Dr. H. S. Rikhy and Others v. the New Delhi Municipal Committee

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 30 to 32 of 1959. App~_.la irom the judgment and order dated April 25, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Revision Applications Nos.186, 187 and203 ofl954. M. G. Setalva,d, Attorney-General for India, Anoop Singh n,nd R. Gop1lalcrishnan, for the appellants. G. /(. Da7ihtary, 8olicitor-Genera.l of India, R. Ganapathi lyer and G. Gopalalcrishnan, for the respondents. 1961. September 13. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA, C. J.--The question for determination m these three appeals, on certificates of fitness granted by the High Court of Punjab under A;r~.133(1 )(c) of the Constitution, is whether the prov1s10ns of s. 8 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952) (which hereinafter will be referred Dr. H. S. Rikhy The }{ew Delhi Municipal Commilt11 Sinh• C. J. 1g6; D,, II S. Rilhy Tiu ]l/tw Dtlhi \11mic,pal Comm•Utt Sir.ha C. }.

G06 SUPRE!lfE COURT REPORTS [1962] to as the Act) npply to the trnnsnctions in question between the nppellants in each case and the New Delhi llfunicipal Committee (which for the sake of brevity we shall call 'the Committee' in the course of this judgment). It is necessary to state the following facts in ordrr to bring out the nature ancl scope of tho controversv. It is not necessarv to refer in detail to the 'facts of each ~ase separately for the purpose of those appea.ls. The Committee built in 1945 what is known as the Central Municipal Mark•:t Lodi Colony. This Market has 3~ shops, with resickntial flat.~ on 28 of them. In April 1945, the Committee, in purnuance of a resolu~ion passed by it, invitPd tendPrs from inten<ling bidders for thos() sJiops and premisPs. On receipt of tenders, the high1·st bidders were allotted ,-arious shops on rents Ynryi11g from Rs. 135-8-0 to Rs. 520 per menscm.

The :dlottees occupied the shops and tho premises in accordance with the allotments made by the Committee and continued to p:ty the rcspecti\·e amounts, which m".y be chamctcriscd as n•nts, without prejudice to our decision on the question whether it was legally a 'rent', because as will presently appe"r, one of the controversies between the parties is whether it is 'rent' within the meaning of the Act. Tmrnrde the end of 195~. 30 Qf the occupants flied applications under s. S of the Act prnying for tho fixation of stand.ml rent in respect of the premises in their respective occupntion. The Committee rniscd n. preliminary objection to the maintain• bility of the afores'Lid applications on the ;.;round thn.t there was no relntionship of landlord and tenant between thr applicants and the Committee, within the meaning of the Act. The Trial Court aec01·dingly fram1'<l the following issue for determination in the first instance :

"Whether the relationship of tenant and landlord exists L>etween the parties, thrrcforc, those applications aro competent and the J Court has jurisdiction. to. fix the standard rent?" The learned Subordinate Judge, who dealt with these cases in the first instance, came to the conclusion that the several applicants were tenants within the meaning of the Act, and that, therefore, the applications were competent. The committee moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, and the learned Chief Justice, sitting singly, referred those cases to be heard by a Division Bench, as they raised questions of general importance. The matter was thus heard by a Division Bench composed ofG. D. Khosla and Dulat, JJ. The High Court, by its judgment dated April 25, 1956, set aside the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court, but made no order as to costs.

The High Court in an elaborate judgment, on an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act, came to the conclusion that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, inasmuch as there was no 'letting', there being no properly executed lease, and the doctrine of part perform >nee was not attracted to the facts and circumst:mccs of the case. For coming to the conclusion that there was n'l valid lease between the parties, the High Court relied upon the provisions of s. 47 of the Punjab Municipal Act (Punjab Act III of 1911 ). The High Court also negatived the contention th:;t the Committee was estopped from questioning the status of the applicants as tenants, having all along admittedly accepted rent from them. The '.tppellants moved the High Court and obtained the necessary certificates of fitness for coming up in appeal to this Court. The certificates of the High Court are dated October 28, 1957. That is how the matter has come before this Court.

