sent communict\tions by post U> tlie Judge containing seanclalous allegations. It aprieat's that it was urged that s.

228 of the Indian Penal Code would bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 3(2) of the Cont{!mpt of Courts Act, 1926, but this contention· was repelled and the High Court stated that its jurisdiction to punish for contempt :·as not ousted. ~Reference waR nlso made to I.L.R. 12 Patna 1 and I.L.R. 12 Patna I i2]. I submit t.hat where the allegations made go beyond r S.C.R. mere personil' insult and tend to bring the whole administration of justice 'tnto' disrepute, then the juris- State of Madhya diction of the High Court \1'0uld not be ousted by -- Pradesh s. 3(2) of the Act. In a case where there is only an insult to the Judge by using vulgar abuse such as Rcvashankar " rogue or rascal " and this abuse was made " e-x facie curiae", then it may be said ·that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted as the offence falls within the purview of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.

[Das J.-Also if the abuse relates to the private life of the Judge, such as, calling him a drunkard or imputing some immorality to him, unconnected with his judicial duties.] I agree. In the instant case the Magistrate must l!a ve been fully conscious of the powers possessed by him under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code as also the relevant provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code which permit him to punish for Contempt of Court, yet he presumably must have felt that the aspersions .made in the•present case were so grave as to transcend mere personal insult and as such it was a fit case to be refetred to the High Court for taking necessary action. In conclusion, it is ,submitted that the view taken by the High Court is much too narrow and cannot be supported either in principle or by the authorities cited. J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, for the respondent.

The view taken by the High Court is correct and is in accordance with the judgments of the Suprem@ Court in the cases reported in [1952] S.C.R. and [1953] S.C.R. If the act complained of intentionally offers, a personal insult to the Magistrate concerned., it may tend to undermine the administration of justice thereby, but it will nevertheless amount to an offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and as such the jurisdiction of the High Court will be ousted by s. 3(2) of th~ Act. It is unsound to say that there are two kinds of con tern pt, aad the lesser kind of contempt will come under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code and the grosser kind will not come under s. 0228 ; : exery illsult to a C<iurt, whatever its nature, is contempt am! punishable, under s. 228 of,the,Indian .Penal Code. I State ()f .\Jadliy!1 J>radesh Ueua-~hat1kar E+UPRE~1E COURT REPORTS/ [1959] [Kapur J.-Every insult to a J1v}ge wJI not necesHarily be a contenipt.' A libel attacking the integrity of a Judge ma!

11ot, in the circumstam·es of a particular case, amount t-0 a contempt at all, akhough it may be the subject matter of a libel proceeding.] [DaS' J.-It appears that there is a further diTieulty in your way, that is, whether the Magistrate was sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding when tho npplication and the affidavit were filed; if he was not, then one of the essential ingredients of s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code was not satisfied.] The High Court has as;umed that the }lagistrate was sitting as a Court at that time and this was also borne out by the facts stated in tho pct-ition for special leave to appeal filed by the appellant wherein it. if! stated "the application having IJCcn presented during the sitting of the Courtwas clearly ciilculated to lower the dignity of the Court in tho public mi11d ". Section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically mentions s. 228 of the Indian Pen~)

Code and• treats it as a form of contempt-, therefore, it will be an offo11cc of contempt pu11ishable under the .Indian Penal Code and as such tlie jurisdiction of t-rie Higb Court would be ousted under s. 3(2) of the AcL I submit ttia.t .the viPw taken by the II igh Court is the correct ,·iew and is su pportcd by the t.wo decisions of t-he Sn pr(' me Court 118 a !so the judgmen<; of the Bombay High C'onrt in (]\)22) 1.1.R. 46 llom. 973. l./mrigar in reply. During the eourse of discussion, doubts ha Ye arisen whet iwr there was a11v ii1tention to i1<sult., or whPther what was said was a-ii insult, or whether the insult was offered in any stage of tt• jucli· e;i,d proceeding. If a11y onP of these three ''ssentials is lacking, then, obviously, there is no offence under s. 228 oft he Indian Penal Coclc. Where there is so muC"h doubt° as to whether an offence under s.

