Sri Baru Ram v. Shrimati Prasanni & Others

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. Prasanni & Others 409 of 1958. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 13, 1958, of the Punjab High Court at Chandigarh in :First Appeal from Order No. 24 of 1958.· C. B. Aggarwala and Naunit Lal, for the appellant. II. S. Doabia, K. R. Chaudhury and M. K. Ramamurty, for the respondent No. 1. • 1958. September 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This appeal by special leaveGajendragadkar J. has been filed against the decision of the Punjab High .Court confi=ing the order passed by the Election Tribunal by which the appellant's election has been declared to be void. The appellant Shri Baru Ram was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from th~ Rajaund constituency •in the Kamal District. Initially seventeen candidates had filed their nomination papers in this constituency.

Out ~f these candidates, thirteen withdrew and the nomination paper filed by Jai Bhagawan was rejected by the returning officer. That left three candidates in the field. They were the appellant Baru Ram, Mrs. Prasanni and Harkesh: respondents 1 and 2 respectively. The poll. infl took place on March 14, 1957, and the result was declared the next day. Since the appellant had secured the largest number of votes he was declared duly elected. Soon thereafter Mrs. Prasanni, respondent 1, filed an election petition in which she all!lged that the appell:wit had committJed several corrupt practices and claimed a declaration that his election was void. The appellant denied all the allegations made by respondent 1. The election tribunal first fritmed, six preliminary issues and after they were decided, 0it raised twenty -nine issutls on the merits.

The tribunal was not,- SUPREME COUitT H.,EPOHT~ , (11159] satisfied with the evidence adduced by'r1;spondcnt I to lirovc her allegations in r(~srie~t. of the corrupt practices Sri Ban• Rani committed by the appelktnl and so it recorded findings Sh•imati ag:1inst respondent I on all the issues in regard to the Prasanni & Others said corrupt practices. Respondent I had also cha!. lengecl the validity of the appellant's election 011 the Ga1cndragadkar J. ground that t.he returning officer had improperly rejected the nomination j><tper of Jai Bhagawan. This point was upheld by the election tribunal with the result that the appelbnt's election was declared .to be void. The appellant then preferred an apJ.leal to the Punjab High Court. He urged before the High Court that the election tribunal was in error in coming to the conclrn;ion that the nomination paper of Jai BhagawaJI had been improperly rejected.

This contention was aceepted by the High Court and the finding of the tribunal on the point w11s reversed. Hespondent 1 sought to support the order oft he election tribunal on the ground that the tribunal was not. justiJ].cd in holding that the appellant was not guilty of a corrupt practice under s. 123(7)(e). This argument was also accepted by the High Court and it was held that the appellant was in fact guiny of the said alleged corr!lpt practice. In the result, though the appellant succeeded in effectivclr d1allenging the only finding recorded by the tribunal against him, his appeal was not allowed bec:ause another finding which was made by the tribunal in favour of the appellant was also reversed by the High Court. That is why the order passed by tlie tribunal declaring the appellant's election to' be void w&~ confirmed though on a different ground. I~ is this order which is challenged before us hy Mr. Aggarwal on behalf of the appellant and both the points decided by the High Court are raised before us by the partie?.

At the h{,aring of the appeal Mr. Doabia ~ise<l .a preliminary objection. He contends that the present appeal has been preforred beyoncl time and should be rejected on ~hat ground alone. The judgment under appeal was·dcliv1ffed on lllay 13, 1958, irnd the petition •for leave to appeal under Art. 136 of 'the Constitution J has been file<J "in this c._mrt,on September 2, 1958. It is common ground that the appellant had applied for Sri Baru Ram leave to the Punjab High Coutt on June 9, 1958, and his application was dismiRsed on August 22, 1958. If sh,imati the time occupied by the appellant's application for Prasanni & Others leav<1 is taken into account, his appeal would' be in time; on the other hand, if the said period is not taken Ga;endragadkar J. into account, his application would be beyond time. Mr. Doabia argues that the proceedings taken on an electipn petition are not civil proceedings and so an application for leave under Art. 133 of the Constitution was incompetent; the time taken in the disposal of the said application cannot therefore be taken into account in computing the period of limitation.

On the 00ther hand, Mr. Aggarwal urges that s. 116A (2) of the Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act) specifically provides that the High Court, in hearing an appeal presented to it shall have the same powers, jurisdiction and authority and follow the sa.me procedure with respect to the said appeal as if it were an appeal from an original decree passed by a civil court situated within the local limits of its ci'vil appellate jurisdiction. The result of this pr-"vision is to assimilate the election proceedings coming before the High Court in appeal to civil proceedings as contemplated by Art. 133 of th.e Constitution and so, according to him, it was not only open to the appella.nt but it was obligatory on him to make an application for leave to the Punjab High Court under the said :i-rticle. That is why the time occupied by the said proceedings in the Punjab High Court must be .excluded in deciding the question of limitation.