It has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to the transactions in question, and th<tt, therefore, the High Court was not justified in insisting upon a registered lease, or even a written lease, executed Dr. H. S Rikhy The )few Delhi Municipal Committet Sinha C. ]. Jh. Ii .\'_ RilJ11 7k .\',u· D,fhi .11i..t:idpal Cnmmit1u Sir,ha r. ]. (1962] betwPen the par'ties. It was enough that the tenants in each case had given a written Kabuliy11t from which the term8 of th~ respecth·e tenanciBs could be asnertaincd. It was also contended that tho High Court was in error in relying upon the provi· sions of s . .J7 of tlw Punjab Municip:d Aet which, it wa' conten·Jed, wa8 8ubject to the provisions of the Art, in view of the O\'Crri<ling prodsions of s. 38 of the Act. It was further eontendl'<l that the definitions of 'landlord' [s. 2(c)J, of'pn·rniseH' [s. 2(g)]. and (1f 'tPna11t' [s.

2 (j)J in the Act wcrn comprchen· sive f•nough to take in the transactions betwet•n tho appeliants and t.he Curnmittec. Heferenco was also nrndn to H. 3 of the Act to show that a public body like the Commitlee was not inte11de<l to be excluder! from the opt·ration of the Act. On the other hand, th'! learned Solicitor General, appearing for tho Committee, contended that the essenti1d ~lcmcnt of 'letting' b••comes appan•nt from the ('Onsideration of tllf\ proYisions of tlw Act, "ith partieu!ar n•forencc to tho definitions of 'landlord'. 'premi,es' ancl 'tf'nant'. His conten· tion was that tho lwy word 'letting' should be equated with tho crC'ation of an interest in immo,·ahle property by a valid contract; hf'nce, if there \ms no valid <'ontract, there was no transfrr of propei ~y. and, thcreforP, no letting.

If there w11-s no lettiug, the relationship of landlord 1md tC'nant was not crl'al"d betwc('n the parties nud the nrnount recci\•erl bv tho Committee as rent was l<'gallr 11ot rent in ti1e strict st•11,;c of the term. Tiiough the Act r!id not prescribe any fnrm of 'lctt.ing', tho provisions of s. 4i of the i\Iunicip1>l Ad applit•d, nncl as t.h•· prodsions of that s1'etion are not in direc'. conflict "·ith any of the provisions of the Act, there nas no inconsistency betw1•en th1·m. That ht·ing so, s. :)8 of the Act was out of the \\'&}' of the Cummittf e. The Comir.ittC'P, being a corporlLlion, has •10 cnpacity to contract or to transff'T propt•rty ·:ccpt in accordance with the provisions of s. 4i. SUPREME COURT-REPORTS Admittedly the provisions of s. 47 have-not' been complied with.

Therefore, the Committee is not bound· to reeognise the transactions in question as creating an interest in immovable property; there being no interest in immovable property in favour of,the a.ppellants, they cannot be called 'tenants' within the meaning of the Act, and as only a tenant can invoke the provisions of s. 8, the applications must be held to be incompetent. There could be no question of estoppel because both parties knew that under the law there had to be a transfer of property by the Committee in accordance with the provisions of s. 4 7 of tho Municipal Act. It is well settled law that there cannot be an estoppel against the provisions of a Statute. The question whether the petitions under s. 8 of the Act were competent, it is common ground, m11st depend on whether or not there was relation· ship of landlord and tenant between the parti08'.

The learned Attorney General, who appeated in support of these appeals contended in the first place, that the definitions of 'landlord', 'premises', and 'tenant' in s, 2, cls.(c), (g) and (j) respectively, of the Act, make it clear that the person for the time being receiving rent is the landlord and the person who is paying the rent is the tenant of the premises. These definitions are as follows : " 'landlord' means a person who, for. the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tE:nant; ... 'premises' . meani> any building or part of <i. building which is, or is intended; to be )et Beparatel:Y for use as residence er f<:>f 19UZ (Ir. H. S. :lt;,t;. ~itfi'~dJl!ta;; s-.. -t.J. /9Gl fl•t Jt.-S.111kfly <:'·•·• ·v.· 'f"ht_JVtw . .