228 of the l nrlian Penal Code has been committed o~ not-, and there is no doubt that " prima t'acie" a Contempt of Coutt 11part .from. the provisions of s. 228 has been committoo, it is wrong to say that the juriHrliction of the High Court is ousted. r S.C.R. \suPRE~E COURT REPOR'PS I submit ittat the case relied upon by the High Court, Narotam Das v. hp~ror, A. I. R. 1943 All. 97, correctly lays down the law so far as the question of " intention " is concerned. 1958. September 24. The Judgment of the Court was-delivered by S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the then Madhya Bharat High Court, dated February 9, 1955, in ·Criminal Miscellaneous Application no. 2 of 1954. Originally, the appeal was filed on behalf of the State of Madhya Bharat, now substituted by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal raises an important question with regard to the interpretation of !!.

3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which repealed the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926), as also the Indore Contempt of Courts Act (V of 1930) which was earlier in force in the • State of M1tdhya Bharat. The facts so far as they are relevant to this appeal are these. One Ganga Ram, stated to be the landlord of phe respondent RevashankJtr, instituted a suit, which was numbered as 1383 of 1952 in the court of the Additional City Civil Judge, Indore, for ejectment and arrears of rent against Revashankar.' It was stated that the suit was filed in the name of Ganga Ram and his wife Chandra Mukhi Bai. It was further alleged that one Mr. Uma Shankar Chaturvedi, a lawyer acting cm behalf of Ganga Ram, advised the latter to sign the name of his wife Chandra Mukhi Bai though Chan,dra Mukhi Bai herself did not sign the plaint or the vakalatnama.

In this suit Chandra Mukhi Bai filed an application for permission to prosecute her husband for forgery. Another application was filed by certain other persons said to be other tenants of Ganga Ram in whoich some alleg\l'tions were made against Revashankar. On June •29, 1953, Revashankar filed a complaint against five persons for an alleged offence under s. 500, Indian Penal Code'. T]tis comp1aint was ver.ified on.July 13, 1953, and was registered ~ Criminal Qase no. 637 of 1953 i.ri the court of one State of Madhya Pradesh Revashankar S. K. Das]. State of .~ft1dl1ja l'tadt5h Rt<iashCJ11ktu i;UPREME COURT R;EPORTil [1959] :IIr. X. IC Ac:harya, Additional Distti~t :IIagistrate, Indore. In timt case ont1 .\)}·. Kulkarni appeared Oil hehalf of t.hc complainawt Hcva;;hankar. The accusecl persons appeared on August 8, 1953, t.hrough .llessrs. l\loh1111 Ringh and Uma Shank"r Chatune<ii. An object.Loll W<LS raised on !J!'half of the fL<'eusecl. pe1·sons lo the appearance of ~fr.

Kulkarni as the latter's name appeared in the list of witrn•sscs. This "·as followed hy a spat;, of applications and counterapplications and on October 12, 19.'i3, the learned Addit.iorrn.I District l\Iagist.ratc passccl an order to t.hc effeet that the' copies of the applicaliorrn as wP1l as Df the aflidaYits filed by both parties shoulcl be sent. to the District Judge for necessary action against the lawyers concerned. In the•meantime a criminal cas~ was st11.rtcd 11gainst HeYashankar in the court of the Additional City Magistrnk, Circle !\o. 2, for an alleged offence under s. 497, Jndian Penal Code. The case wa.s started on the complaint of (~anga Ram. That case was numbered ns 644 of l!J53. \Ve tJ1cn come to the crucial date, namely, llecember 17, l9.'i3. On that• date Revashankar filed an application in the court of the Additiorml District .Magistrate who was in s1'!izin of Criminal Case no. 637 of 1953. The application pur• ported to be one under s.