We do noll propose to deal with the merits of these contentions. It is not seriously dispu'ted by Mr. Doabia that parties aggrieved by orders passed by High Courts in appeals under s. 116A of the Act generally apply for leave U1'der Art. 133 artd in fact such applications are entertained and considered on the merits by them. It is true that Mr. Doabia's argument is that this practice is erroneous and that Art. 133 has n1> application• to the appellate decision of the High Court mider s. 116A SUPRE:IIE COURT REPORTS, , [1959) 195 1 of the Act. Assuming th<it Jl.lj. Doabia ij; right, it is clear that the appellant has mcrel.1· followed the Sri Rc1111 Rllm general pract.ice in thi~ matter when he applied for 54,;,.,1; lea.Ye to the Punjab High Court; his application was h•s••rni <S· Othm entertained, con8idercd on the merits and rejected by the l:l~h Court. Under these circumstances we t.hink Ga;end•agadh"' J. that even if we were to hold that Art. 133 has no application, we would unhesitatingly have excused the delay made in the presentation of the appeal; and so we do not think we can throw out the appeal in ljmine on the ground of limitation.

If neccssn.ry we would excuse the delay alleged to have been made in presenting this appeal. On the merits, :\Ir. Aggarwal contends that the finding of the High Court that the appellant has COIJ\,- mitted .a corrupt practice under 8. 123(7)(c) is not support~d by any eddence. Before deiding with this argument it would be relevant to consider the legal position in the matter. Corrupt practice as defined in s. 2(c) of the Act means "any.of the prae-. ticc8 specified in s. 123 ". Section 12:J(7)(c) provides inter alia that the obtaining or procuring or a.betting or attempting t-0 obtain or proeure by a candid"a.te any assistance other than giving of vote for the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election from any person in the scnicc of the Government and who is 1L member of the armed forces of the Union, is a corrupt practice.

The case against the appellant a.s s<'t out by respondent 1 in her election petition on this point is that the appellant secured the assistance of Puran Singh who is a member of the armed "forces of the Union. It was alleged that Puran Singh "a~ti­ vely canvassed for the appellant on '.\larch 1'lth to 13th, Hl57, in his village and so much HO that he subsequently 8erved as his polling agent a.t polling booth ~o. 15 at village Kotra on .March 14, 1957 ". Both the tribunal and the High Com't are agreed inJ1olding that it had nut been proved that Puran Singh actively canvassed for the appellant on '.\larch 11th to l:~th as all<-ged by respondent I. They have, however, diffored on the' q'uestion as to whether the appellant had ·appointed Puran Singh as his pollin"g a.gen£ for tho S.C.R. • .SUPREME COURT REPOR'PS polling boot.Ii. "in question .• It would thus be seen that the point which falls for our decision in the Sri Baru Ram present appeal lies within It very narrow compass.

Did the appellant secure the assistance of Puran Shrimati Singh by appointing him as his polling agent? Going Prn>anni & Others back to s. 123, explanation (2) to the said secfam provides that "for the purpose of cl. (7) a person shall be Ga;endragadkar J . deemed to assist in the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate for election if he acts as an election agent or polling agent or a counting agent of that candidate". In other words, the effect of explanation (2) is that once it is shown that Puran Singh had acted as polling agent of the appellant, it would follow that the appellant had committed a corrupt practice vnder s. 123(7)(c). But it is important to bear in mind that before such a conclusion is drawn the provisions of s. 46 of the Act must be taken into account.

Section 46 authorises a contesting candidate to appoint in the prescribed manner such nnmber of agents and .relief agentil as may be prescribed to act as polling agents of such candidate at each polling station provided under s. 25 or at the place fixed under subs. (1) of s. 29 for the poll .• There can be no doubt t'hM, when explanation (2) to s. 123 refers to a person acting as a polling agent of a candidate, it contemplates the· action of the polling• agent who is duly appointed in that behalf by the candidate under s. 46. It is only when it is shown that a person has been appointed a polling agent by the candidate and has in CIJnsequence acted as such agent for the said candidate that explanation (2) would come into operatiq,n, If, without being appointed as a polling agtmt by thll candidate, a person fraudulently, or without authority, manages to act as the polling agent of the said candidate, explanation (2) would not apply.

Tha_t being the true legal position the short. point which arises fM our decision 'is whether the appellant had appointed Puran Singh as his polling agent and whether Puran Singh acted as such polling agent at the polling booth No. 15 at Kotra. What ihen are the facts held proved l:ly "the High Court in support· of its conclusion against the appellant• r958 under s. 123(7)(c)? The fjrst ,point wh~h impressed the High Court iH in respect of the writing by which Sri Uarl4 Ram ll the appellant is a eged tll have appointed Puran Singh Shrimati as his polling agent. The printed prescribed forms were Prasanni <>- Others not available to the candidates and so they had to copy the prescribed form for the purpose of appointing their Gajrndragadkar J. polling agents. This position is not disputed.

The form by which Puran Singh is alleged t.-0 have been appointed the appellant's polling agent contains a glaring mistake in that while reciting that the polling agent agreed to act as such polling agent the form says" 1 agree to act. as such following agent" (P. W. 48/1). The same glaring mistake is to be found in the form by which the appellant admittedly appointed Pal Chand to act as his polling agent at the samw polling booth. The High Court thought that the identity of this glaring mistake in both the forms coupled with the similarity of the handwriting of the rest of the writing in them showed that the two forms must have been written by the s:une scribe. This is. a finding of fact and it may be accepted as correct for the purpose of our decision. It would, howm·er, be rclc. vant t-0 add that it is not at all clear from the" record that the same scribe may not have written simitar forms for other candidates as well.