Dtlhi ~~2~f""":C: ·~":l: 610, [l!J62] commercial use or for any other purpose, and ino!udes- '-4(:· ( i) the garden grounds and outhouse's if any, appertaining to such building or part of a building; (ii) any furniture supplied hy the landlord for use in such building or part of a building; but docs not include a room in .a: hotel or lodging house ... 't('nant' muans any pcrnon by whom or on whose account rent is payable foranyprrmisca and includes such sub-tenants nnd other pcr- BOns as ha"Ve derived title .under a tenant under the provision5 of any law before the commencement of this Act...".

The argument is that the Act has he<>n enacted 'to provide for the control of rents ancl evictions' and that in mnking these provisions for safeguarding the interests of tenants under tho Aet th<· provisions of other enactments n·lating to the creation of the relationHhip of landlord and t<·nant and regulating the incidence of tenancy and grounds of ov iction, the Act ha,i; pro\·ided for a simple rule that without paying any r<'gard to formalities, the fact of receiving rent by n person constitutes him the landlord and the payer of the rent the tenant, within the meaning of the Act. The Act does not stop to co1rnider wheth•~r there is a lease, and if so, what are the terms contained in the lease regulating the relationship of landlonl nnd tenant., and that if there is any inconsistency between the pro\·isious of tho Act and any other law for the time being in force, the former shall prevail, as laid down in s. :~8 0f the Act. Tim section reads as follows :

"The provisions of this net and the rules rn1de th~reunder shall have effect notwith- , ilt1mding anything inconsistent there\\ ith contained in any other law for the time being tr· J in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." .With reference to the terms of the section, just quoted, it has been contended, that the provisions 'of the Transfer of Property Act regulating th(J grounds of eviction, or even the pro visions of tha Municipal Act, particularly s. 47, have _no legal _effect in so far as they are . inconsistent with the provisions of. the Act. In this connection, it is asserted that the formalities required by s. 4 7 of the Municipal Act, in order to invest binding force to the transfer of property or the contract made by the Committee, are inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, namely, . the definitions of 'landlord' 'fonant' and 'premises'. . With reference to s.

4 7 of the Municipal Act, it is further contended that the section does not confer capacity ·to contract or to transfer property but only prescribes the mode for entering into a contract or for making a transfer of property by the Committee, and that therefore, s.47- '\. • cannot have the effect of rendering null and void what was done by the Committee, namely, advertising the premises for being allotted to the highest bidders on terms and conditions as contained in the Kabuliyat given by the tenants. In this connection reliance was placed upon Crook v. Corporation of ---' ~ 8,eaford (1 ) and Deo v. Taniere('). It has also been r urged that the 'letting' contemplated by the Act does not necessarily connote a transfer of property, ~ but simply permitting the tenant to occupy the premises for a sum of money. In other words, even. a licensee, as distinguished from a lessee, would come within the purview of the Act. In this connection.. reference was made to the Shorter Oxford .

Dictionary, which contains the following words,. inter alia, under the word 'let': "to grant the temporary pos8ession and; . . . use of in consideration .of rent or hire" . • .• '. (I) (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 551. · (2). (JMB) 116 E. R. II, -H ••.. ··---"'• '- .. iJ --·..I·-~·· .. ...,, t;,_._,._, ...... HS~I ·D~,·:H. S.R;Jiby .v . . TJie N<W JJdhi -M11nUipGl Co'!Ufrittti, Sinhi< C. J. · 1111 DJ;• u.s: Rlllly .. J1- 1.lllt.; Ir . ' it ' 'C....,. stlPR'!ME OOUBT-m:PORTS (1962] If this coJJtention i~' oorreot, then there ea.nnot be the least doubt that a licen1ee would also come within tho ambit of the Act.

But wo a.re not pre· paTcd to hold that tho Act, by its torms, intended to be' so comprehensive as to include within its sweep not only tenants properly so ca.lied, but a'1so lioon. seos, It is, true that the dictionary manning applie11 the term 'Jetting' to inducting a tenant and deli· v,ering p<>l!Bession to him as s-.ich, of tho promisee for a consideration which can be characterised aa 'rent', or a licemeo who has been permitted to occupy the promises for a consideration which may be' called 'II.ire'. If the argument is correct, then a penon hiring a room in a hotel as a licensee would also' come within the purview of the Act. But the Act, in terms, has excluded a room in a hotel or a lodging !rouse from the definition of 'premises'. It was also contended that it was admitted by tho r<lBpondcnt that rent was received and receipts tor rent were granted by its a.gents. Tho use of tho word 'rent' is not conclusive of the matter.