528, Code of Criminal Procedure. Thisp.pplicat.ion contained some serious aspersions against the '.lfagistrate, Mr. X. K. Acharya. The aspersions were summarised by tlrn learned Judges of the High Court under the following four cntcgorieA. The first. aspersion was that from the order datecl October 12, 191>:3 it appeared that :llr. ~- K. Acharya wa1ikd to fa,·our :llr. Cma Shankar.Chaturvcdi. The S<'coud aspersion \\"<LS t.hat from certain opl111io11s expressed by the :\Iagistrate, Revashaulrnr asserted that. he was sure that he would not gcJt impa."tial and legal justice from the :llagistrate. The third aspcr"ion was of a more serious character a.nd it w11s that the llfagistrntc had ,L hand in a conspiracy h:it.ehed by l\lessrs. Mohan Singh and Uma'Shankar Chaturvedi regardiug ce~tain .ornaments of Ch<tudra i\lukl1i Bai with the object of involYing, HeYashankar and his hwthcr Sushi! Kumar in a false m~e of t'heft of ornaments. Tlvi fo~rtk aspersion was th11.I; ~Ir.

Urna S.C.R .. \sUPRE~E COURT REPOR'.00 Shankar ChattJrvedi had declared that he had paid Rs. 500 to the Magistra~ th1·ough Ganga Ram. These aspersions were later repeat"d in an affidavit on December 21, 1953. On January 11, 1954, the learned . Magistrate reported the aforesaid facts to the Registrar of ti}e Madhya Bharat High Court and prayed for necessary action against Revashankar for contempt of court. On this report the High Court directed the issue of notice to Revashankar to show cause why action should not be taken against him under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 and Criminal Miscellaneous Application no. 2 of 1954 was accordingly started against Revashankar. On March 3, 1954, Revashankar showed cause. The case was then heard by a Division Bench consisting of V. R. Newaskar and fj, M. Samvatsar, J J. and by an order dated February 9, 1955, the learned Judges held that by reason of the provisions in s.

3(2) of the Act the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted inasmuch as the act complained of constituted an offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The question for consideration in the present appeal is if the aforesaid view of the High Court is correct . • Mr. H. J. Umrigar, who h!ts appeared on behalf of the appellant, has very strongly submitted before us that the High Court has erred in holding that the act of the respondent complained of constituted an offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code, and the jurisdiction of the High Court was, therefore, ousted by reason of the provisions in s. 3(2) of the Act. It is necessary to read 'first s. :3(2) of the Act. We may state here that the corresponding section in the earlier Contew.pt of Couts Act, 1926 was s. 2(3) and in the judgment under consideration there is some confusion as to the correct number of the sub-section. Section 3(2) of the Act is in these terms:- .

"No High Court shall take cognizance ·of a contempt alleged to have Ueen committed in respect of a Court subordinate to' it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (,;\.ct XLV of 1860)." State of Madhya Pradesh Revasllankar S. J(. Das]. Sttll-: of ;lfadhy11 Pr(ldtsh Rt;;asha11har S. Ii. Das j. SUPREME COURT R~PORT8/ . [1959] The sub-section was ':onsidered in 1rwo decisions of this Court, Bathina Ra.mt.tkri!Jhna Reddy '" 'l'h; State of Madras(') and Bra/i,ma Prakash Sharma '" 'l'he State of U itar Pradesh ('). Jn the earlier case of Hamakrishna Heddy (') the appellant was the publisl.er and mana14ing editor of a Trlugn Weekly know11 as "Praja Rajyam ". In an issue of the said paper dated February IO, 1949, an article appeared which contained defamatory statements a.bout the stationary sub-Magistrate, 1\0\;vnr, itnd the point for consideration wa.A if the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of such a c11,se was expressly barred under s.

2(3) of the earlier Contempt of Courts Ad, when the allegatiorrn made in the article in qucstiou constituted an offence under s. 499, Indian Penal C.1de. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that "·hat tlie sub-section meant was that if the act by which the party was alleged to have committed coutcrnpt of a subordinate comt constituted offence of any description what.~oever puni:ihable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court was precluded lrom taking cognizance of it. This <trgument was rcpdlcd and this Court said (at pitge 429):- "ln our opinion, the-Sub-section referred to abo\ie ex dudes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases where the JLCtii alleged to con&titnte contempt of a subordinate court arc punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts mereh· amount to offences of other description for which l;unishmcnt has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code.