There is no evidence to show that the scribe who made this glaring mistake had been em ployed as his own scribe by the appellant. The High Conrt was also disposed to take the view that Puran Singh in fact had acted as th~ polling agent on the day of tho election at the said polling booth. Respondent I had examined herHelf in suppQrt of this plea and Banwari Lal whom she examined supported her in that behalf. The tribunal was not. impressed by the e\·idence of these two witnesses; and it has given reasons for not accepting their evidence as true or reliable.

It is unneces~ary to emphasi~c that, in deitling with an appeal under s. ll6A of the Act, High Courts should normally attach importance to tho findtngs of fa.ct rooorded by the tribunal when the said findings rtlsf solely on the appreciation of oral 9vidence. °'rhe judgment of the High Court docs not show that S.C.R. • ~UPREl\lE COURT REPORT.S the High Cow-t" definite~ ac.cepted the evidence of the two witnesses as reliable; in dealing with the question Sri Baru Ram the High Court has referred to this evidence without expressly stating whether the evidence was accepted Shdmati or not; but it may be assumed that the High Court P•asanni.;;. Others was -disposed to accept that evidence. In this @onnection, we would like to add that it is difficult to under- Ga1endragadkar J. stand why the High Court did not accept the criticism made by the tribunal against these two witnesses.

If we consider the verifications made by respondent 1 in regard to the material allegations on this point both in her petition and in her replication, it would appear that she had made them on information received and not as a result of personal knowledge; that being so, it is not easy to accept her present claim that she saw Puran Singh working as polling agent; but apart from this consideration, the evidence of respondent 1, even if believed, does not show that Puran Singh was working as a polling agent of the appellant; and the state- 0 ment of BaRwari Lal that Purau Singh was working as the appellant's polling agent loses much of its force in view of his admission that he had no knowledge that Pb.ran Singh had been appointed by the appella'tlt as his polling agent. ~ven so, we may assume, though not without hesitation, that Puran Singh did act as appellant's polling agent a~ alleged by respondent 1.

In dealing with this question the High Court appears to have been considerably influenced by the statement qiade by Jangi Ram whom the appellant had examined. In his cross-examination, Jangi Ram sJoated that Jagtu and Pal Chand were the agent8 of Shri ilaru Ram, but he added that Puran Singh was not at the polling booth. It may be mentioned that the appellant's case was that he had appointed only one polling agent at Kotra ; and tjiis allegation, accorciing to the H~h Court, was disproved by the statement of Jangi Ram inasmuch as he referred to two polling agents working for the appellant. In considering the effect of this·statem"nt, tb.e High Court has failtid to take into account the p,ositi~e ··statement of the witness t'hat Puran Singh was not at the pollin~ I 7?58 station at all.

The evideQce pf t.he \;·i~ess may be Sri 11.,,, Ila•• rejected if it appears to be· unreliable; but if it is accepted, it would not be! fair to accept it only in pm't sh'"'"''; and to holcl that two polling agents had been appointp,.,.,,.,, ,,, u1hm eel by the appellant one of whom was l'uran Singh. There is another serious infirmity in the inference Ga1"1d•agadkar J. drawn by t.Ju, High Court from the statement of ,J angi Ham; that is that .Jagtu to whom the witness has reforred as a polling agent of the appellant appearn in foet to have acted as a polling :•gent of Harkesh, respondent 2. ,Jhandu, another witness examined by the :tppcllant has stated so on oath and his statement has not he<m challenged in cross-examination. Thus, reading the evidence of ,Jhandu and Jangi Ram, it would be clear that Jangi Ram was right when Ju~ said that ,Jagtu was acting as a polling a.gent but he was wrong when ho thought t.hat .Jagtu was the polling agent of the appellant.

If the attention of the High Court had been drawn t-0 t.he unchallenged statement of Jha.ndu on this point, it. would probably not have. drawn t.hc inference that Jangi Ram's evidence supports the case of respondent l a.bout the al?point.- ment of l'uran Singh as th.e appellant's polling agent. The next circumstance on which reliance lrns b()~n" plai:ed in the judgment of the High Court is that Puran Singh.ha'!; signed t.he prescribed form appointing him as the polling agent and he must ha\'e presented it to the returning officer. The prescribed form requires tlmt a candidate appointing his polling agent and tlw polling agent. himsulf should sign the ti,rHt part of the form. Then the polling a.gent is required to t.ake the form to the returning ollicer, sign in token Qf his agreeing to work as a polling agent before the' said officer and present it to him. The High Court has found tlmt Puran Singh must have signed the form and prcsent<'<L it as required by law.