It may be used in the legal sense of recompense paid by the '-.. tenant to tho landlord for tho exclusive posseesion of premil!E's occupied by him. It may also be used 1 in the l{eneric sense, without importing the legal significance aforesaid, of compensation for use and occupation. 'Rent' in the legal sense can only be reservt1d OD a demise of immovable property. Reference may be made in this connection t<:> paragraphs IL 9a and 1194 of Hulsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, VoL 23) at pages 536-537. Hence, the use of the term 'rent' cannot preclude tho landlord from pleading that thero wa.B no relationship of landlord and tenant. The question must, therefore, depend upon whother or not there was a relationship of landlord and tenant in tho sense that thero was a transfer of interest by the landlord in favour ot' the tenant.

Jn our opinion, tho Act appHes only to tbat 61>ecle1J of •lettiDg'- b~ ""~icP, t)le 1el11-tionehip of ~nd· a.s.o.~ . lord and tenant is created, that is to:say, by which an interest in the property, .howl').vtir limitJ)d in duration, is created. Having held that the Act applies to 'letting' which creates an interest in immovable property, we have to determine the question whether in these cases there was a contraet creating such a relationship. Now, under the Punjab Municipal Act, s. 18, a Committee is a corporate body with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property and to tran~fer any property held by it "subject to the provision of this Act, or of any rules thereunder". Section 18, therefore, contains the. authorisation in favour of the committee to enter into contracts and to transfer property belonging to it. This power is subject to the other provisions of the Act.

Thus, in so far as the Committee's power to enter into a contract or to transfer a prope1·ty is concerned the power may be delegated in accordance with the provisions of s. 46. The contract to transfer property has to satisfy the conditions laid down in s. 46 (2) of the Municipal Act if the vstluc or amount thereof exceeds Rs. 500. No such contract can be made until it has been sanctioned at a meeting of the Committee. That condition has been satisfied in these cases. But we have to consider the provisions of s. 4 7 which have been very stroi;igly relied upon on behalf of the Committer. The se9fo;in is in these terms : "47. (1)

Every contract made by or on behalf of the Committee of any municipality of the first class whereof the value or amount exceeds one hundred rupees, and made by or on behalf of the Committee of 11ony munici,pality of the second and third class whei:<Pof the value or amount exceed,$ fifty rupe.es, .shall be in writing, .and must b.e signed ~y two members, of whom the president or ·1:1 vic.cprellident ,shall be one, and .countersjgMd Ji;y the. secr.eta.ey : L, •. J:s . .a:;.v !Eltai,,., I/"11.i 11"• 196I. Dr· H. S. •iliJ Tiu Nn»"•Dellri Munitil'dl c.mnuittt snw. c, J. . SUPRE~fE OOU.RT]{EPORTS . [1!162] · P1'ovided that, when the power of entering into any contract on behalf of the committee has been delegated under the last fore; going section, tho signature or signatures of tho member or members to whom the power has been delegated shall be sufficient. (2)

Every transfer of immovable property belonging to any committee, must be mado by an instrument in writing, executed by the president or vice-president, and by at least two other members of committee whoso execution thereof shall be attcst-;d by the secretary. (3) No contract or transfor of the description mentioned in th is section executed otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of this section shall be binding on the committee." Now in order that tho transfer of the property io question should be binding on the Committee, it ~ms essential that it should have bePn made by an instrument in writing executed by the President or the Vice-President and at least two other members of the Committee, and tho execution by them should have been attested by tho Secretary. If these conditions arc not fulfilled, the contract of transfer shall not be binding on the Committee. But it has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the non-complianoo with the provisions aforesaid df s.