This would be clear frum the language of the sub-section which uses the words "where such contempt is an offence' arxl does not say "where the act <~lleged to constitute such contempt is an offence". On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in fndia it was laid down that the Hig~ Court had the right to protect su~rdinatc courts against contempt but subject to this restriction, that cases of eontcmpt \\;hich .fia,-e already been provided for in the Indian PenlLI Code should no(. be ta.ken cognizance of 0 (t) [195'] S.C.K 4'5' (2)°[1953] s.C.R 1169. S.C.R .. \suPREME COURT REPOR'.PS by the Hig'- Dourt. This, it was stated, was the principle underlying s. 2~) of the Contempt of Courts St I 1 M di Act, 1926.

This Court then observed that it was not a' ;radco~ •ya necessary to determine exhaustively what were the cases of contempt which had been already provided llevashankar for in the Indian Penal Code; it was pointed out, however, that some light was thrown on the matter by 5 · K. Das f. the provision of s. 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers any civil, criminal or r.evenue court to punish summarily a person who is found guilty of committing any offence under ss. 175, 178, 179, 180 or s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court. The later decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma (1) explained the true qbject of contempt proceedings. Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the Court said (at page 1176):

"It would be only repeating what has been said so often by various Judges that the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges .Personally ~om imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals ; it is intended to be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party, the a:uthority of the court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is weakened''.

It was also pointed out that there were innumerable ways by which attempts could be made to hinder or obstruct the due administration of justice in courts and one .type of such interference was found in cases where there was an act which amounted to "scandalising the court itself": this scandalising might ma:nifest it~elf in various ways but in substance it was an attack on individual Judges or the court as a whole with or without reference to particular cases, causing unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the charaaier and ability qf the Judges. Such 'conduct is punished as contempt /for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the conrts which ar& of prime im,portance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and liberties. (1) [1953] ~.C.R. II6g. State of .\ludhya l)riJ.itsh Revaslia11har 5. K. D•s J. S'L'PREME COURT R;EPORTt/ . [1959]

Bearing the aforesaid principles in n1i~d, let U'l now examine the case und~ oonsideration. The High Court expressed the Yie1'· tlmt the act of the rnspon. dent complained of merely amounted to an oflence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code. Ncvaskar J. said: "J.t appearR to me that the application, thm~h it was stated to be an application for transfer, was intended to offend and insult the M:i.gistrate. A man's intention can be judged by the nature of the act he commits. The application directly and in face <ittri. buteR partiality and corruptign t-0 the Magist.rnte. It. was not an application made bona fitle to a court having jurisdiction to transfer the case from that Court. to some other Court. It was an applicat.ion thrown in tho face of the llfagistrate himself. Tl~c action is no better than telling the Magistrate in face that he was partial and corrupt..

The allegations in the application no doubt are insulting t-0 t.h<, Magistrate and he felt them to be so and at the time the application was submitted on 17th Dcct0mb(•r, 1953, when he was sitting as a l'-0urt and dealing with the case of the opponent." "Thus, since I hold that the opponent itJtended to offer insult t-0 the Magtst.rate concerned there is nu doubt that the act would fall within the pt1rview of sect.ion 228, ludian Penal Code, :i.nd this Court will be precluded from taking :wtion for the contempt committ<!d before the Court of the '.llagistrate by reason of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act". The other learned Judge also expressed the ~me view in the following words: • "The subordinate Courts c:.n sufficiently vindic11te their dignity by proceeding against the off!mdcrs under the provisions of criminal ·1aw in such cases.