Puran Singh was examinc'!d bv r<·spnndcnt l ; 'but when he ga"c evidence, he was "allowed to be treated as hostile ;rnd eross-exa.mined by her counsel. Puran Singh denied that·hc had act.cdw'l.S the appellant's polling agent and that he htta ~igncrl t.he form and presenter! i~ tu the returning ofliccr. It, however, appears that Chand S.C.R. • L3UPRE~E COURT ·REPORTS Jamadar to w1iose platoon Puran Singh is attached gave evidenc; that the ~ignature of Puran Singh on Sri Baru Ram the form in question (P.W. 48~1) appeared to be like the signatures on acquittance rolls which had been ad- Shrimati mittedly made by him. On the same question hand- Prasanni & Others writi.ng experts were examined by both the parties. Mr. Om Parkas was examined by respondent 1 and heGa;endragadkar J. stated that he had compared the admi.tted signatures of Puran Singh with the disputed signature and had come to the conclusion that Puran Singh must have made the disputed signature. On the other hand, Mr:

Kapur whom the appellant examined gave a contrary opinion. The tribunal thought that in view of this conflicting evidence it would not be justified in finding that Puran Singh had signed the form. 'f'he High Court has taken a contrary view. Mr. Aggarwal for the appellant contends that the High Court was in error in reversing the finding of the tribunal on this point. There may be some force in this contentJon ; but we propose to deal with this 'appeal on the basis that the finding of the High Court on this question is right. The position thus is that, accordlng to the High Court, Puran Singh signed the ro11m appointing him as tll.e appellant's agent and presented it before the officer. Puran Singh was seen at the polling booth and the scribe whQ wrote the form · in question also wrote the form by which the appellant appointed Pal Singh as his polling agent at the same booth.

The High Court thought that from these circumstances it would be legitimate to infer that the appellant had appointed Puran Singh as his polling a!\,ent and had in fact signed the form in token of .the said appointment. It is the correctness of this finding which is seriously disputed by Mr. Aggarwal. before us. It is significant that from the start the parties were at issue on the question as to whether Puran Singh had befn appointed hy the appellant as. his polling agent; and so respondent 1 must have known that she had to prove the said appointment in order to obtain a finding in her favour on isspe 29 under s, 123. (7)(c) of the Act. Respondent 1 in fact leCI evidence to prove tlfe signa 1mre of Puran Singh· but no attempt' I SUPHEME COURT Rf,PORTS. • (1959] was made by her to pro\'e t.11~ signature.of the appdlant on the said form.

Tf1e appellant had specifically Sri Ratu Rani d • d h J S cme t at ie appointed Purnn , ingh as his sh,imati polling agent and when he stepped into the witness p,., ••• ; 6- 01hm box he stated on oath that he had not signed any form i.11 that behalf. Under these circumstanc~s, it Gajend•ag, .. Jka• J. was dearly necessary for respondent l to examine competent witnesses to prove the appellant's signature on the form. It is true that the appellant's signature on the form appears t-0 have been over-written, !mt it is only the expert who could have stated whether the over-writing in question made it impossible to cornp:ire the said signature with the admitted signatures of the appellant. It appears that after the whole of the evidence was recorded, respondent woke up to thi~ infirmity in hl'r case and applied to the tribunal for permission to examine an expert in that behalf.

This application was made on Fcbmary 6, 1958 ; and the only explanation given for the delay in making it was that it was after the appellant denied his signature on oath that respondent l realized the neHd for exa- • • mining an exp(•rt. The tribunal rejected this application and we think righlly. In itR order the tribunal has pointe(I out that resp~ndent l had been given 1rn opportunity to examine an expert and if she wanted her expert to. gi~·c evidence on the alleged signature of the appellant her counsel should have asked him rnlevant q1wstions when he was in the witness box. Thus the position is that there is no evidence on the record to support the case of respondent I that the said allcg· cd signature has in fact been made by the a1ipellant, Th(~ onlv relevant evidence on the record is the statemcnt. of the appellant on oat.h t.lu•t he had not signed the form in question: )fr.

Doabia fairly conceded that there was no legal e\'idence on thiH point; but hiH argument was that from the ot11er finding" of fact• recorcled by th11 High Court it would be legitimate to infer th:it the appellant had made the said signature. In our opinion this ~onwntion is ~vholly unteimble. It must he borne in mind that the alleaat.ion against the appellant is t+1at he has commit tea° a corrupt practi\:c and :t finding S.'C.IR .•• SUPREJ\l'E COUR\I' REPORTS 141;5 against, him. ~n the . poinJ;' w6uld involve serious I z9~B consequences. In.such a.case, it would be difficult to ) . --:.- hold that merely from the findings recorded by the 5 " Baru Rain ·High. Cou:r:t it w.o'iild~•be legitimate to inf~'r that the sh;l; •• 1; appellant had signed the form al)d had 111 fact.ap_- f'rnsefnni ~ ·oihers pointed Puran.'Singh as his :polling agent.