47, quoted above, would not render the contract of transfer of property void but only voidable. In other words, where tho actings of the parties have given effect to the transactions, as in the instant cases, by delivery of possession of the pro. perty by the Committee and payment· of the rent by tho appellants, the absence of formalitios would not render the trans:ictions of no legal ·effect But it has to bo n·oted that it was not contended on behalf of appellants that the provisfons of s.47(3) oftho Municipal Act, all· P.ot mandatory antl a·kc.R. :13j5 _are merely directory. Such an argument was not arid could not have been advanced because it is settled ·.rir.:·H. s:-RfH.y -law that the provisions of a Statute in those : 'T•; },;,,:J;>e1;; peremptory terms could not but be construed as ··Municipal Commilfte ·mandatory. ·sinlu.<}: j. But the learned counsel for the appellants placed. a great de<tl of reliance on the decisions in the .cases of Crook v. Gorporation of Seaford (1) and Dea v. Taniere (2). ln the first case, the suit was for specific performance of a contract by the Corporation which was evidenced by a resolution of the Corporation; to let to the plaintiff a piece of land the boundaries of 'vhich had not been fully determined.

Though there was no contract under seal, Crook iri pursuance of the contract built a wall and terrace on parts of the land in question. The Corporation brought a suit for ejectment, and the plaintiff thereupon filed a bill in Chancery for ' "specific performance. It was held by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Hatherley, confirming the decision of the Vice-Chancellor, that though the agreement was not under seal, the corporation, was bound by .licquiescence and must perform the agreement' to .grant the lease. It must be remembered that was ·a suit to obtain a lease from the grantor, the Corporation, that is to say, it was an action in equity, and the Court of Equity held, in the words ofthe Lord Chancellor, that . "at a)l events, a Cour.t of Equity could riot allow the ejectment to proceed after the plaintiff had spent .so· much money hn the wall". The decision was, therefore, explicit~y based on the . doctrine . of 'Standing by'.

In that case, there is no. reference to any statute, the tl'.rms of which could said to have been infringed. In the second case [Deo v. Taniere.(')] again there .was no question of the infringement of any manda- ,tory: provision bf a Parliamentary statute. ·· That·.is ~-+-·. the case, qf. a grant .:of lease for' 99 .years,' .Quritt,illg a covenant to build. It., ~YJ~B h\lld .t.h:i..to,whether (l) (1871) L.R. 6 Ch. 551. (2) (1848) 116 E.R. 1144. [1962] -lilt the lease was only voidable, -or void, receipt of Dr,'H,S.RikfJY _'rent without proof of any instrument under seal could raise a presumption of a demise from year i .Th /'few Delhi n,,;,;,;pai_s:omm;11,, to year. It is thus clear that neither of those __ cases, strongly relied upon by the coumml for the Si•"4 c. J. · appellant, is an authority for the provisions that ·where the statute makes it obligatory that there · • should be a contract under seal, the absence of such '.a contract could be cured by mere receipt· of rent.

We· have here to determine whether the provisions of s. 47 of the Municipal Act prevent the committee"from enterh1g into a contract or making a transfer of property without_ complying with the .conditions laid down in that section. - That the ·two· cases referred to above are no authority· on the :question now arising for determination in the instant caseg is clear from the decision of the House of Lords in Young & Co. v. The JJfayor and Corporation of. Royal. Leamington Spa:('). In that case, their Lordships, had -to consider the effect of ;s.174 of the Publfo Heath Act, 1875 (38 & 3\1 .Viet. c. 55) which required that every contract .made by ·an urban authority of the value or amount · exceeding £ 50 shall be in writing and sealed with ;the common seal· of the ·authority.· It was held that the provisions of s. 174 were obligatory and not merely directory and applied to an exe- Clited contract of which the urban authority had taken full benefit and had been in enjoyment -.thereof.

That was a .case which came ·before · the ·Queen's . Bench Division on a. -reference. ·The · g'uestion referred was whether the ·absence of the·_common seal of ·the Corporation ·required by s. 174 of the Public: Health Act _aforesaid .. wal! .fatal,. to the •plaintiff's . claim .to ·recover from the_, Co~poration the costs .. of the works constructed by the pbintiff at.the instance of.the .Corporation. .Th~ decision of the.Court of Appeal, _ composed of Brett, Cotton and Lindley, L. JJ.', . '(!) (1883) LR. a App. Cas. 517. confirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division. is reported in 8 Q.B.D. 579. In the House of Lords, Lord Blackburn made an exten· siv.e quotation from tho judgment of Lindley, L.J., from which the following passage may be read. "The cases on this subject are very numerous and conflicting, and they require review and authoritative exposition by a Court of appeal but, in my opinion, the question thus raised does not require decision in the present case.