Legisl:.ture lms deemed it proper to exclude such cases from the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Th~ how . ever, does not mean that High \;ourt's jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where t.he act complained of, which is alkged t.o constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence und~r the Indian Penal Code." "The question to \Je considcrell in th 0is case is r ,I o S.C.R .• \sUPRE:fy!E COURT REPORT~ whether the .a"ct complained of is punishable as contempt under any one'of \he specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code. In t>ther words whether it falls under any one of the sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the Indian Penal Code." :•If the act complained of constitutes an .offence under any of these sections, it can be dealt with by the subordinate Court itself under section 480 of the Criminal Procedure· Code and the High Court will have no power to take cognizance of it under the Contempt of Courts Act."

We are of the opinion that the learned Judges were wrong in their view that prima Jacie the act complained of amounted to an offence under s. 228, Indian fenal Code, and no more. We are advisedly saying prima facie, because the High Court did not go into the merits and we have no desire to make any final pronouncement at this stage on the merits of the case. Section 228, Indian Penal Code, is in these terms: "\Vhoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such pllblic servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial :proceeding, shall be punish'!ld with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousaJJd rupees, or with both." The essential ingredients of the offence are (1) intention, (2) insult or interruption to a public servant. and (3) the public servant insulted or interrupted must be sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding.

In the present case there is an initial difficulty which -has been 'pointed out to us. The respondent was sought to be proceeded against by reason of the aspersions he made in the application dated December 17, 1953, and the affidavit dated December 21, 1953. It is not very clear t;rom the record jf the learned Magistrate was sitting in any stage ofla judicial proceeding when the application and the affidavit were filed. The High Court rio doubt says that the MagistPate was sitting as a court at the time; but there is no refeienbe to the particulir work', judicial or oth~rwise, which the 0 State oj Madhya Pradesh Revashankar S. K. Das j. ~UPRE.ME COURT REPORTEI.

[1959] l\Iagistrntc w1~s doing at the time. 'l'hc liroi.ctice as to the State of .\fad;•ya filing of applications ancf aflfdavits varies from court rra,Jcsh to court and in some c:ollrts applications and affidavits 1trc filed within stated hours before the reader or t.hc Nrvu;/;a"'" bench clerk; they are oo tiled even when tho Jt:dge or Magistrate is in chamber or pre.occupied with '80mc S. /\·. /Jas j. d . , a m1mstrat1,·c uties. ,:)o far as the present case is concerned, it is not at all clear, from the record as placed before us, <LS to what was the judicial work whieh the learned :11agistrate was doing when the application and affidaYit were filed. If he was not doing any judicial work at the rcleYant. time, then the third essential ingredient mentioned 11bove was not fulfilled and the act complained of would uot. amount t-0 an offence under s.

228, Indian Penal Code. \Ve are not, however, basing our decision on the mere absence of m1tterials to show what puticula.r judicial work the learned Magistrate was doing when the application dated Der·emher li, 1953, a,nd the affidavit dated December 21, 1953, were ti.led. If that were the only infirmity, the proper order would be to' <Lsk for a finding on the qucRtion. Our decision is based on a more fundamental ground. Lcame'd conn. sel for the parties lmvc taken ns through the applie1ttio11 dated December 17, 1953, and the affida,·it: dated December 2-l, i.953. The aspersious nrnde therein prima Jacie showed that they were much more than a mere insult to the learned Magistrate; in effect, they scandalised the Court in such a way ILS to create distruHt in the popular mind and impair the C'Jnfidence of people in Courts.

Two of the <LSpcrsions made, takoen at their face value, were (1) that the learned Ilfagistrate had joined in a conspiracy to irnplica'te the rec;pondent in a false case of thPfr. ln the aflidnvit it w:Ls st<Lted that the lell.rned M<Lgistra.te had sent for the respondent. ancl his brother and had asked them to make a fabe report to the policl\ th:tt the ornlj,ments of Chandr<L :IIukhi B<Li hn,d been\stolen. The learned Magistrate characterised the aspersion as totally false and•said tha.t he 11either knew the respondent nor his brother Mid 'had !HJ acquaintance with them. Another ·aspersion was that the :'lfagistrate hud ta,kci1 a bribe r S.C.R. ~UPRE~E COURT REPORT$ of Rs. 500. This aspersion was also stoutly denied. We must mak"e it clear here &hat at this stage we are expressing no opinion on merits, nor on the correctness or otherwise of the aspersions made.