Mr. -Doabia1 . _--::: ··' - argues tlia:t it is not al"'ays absolutely necessary tp va;endragadhar ~- examine an expert or to lead other evidence to prov~: handwr~ting. It would qe po~s~~le :and legal, he con-, 1 tende, to prove the . handwrrtmg of a person from, circumstantial evidence. Sectjon 67 of the Indian) Evidence Act' provides iriter , alia that if a documE'lfit is alleged to be signed by. any per!JOn the. signa tti:re must be"proved to· be in his hand writing. , Sections 45 .-nd '4 7 of the said Act ( l of 1872), prescribe the method in which ~uch signature can be proved. Under s. 4i'i, the opinion. of the ·handwriting. experts is rel!lvant while·undeF s. 47 the opinion of any person acqua,iut'.- ed with-the' handwriting of the person who is alleged • to-ha've sigaea 'the document is admissible. The.explanation to tli.e section explains when a person can be ·said to be acquainted with .the .handwriting of another person_.

Thus, there ean be no. doubt .as to ~11\l mai;ner in .. which the· alleged signature of the. -appellant c<Juld and .shouJd have been proved; but eve rt ·assuming that· the signature. bf the a.ppellan.t pan 'be lega:ll:Y- held tO' .be proved· on circumstahtial evidence· the principle which governs the appreciation of such circumstantial ev:i(ience, in· cases· of .this kind nannot ~!l ignored: It is only· if the court is sa.ti,sfied ,that the' circumstantial evidenc~ iirresistibly leads· to tbll inference that the• appellant must have sign<;lg -the form 'that the court cap legitimately :reach suc]l a conclusion. In our opinion, it :is impossible to acced,e to Mr. D.oabia's argument· thil>P the facts held pro~ed in the High Court inevitably lead to itl\ final conclusionlthfl.t the appellant hh.d .in fact signed._ the form, It is clea'.r that in reaching this conclusion the High Cour.t did not ·properly appreciate the Jact that there. was no'legal ·eviilence on the; point.and tbiJ.t the p.ther facts foqnd by• iti 'Cannqt ·even :teasonably'sii-ppoJ?t, thi;i SUPREME COURT REPORTtl._ , [1959] case for respondent 1. \Ye JiUSt accorc1ingly reverse the finding of the High Court and hold that rcspon- 5"

Ha'" 11"'" dent 1 has failed to p,·ove that the appellant had sA,~;,..,; committed a conupt practice under s. 123(7Xc) of the l'rasanni ('>- Other$ Act. Thi~ finding, however, does not finally dispose ()f the Gajend,agaJP.a, J. appeal because Mr. Doabia contends that the High Court \\'as in error in reversing the tribunal's conclusion that the nomination paper of Jai Bhagawan had been improperly rejected. .Mr. Aggarwal, however, argues th:it it is not open to respondent 1 to challenge the correctness of the finding of the High Court on this point. In support of his objection, ;\Ir. Aggarwal has referred us to the decision of this Court in Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chandra('). In this case, whq1 the respondent., ha.\·ing failed on the finding recorded by the tribunal in his favour, attempted to argue that he could support the decision of the tribunal on other grounds which had been found against him, this Court held thM he was not entitled to do so.

Tbe provision. of the Code of Civil Procedure which permits the • respondent to adopt such a course, it was observed, has no application to an appeal filed by special leave under Art. 136. " W c h11ve no appeal before us o0n behalf of the respondent", observed Ghulam Hasan .J. "and we are •unable to allow t.hat question to be reagitated ". :\fr. Doabia clmllenges the correctness of these observ'1tions. He relies on s. l 16A of the Act which empowers the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction, authority and power, and to follow the si:me procedure, aH would apply to appeals preferred against original decrees passed by a. civil court within the lo~al limits of its ci\·il appellate jurisdiction. There' is no doubt that, in an ordinary civil appeal, the respondent would be entitled to support the decree under appeal on groundH other than those found by the trial court in his favour.

Order 41, rule !!2 of the Code Qf Civil Procedure, which permits the respondent to file croH.~­ objeclions recognize the respondent's right to support the 'Cleere~ on an.l' of the grounds decided against him by the court below. ln the present case no appeu,l (1) [1955] I S.C.R. 509. S.C.R .•• suPRE¥E COURT REPOR'.I;S could have b~en preforr~d by respondent 1 because she '958 had succeeded in obtaining the declaration that the Sri Baru Ram appellant's election was void :ind it should therefore be open to her to support the final conclusion of the High Shrimati Court by contending that the other finding recorded Prasanni & Others by tlae High Court which would go to the root. of the matter is errone.ous. .Prima facie there appears to be Ga;endragadkar J. some force in this contention ; but we do not think it necessary to' decide this point in the present appeal. Mr. 4ggarwal's objection assumes that respondent 1 should have preferred a petition for special leave to appeal against the finding of the High Court on the issue in question ; if that be so, the application made by her for leave to urge additional grounds can be ~onverted into a petition for special leave to appeal against the said finding, and the delay made in filing the same can be condoned.