We have here to construe and apply an Act of Parliament. The Act draws a lino between contracts for more than £ 50 and contracts for £ 50 and under. Contracts for not more than £ 50 need not be sealed, and can be enforced whether executed or not and without reference to the question whether they could be enforced at common Law by reason of their trivial nature. But con· tracts for more than £ 50 are positively required to be under seal; and in a case like that before us, if we were to hold the dofen· dants liable to pay for what has been done under the contract. we should in effect be repealing the Act of Parliament and depriving the ratepayers of that proteot~on which Par· liament intended to secure for them." It appears that in England there is a distinction betlfeen contracts made under the Common Law by Municipa:I Corporations which may not be under iieal, and contracts made by them in pursuance of a statute like the one now under consi· deration.

The following excerpt frem the jud~­ ment of Brett, L. J., quoted in the judgment 0f 'Lord Blackburn, is instructive from this point of view: "I ihQUld ;wish.to aa.y that I have come w the llMlllil· \W,l;lclusion after weeks spent Dr .. Jl, s .. Ri/ifzy The Nerp D•lhi Municipal CiJmmilJu Sinha C; ]• . • i9fii_ t,~~-fi. s. llikf!y :. y. .'I:he :.Yew D~lhi · ~it unit: ipaL-Commiu 1t . "SUPREnIE COURT REPORTS . [l!J62] in attempting to.come to auother. ·However, ·I come to the same ·conclusion as Lord J usticc Lindley -and · Lord . .T ustice Cotton in this case, upon tho ground that, although this was a municipal corporation, yet in the transaction in question it was acting asa board of health, and that therefore. it was bound by the statute, and that . as to the construction of that statute we are bound by a former decision of thia Court which held that the enactment as to the necessity for a seal is mandatory and n.ot merely . Jrectory .

The same distinction . is very well brought out in the following observations of Lord Bramwell at page 528: "As I think the case turm on the con· struction of tho statute, I have not . thought it necessary to go into the doubtful and · conflicting. cases .governed by the Common Law.'_' __ It is note-worthy that. neither of the two cases discussed above was even referred to. at .the bar or by their Lordship<> in the .course of their· judgment, though many cases appear to have been cited-at the bar. That was apparently for the reason that these earlier cases, rather ancient, did not turn upon the construction of any statute like the one .we are now considering. . '. ; Thus, the provisions of s.

4 7 being .mandatory · and not merely directory, the. question which now has to be determined is.:whether those provisions are inconsistent with any of the_ provisions. g_f the Act, as· contempla.ted by __ s, 38 __ o(Jhe.:_Act .. ,~· It has_ no~ .b!)en:c;CQn~.\lAd<;>!,l, l:i:4we .11s,, !l}atffie;-e ... i~ anything in the Act which in terms is inconsis~~!lP - with the provisions of s. 4 7 9f the niunicipal Act. But it has been ;coritended.that· such' ari inconsistency is· im'plicit in the 'terms of-the' Act as they appear from the definitions of 'landlord', 'premises' and 'tenant'. ·In our opinion, there is no substance SUPREME COuRT~REPORTS in this contention. ·We ha~e already pointed·. out that those definitions postulflte the· relationship of landlord and tenant which can come into existence . .only by a transfer of interest in immovable property, in pursuance of a uontrac1' . These definitions are entirely silent as to the mode of creating :the relationship of landlord and tenant. .