All that we are saying is that the aspersions taken at their face vain~ amounted to what is called scandalisipg the court itself, manifesting itself in such an attack on the Magistrate as tended to create distrust in the popular mind and impair the confidence of the people in the courts. We are aware that confidence in courts cannot be created by stifling criticism, but there are criticisms and. criticisms. "The path of criticism'', said Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago (1), "is a public way: The wrongheaded are permitted to err therein: provided that members of the public abstain fiom imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune".

If, therefore, tlie respondent had merely criticised the Magistrate, no notice need have been taken of such criticism as contempt of court whatever action it might have been open to the· Magistrate to take as an aggrieved individual; but if the respondent acted in malice and attempted to impair the acjministration of justice, the offence committed would be something more than an offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Code. Learned counsel for the respondent has contended before us'that as soon as there is an element of insult in the act complained of, s. 228, Indian Penal Code, is attracied and the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of the contempt is ousted. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. Section 228 deals with an intentional insult to a public servant in certain circumstances. The punishment for the offence"'is simple impri#onment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with botti.

Our attention has been drawn to the circumstance that iinder s. 4 of (<) [r9J6] A. C. 312, 335. State of Madhya Pradesh Revaskankar S. K. Das j. State nf .\-fadhya }'radesh Ueuashat1kar S. }(, }Jas }. SUPREME COURT R~PORTs/ [1959] the Act the sentBnce for contempt of t:ourt is more or le~ the same, namely, simphlfimprisonm~mt for ,, term which may extend to si~ months. The fine is a little more and may extend lo two thousand rupees. Section 4 of the Act contains a proviso t.hntthe aGcused person, may be discharged or the punishment a1;r11-rded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. \\' e do not, howe1·cr, think that. a similarity of the sentence in the two sect ions referred to above is a real test. The true test is : is the act complained of an offence under s. 228, India!' Penal Code, or is it something more than that ?

If in its true nature and effect, the act compl<iined of i~; really " scandalising the court" rather than a mem insult, then it is clear that on the ratio of our decision in Ramakrishnu Reddy's ca.se ('} the jurisdictior, of ll~e High Court is not ousted by reason of the pro·:ision in s. 3(2) of the Act. !llr. Umrigar has urged a further point in this connect.ion and has eontendcd that for an offence under s. 228, Indian Penal Codr, the insult inust be ;Lir intentional insult. The tirst essential requirement of the offence, according t-0 him, is that the in"1it must. be offered intentionally.• He has point.eel out tha.t the application which the respondent filed l,urported to be an applica,.tion under s.

528, Criminal Procedure Code, and though it is di!Iicult t-0 see how that section applied in the present case, the intention of t~1e respondent 1rns not to insult the 1'fagistrate, but merely to state the circumstances in which the respo:1dent was prnying for a tra1rnfer of the case. :\Ir. Urm'igar has poijltcd out that in the reply which the reporulent gave to the notice issued from the High Co11rt, he said that he had no intention to insult or show disrespect to the learned '.llagistratc. :lfr. Umrigar has further Hubmittecl that the decision in Narotam Da.s v. Emperor(); (on which the learned .Judges of the High Court relied) where in somewhat similiar cii·cumstances it was hel<l that s. 22~, Indian Penal Code, applied, cloes not ,correctly lay down the law. In that case y orke :J. observed thitt it would be lt matter for (1) (195l) S.C.H. 425 • S.C.R. ~UPRE.ll:IE COURT REPORTS consideration jn· each individual case how insulting the expressions used were ~nd' whether there was any k State of Modhya necessity 1or t e app want to ma e use o t ose P d h expressions in the application which he. was actually making to the court.