As in the case of the preliminary objection raised by respondent I against the appellant on the ground of limitation, so in the .case of the pbjection raised by the appellant against • respondent I in this matter, we would proceed on the basis that we have condoned the delay made by respondent 1 fn preferring her petition to this Court for leave to• challenge the finding of'the High Court that the nomination form of Jai Bhagawan had been properly rejected. That is why we have allowed M.r. Doabia to argue this point before us. We may add that the two points of law raised by the respective objections of both the parties may have to be considered by a larger Bench on a suitable occasion. On the merits, Mr. Doabia's case is that the returnin~ officer was not justified in rejecting JaiBhagawa.n's nomi11ation under s. 36(2)(b) of the Act. The facts on which this contention is raised are no longer in dispute. Mr. Jai Bhagawan who presented his nomination pa.per to the returning officer on January 29, 1956, was admitt!ldly not an erector in the constituency of Rajaund in the District of Karna!.

It is alleged that he was a voter in another constituency. When his nomination paper was presented, he qid n9t produ9e a copy of the electoral roll of the said constitmency or of the relevant patt thereof or a certified copy of theo• r . I • SUPREME COURT ~i:.:PORTS0 • [1959] relevant entries in t.hc said roll; nor did'h~ produce any of these documents on the 0first of February which was _C;,j IJan' Hatti fixer! for scrutiny of the nomination papers. When shnmato the returning officer noticed that the candidat-0 had not I"asan"i ,s;. Othm produced the relevant clocumont, he gave him, at his reques•, two hours' time to produce it.. The caudidate Gajendrogodk., .J. failed to produce the document within the time allowed and thereupon t.be returning officer rejected his nomination pt1per under s. 3G (2)(h) of the Act. It is true that the candidate subscqncntly purported to pr9cluce before the officer his afiida.yit that his name was entered as a voter in the list of Y01crs (Ko.

1074, Constitucncv :i';o. 6, Karna.I Baneket ~o. 21, Vol. IO), but. the returning officer refused to consider the said atlida vit because he had alrcadv rejected his uomination paper under s. 36(2)(b). 'Thus the rejecti•m of th~ nomination paper was the result of the candidate's failurn to produ<"e any of the prescribed documents before the returning officer. On these facts the question which :u·ises for decision is whether tije returning ofiicer was justified in rejecting the nomination paper" • under s. 36(2)(b). Section 33 of the Act deals with the presenttttion of nomination paper;; and pt"escribcs the reqniremeuts fo1: valid nomination. It would be relevant to refer to sub.ss. (4) aud {fi) of this section.

Sub-section (4) pro- ,·ides that on the presentation of the nomination paper, the returning officer shall satisfy himself that. the namPS and eleetoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination paper arc the same a8 those entoreH in the eloctoral roll. The prodso to this sub-section rcrp1ires the returning ofliccr to permit clerical or tcc-lrnical errors t<i be corrected. U ndcr this sub-section it would have bcPn open to Jai Bhagawan while presenting his nomination I?aper to produce one of the prescribed documents"to show his elcct-0r1Ll roll number. on the roll of his constituency. Howeycr, his failure to do so does not entail any penalty. Sub-section (5) of s.

33 dcaJs with t_hc st~ge of thi> scrutiny of the nomination papers a1~d ;t proyides that where a candidate is an elec- .. t-0r of a different constituency, a cop,Y of the• electoral S.C.R. • JlUPRE¥E COURT REPORTB roll of that c~nstituency, or the relevant part thereof or a certified copy of the relevant entry of such roll Sri Baru Ram shall, unless it is filed along with the nomination paper, be produced before the returning officer at the Shrimati time of the scrutiny. It is thus clear that when the Prasanni & Others stag'1 of scrutiny is reached the returning officer. has to be satisfied that the candidate is an elector of ·a differ- Ga;endragadkar. f· ent constituency and for that purpose the statute has provided the mode of proof. Section 36, sub.s. (7) lays !1own that the certified copies which are requi~ed to be produced under s. 33 (5) shall be conrlus1ve evidence of the fact that the person referred to in the relevant entry is an elector of that constituency.

In other words, the scheme of the Act appears to be that where a candidate is an elector of a different constituency he has to prove that fact in the manner prescribed and the production of the prescribed copy has to be taken as conclusive evidence of the said fact. This requirement had not been complied with by Jai • Bhagawan ;i,nd the returning officer thought that the said non-compliance with the .provisions of s. 33(5) justified him in rejecting the nomination paper under s. 36(2j(b) of the Act. The question is whether this view of the returning officer is right. Section 36 of the Act deals with the scrutiny of nominations and the object of its provisiqns as shown by sub-s. (8) is to prepare a list of validly nominated candidates, that is to say, candidates whose nominations have been found valid and to affix it to the notice board of the returning officer. Sub-section (1) of s.

36 provides that on the date fixed for the scrutiny o~ nominations each candidate a.nd onA other pe~son duly ~uthorized ma.y attend a.t such time a.nd place as the returning officer ma.y appoint a.nd the returning officer is required to give them a.II reasonable facilities for examining the nomination papers of all candidates which.have been duly delivered. Sub-section (2) then deals with the scrutiny of the nomination papers a.nd provides that the returning officer sha.II decide all objections which ma.y be ma.de to a11y no!llina.tion. and ma.y either on such objection, or on his "Own motion, a.fter such surt'lmary enquiry, if any, a.s he thinlm r SUPREME COURT R~PORTS. , [1959] necessary, n'jcct any nomii1atijln on any Qf the grounds mentioned in els. (a), (b) and (c) of the said sub.section. Sri lJaru Ra'li It is obvious that this emiuiry must be summary and sh,iniati cannot be elaborate or prolonged. In fact., sub-s.