Therefore, .the question is wh.ether the complete silence as to .the mode of creating the relationship between landlord and tenant can be construed as making a provision, by implication, inconsistent with the terms of s. 4 7 of the Municipal Act. In our opinion, the mere ·ab>ence . of such provisions does not . crea,te any inconsistency as would attract the application of s. 38 of the Act. It is note-worthy that th!.) provisions of s. 38 of the Act were not relied upon either in the High Court or in the Court of first instance. In ·those Courts great reliance bad been placed on the doctrine of part performance which bas now been crystalised in s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) and which in terms cannot apply. Rightly, therefore, no reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants on the provisions of s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

On the question of the validity of the transfer, it is necessary to consider the further argument raised on behalf of the appellants, . namely, that the power Qf the Committee. is ctintained in s. IS and not in s .. 4 7 of the M:u.nicipal Act, wliich only lays down the moqe of exeputing qontracts and transfer of property;·as appears from the marginal note to the section i. e., the \vords . "Mode of Executing Contract: and Tra.nsfor of .. Property". It is true that s. 18 contains.the power to enter into a contract and to transfer any property _held by the Cqmmittee, but s. 4 7 lays .down, the e~se11tial conditlcm,s ofthe exe,rcis() oJtlr.eri'ower ~n<l un,le$s those "conditio#s:are fp#i!ltJ!lJliere Coi.IW oC).no. contract and no .. t_ra,nsfer • 0f ]>;t"Opitrty; · ·· :i:.n: thfa. qq:iii;11,1ction. it was further argued" thilt sub s: ('3} ·ofs:· 47 only J96J D,. 71.. S. Ri<)ry -The JileU/ D~lhi AfulliCifia_l' ,Cointnittte Sinka c. J. 196) D•. H. S •. RW.y 7Jw Xtw v,u.;

Mwridj>al c.mmuw SiwC.J. says that a oontract or transfer of property contern· plated in the section executed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the section shall not be binding 011 the Committee. Therefore, the argument further is that tho con'ract may not be binding on the Committee but it is not void. Now, what iH tho legal eignificanee of tho expression "shall not bo binding on the Committee"? It simply means that it shall not be enforceable against tho Committee, a.nd it is cloar beyond doubt that an agreement not enforceable in law is void. It must, therefore, be held that the provisions of s. 4i aforesaid are essential ingredients of the power contained ins. 18 of tho Act. Tho same argument wa.s advanced in another Act form, viz., that tho effect of s. 4 7 of the Munioipa.l Act is not to render tho transactions in question between the parti68 entirely void but it was only declared to be not binding on the Committee.

In other words, tho argument is that a distinction haa to be made between acts which are uUra vir~ and those for the validity of which certain formalitie.s are necessary and have not been gone through. This distinction assumes an importance where the 1 rights of third parties have come into existence and those parties are not expected to know the true facts as to the fulfilment of those formalities. That it is so becomes cloar from the following statement of tho law in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd edition, Vol. 15) paragraph 428 at page 22i: "Di,etinction between ultra vires and irregular . acts. A distinction must be made between acts which are ultra i·ires and those for the validity of which certain formalities are necessary. In the latter ease, persons dealing without notice of any informality are entitled to presume omnia rite esse a.eta.

Accordingly a company which, possessing tho requisite powers, so cond11cts itself in issui,l;lg dehenttml as to repretlllnt to the public that SUPREME OOlJ'ltT REPOR'l'S they are legally transferable, cannot set up any irregularity in their issue against an equit· able transfere& for value who has no reason to suspect it." In this connection, it is also convenient here to notice the argument that the Committee is estopped by its conduct from challenging the enfor.ceability of the contract. The answer to the argument is that where a statute makes a specific provision that a body corporate has to act in a particular manner, and in no other, that provision of law being mandatory and not directory, has to be strictly followed. The statement of the law in paragraph 427 of the same volumP of Halsbury's Laws of England to the following effect settles the controversy against the appellants:

"Result must not be ultra vires-A party cannot by representation, any more than by other means, raise against himself an estoppal so as to create a state of things which he is legally disabled from creating. Thus, a corporate or statutory body cannot be estopped from denying that it has entered into a contract which it was ultra vires for it to make. No corporate body can be bound by estoppal to do something beyond its powers, or to refrain from doing what it is its duty to do ...... " In view of these considerations it must be held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that, therefore, the applications under s. 8 of the Act made by the appellants had been rightly dismissed by the High Court as incompetent. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs, one set of hearing fees. Appeals dismissed. 11112 -· Dr. H; S ltikhy Tiu N1w Delhi Munfr;ijol Committ1t Sinha C. ].