While we agree that the queB- Revashankar tion Qf intention must dflpend on the facts and oircumstances of each case, we are unable to accept as correct s. K Das J . the other tests laid down by the learned Judge as finally determinative of the question of intention. In two earlier decisions of the same High Court, in Queen Empres8 v. Abdullah Khan (1) and Emperor v. Murli Dhar('), it was held that where an accused person made an application for transfer of the case pending against him and inserted in such applicatjon assertions of a defamatory nature concerning the Magistrate who was trying the case, there was no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the court, but the intention was merely to procure a transfer of the case. We do not think that any hard and fast rule can be .laid down with regard to this matter.

Whether there is an intention to offer insult to the Magistrate trying the case or not must depend on the facts arid circumstances of each case and we do not consider it necessary, nor advisable, to lay down any inflexible rule thereto. Taking the aspersions made by th~ respondent in the application dated December 17, 1953, and the affidavit dated December 21, 1953, at their face value, we have already expressed the view that they amounted to something more than a mere intentional, personal insult to the Magistrate ; they scandalised the court itself and impaired the admililistratiol'l of justice. In that view of the matter s. 3(2) of the Act did not stand in the way and the learned Judges of the High Court were wrong in their view that the jurisdiction of the High Court was ousted. We ~ccordingly alloy the appeal and set aside the order of the High Couift dated :February 9, 1955.

In our view, the High Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the act complained of and tb.e case must (1) (1898) A.W.N. 145· (2) (1916) 38"All.•284 . Stolt r:j 1'1adhy.:J 1'1adf;;h Ueuashankar S. K. Das j. Septen1ber 2 4. SUPH.ElllE COURT R~PORTS/ [1959] now be decided by the High Court on merits in accordance with law. It ~s ottly necessa~y to adr.1 that the act complained of was committed a.s far ba~k as l9;i3 and it is desirable that. the case should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. Appeal aUoweJ'. S. l\L JAKATI & ANOTHER 11. S. JL BORKAR & OTHERS (B. P. 81~HA, JAFER h1,n1 and J. L. KAPUf: JJ.) Hindr1 La<()-Dcbt.1' of fathcr--Pious oblt'gation uf son---I)artition. if ajf1:r:fs such obligation-A\ 0yavaharika, J/raning •Jf- ·S11!r of joint Ja1nily property-" J?ight, title and interest Qf d~Jaulter "-. Bombay Land Rcrcntte Code, 1879 (Rom. V of 1879), s. i55 . .J \\'as the 1nanaging director of a Co-operative Bc..nk getting a y•mly remuneration of I<s. 1,000.

The Bank went iat~ liquidation and an examination of th~ affairs ha\'ing ~ho\,·l'ci that the n1011ies of the Bank ,,·ere not properly invested and that J \Vas ncglige11t in the discharge of his duties, a payment order for Rs. r5.100 wa9'rna11e by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies against him. On .July 2i, 1942, for the realisation of the amount, an item of property belonging to the joint family of .J was attached hy the Collector and brought to sale under s. 155 of the Bombay Land Ifovenue Code, and purchased at auction hy the first respondent. This sale was held on Februuy 2. 1943, and confirmed on .June 23, i943.

In the meantime on January r5, -r943, one of the sons of J instituterl a suit for partition and separate possession of his :->hare in the joint farnily properties. and contended, i11ter alia, that the sale in favou1 of the first respondent was not binding 011 the joint family. lhc sale \\·a3 challenged on the grounds (1) that the liability wh'eh J incurred \vas aP)'a;,•aJ1ariha and therefore the interest of his :ions could not L><' sold for the realisation of tlw debt (2) that eve·1 if J.he debt \\"as not ai·yaraharika, the institution ~f the suit for partition operated as :;cverance of status bet\\·een the 1n1~mbers of the family and, therefore, the father's power of disposition ovrr the son·~ share hari con11! to an end and, consequently, at the a.uc:tion sale the sha1'e of the. sons did not pass to the a'>ction pur- 'chaser, and (3) that what could legally ht sold under s. 155 t