(5) f',am••i & Othm directs that the returning of!icer shall not allow any adjourmnent of the proceedings except when such•pro- Ga;end,.gadkar J. ccedings arc interrupted or obstructed by riots, by open \'iolenee or by causes beyond his control and the proviso t-0 this sub-section adds that in case an objection is made the c:inrlirlatc concerned may be allowed_t.ime t-0 rebut it not later than the next day but one following the dR.te fixe<I for scrutiny, and the returning oflicer shall record his decision on the date to which the proceedings ha,·e been arljourned. Sub-section (2) (b) <lea.ls with cases where there has been a failure ~ comply with any of the provisions of s. 33 or s. 34. There is no doubt that in the present case there was failnre on the part of ,J .ii Bhaga.wan to comply with s. 33(5) and prima facic s. 36(2)(h) seems to justify the rejection of his nomination paper on tbat ground .• Section 3:3(5) requires the candidate to supply the prescribed copy and s.

36(2)(b) provides that on his failure t-0 comply with the said requirement his "nomination pa.per is liiible to he' rejected. In other words; this is a case where the statute requires the candidate to produce the• prescribed e\·idencc and provides a penalty for his failure to do so. In stwh a case it is difficult to appreciate the rclev:inec or valirlity of the argument that the requirement of s. 33(5) is not mandatorv but. is dircctorv, because the statute itself has made it clear t.hat the failure to comply with the said· rcq uirement leads to the rejection of the nomin!ition paper. Whenever the st.Mute requires a -pa.rticulitr act to·he done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said recp1irement leads to n. specific consequence it would be difficult to accept the argument that.' the failure to oomply with the sairl requirement should lead to any other consequence.

It ~s, however, t\rged t.lrat the statute itsdf makes a distinction."b~twee}l defrcts which arc of i~ substantial ~Tiaracter and those which are not o'f a substantial S.C.R.. • SUP RE.ME COURT REPOR~S character. Xliis argml\ent )s based upon the provix958 sions of s. 36(4) of the Act which provides that the Sri Baru Ram returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect "which is not of a sub- Shrimati stantial character". The failure to produce the P.asanni & Others reqttisite copy, it is urged, may amount to a. defect but it is not a defect of a substantial character. We·Ga1endrngadkar ]. are not impressed by this argument. There is no doubt that the essential object of the scrutiny of nomination papers is that the returning officer should be satisfied that the candidate who is not an elector in the constituency in question is in fact an elector of a different constituency.

The satisfaction of the returning officer is thus the matter of substance in these proceedings; and if the statute provides the mode in which the returning officer has to be satisfied by the candidate it is that mode which the candidate must adopt. In the present case Jai Bhagawan failed to produce any of the copies prescribed and the .returning o~cer was naturally not satisfied that Jai Bhagawan was an elector of a different constituency. If that in substance was the result of Jai Bhagawan's fai!ure·to produce the relevant copy the consequence J:)]•escribed by s. 36(2)(b) must inevitably follow. It is only if the returning officer had been satisfied that Jai Bhagawan was an elector of a difi'er~nt constituency that his nomination papers could have been accepted as valid. It is well-settled that the statutory requirements of election law have to be strictly observed. As. observed by Mahajan C. J. who delivered the judgment of this Court in Jagan Nath v. Ja8want Singh (1)

" ...... an election contest is not an ac~ion at la-<'> or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power". The learned Chief Justice has also added that " ...... it is a sound principle of natural ju!!tice that the succesg of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to th-i req\lirementt; of the law." In this connection we may usefully refer to another deci!!ion of this Court ln Rattan Anmof• (1) [1954] S,t.R. 892, 895, 896. T '958 Singh v. Atma Ram('). \Vl)ilc ~ealing \\~it~ the question as to whether the requirements as to attestation were Sri Baru Ram of a technical or of an 11tl8uLst.ar1tial ch1irncter, Bose J. Shr;mali observed that "when the law enjoins the obser- Prasann; 6- 01hm vance of a particular form:1lity, it c:mnot.

Le disregarded and the substance of the thing mu~L be Ga1rndragadkar f. there". We must, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in coming t-0 the conclusion that the nomination paper of Jai Bhagawan had been validly rejected by the returning officer. l\Ir. Doa.bia, however, contends that the view t1tken by the High Court is purely technical and does not take into account the substance of the matter. This approach, it is said, is inconsistent with thn decision of thi;; Court in Prawp Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta('+. It is true that in this case Bo.ie J. has disappro,·ed of the tendency of the courts towards technicalities and has observed that "it is the substance that. counts and must take precedence o\·er mcro form". But in ordt!r to appreciate the scope and effuct. of these. ohserv:1tions, it would be necessary to bear in mind • the relevant facts and the natur" of the point. raised before the court for decisivu in thiH case.

The question raised was whether the failure of the mtmlidate•to mention his occupation <LS required by r. !)(I )(i) rendered his 1'omination paper innLlid and it was :tnswercd by the court in the negatirn. The question arose under f.he proYisimrn of the C. P. and l:lerar Municipalit.ies Act II of 1922. It is significant that the decision of t.his Court rested principal!)' on the provisions of s. !:::J of the said Act according to which " Anything done or any proceedings taken undt;r tLiis Act ,hall not he questioned on account of any ......... defect or irregularity in affect.ing the merits of the ca•e ''. It waH held by this Court that reading r. 9(1)

(iii)(~') ... -hieh directed the supervising officer to examine nomirw.tion papers, iri the light of s. •2a, the court had to see whether the omission to set out a eimdidate's occupation can be said. to affect. the merits of the casJJ and 011 that 1'>oint there was no doubt that. the said faiCure could not possibly affect the pierits of 00the case, The High Court had, however, taken a (1) [1955) 1 S.C~lt 481,•488.' (2) A.I.I\. 1956 °S.C. 140, 141 . S.C.R. • B.UPREM.E· COURT REPORTS 1423. contrary view.and it wa'\in i:eversing this view that Bose J. disapproved the purely technical approach Sri Baru Ram adopted by the High Court.• Where, however, the statute requires specific facts to be proved in a specific Shrimati way and it also provides for the conseqmmce of non- Prasanni & Others compHance with the said requirement it would . be difficult to resist the application of the penalty clause Ga;endragadllar J. on the ground that such an application is based on a technical approach.

Indeed it was precisely this approiwh which was adopted by this Court in the case of Rattan Anmol Singh v. Atma Ram (1). Mr. Doabia has also relied upon a decision of the Andhra High Court in Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Miiralidhar Rao (')in support of his argument that the fll;ilure to produce the prescribed copy cannot justify the rejection of the nomination paper. In our opinion this decision does not assist Mr. Doabia's contention. In this case it was urged before the High Court that the document produced by the party was not a certified copy aia required by s. 3.3 (5) of the Act. This " argument was based on the assumption that the certified copy mentioned in s. 33(5) of the Act must satisfy the test prescribed by s. 76 of the Indian Evidence A'.ct. The High Court rejected this argument for two reasons. It held that the certified copy mentioned in s. 33(5) need not necessarily satisfy the·te~t prescribed by s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Alternatively it held, on a consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, that the document in question was in fact and in la:w a certified copy under s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. These points do not arise for our deci.- siop in the present appeal. Mr. Doabia, howev.er, relies <'m certain observations made in the judgment of the High Court and it may be conceded that these observations seem to suggest that according to the High Court the provisions of ss. 33(5) and 36(7) do not precludoi proof by otl:ter means of the 0fact that the name of the candidate is on the relevant electoral roll. These observations are clearly obiter. Even so we (I) [1955] I S.C.R. 481 1 488. · (2) A.I.R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 485.

I8I ~UPREME COURT·~EPORTS • [1959) would like to add that th~y d~ not cor're&tly represent Sri Llaru Ram the effect of the relevant prnvisions of the Act. v The result is the appeal is allowed, the orrlrr passed sh.;,,,,.,; by the High Court i8 set aside and the election petition Prasanni & Othm filed by respondent l is dismissed with costs through- Gaj1ndragadkar J. Stptemb!r 30. out. • Appeal allowed . GHAIO MALL & SOXS THE STATE OF DELHI & OTHERS (S. R. DAS c. J., ?I<. H. BIIAGWATI, B. P. S1:-1HA, K. SnrnA RAO and IC ~- WANCIIOO JJ.) Certiorari, Writ of-Rule iss11<d on app!ic~lio11-D11ty of. inferior Courts and 1"ribunals-/j 'nust produce entire records. The appellant firm, an unsuccessful applicant for a license for vending foreign liquor in l\ew Delhi for the year 195.1-rg~. mewed the High Court under art.

226•of the Constitution for a wrij wf certiorari quashing the order granting the Iici~nst• to a ri\'al applicant ancl implcadcd the Chief Minister, the Excise Commissioner, the.Seeretary ancl the Cnder Secretary, Finance, of the State of Delhi, as it then was, as parties to the application. Its case in substance was that the applications macle for the grant of the licence were never placed before the Chief Commissioner \vho alone \1,·as the competent authority to grant it under Ch. 5, r. I of the Delhi Liquor License Rules, r935, fraa1cd under s. 59 of the Punjab Excise Act (Punj. I of 1914). as extender! to J)eU1i. and no orclcr granting the license \vas ever made by him.

The said opposite parties rcsponclcnts, although rcptatedly called upon by the High Court to do so, did not produce the entire records and file<l evasive affidavits and eventually produced a letter written by the Coder Secretary, finance, to the Excise Co1nmissjoncr intirnating that the Chief Commissioner had made th~ order for granting the license to the rival applicant and maintained that th<: order had in fact been made by the Chief Commissioner. The High Court, under a misapprehension of fact and of the true nature and effect of that letter \vritten by the. C'ntler Sccrcta'ry, finance, to the Excise Con1missioncr, held"t!Tat th~ order had in fact been passed b~ the Chief •O::ommissioner. The production of the en,ire records in the