Jai Lal v. Delhi Administration

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J.-The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicted the appellant under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life. The Judge also convicted the appellant under sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code, sentenced him to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment and directed that the two sentences would run concurrently. An appeal was filed in the High Court of Punjab. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave. The appellant lives at Sat Nagar in Delhi. On November 25, 1961 at 1.45 p.m. he entered the house of his neighbour Somawati and stabbed her daughter Leela aged 1 t years with a knife. He inflicted five stab wounds, one on the back trunk, one on the right gluteal region, two on the right thigh and one on the chest. The injury on the back of trunk, proved fatal. Leela died in the hospital at 4 p.m.

The appellant then returned to his house and bolted the front door. A crowd collected near the front door and raised an alarm. After some time the appellant went out by the back door and stabbed another neighbour Parbati and then Raghubir who tried to intervene on her behalf. The injuries were simple incised wounds Rabhubir and others tried to apprehend him. He then ran back to his house, bolted the door and started throwing brickbats from the roof. He was later arrested by the police. All these facts are proved by unimpeachable evidence. One Dhani Ram was the father of Leela. Dhani Ram, his wife Somawati, his daughter Leela and his brother Baburam lived together in the same house. Indra is the appellant's sister. The app~llan~ al!d his father suspected that Baburam was prone to makmg ilhctt approac!Jes to Indra. On this account, the appellant had a long standing grudge against Baburam.

This enmity is said to be the mo~ve of the attack by the appellant on Leela, a member of the family of Baburam. The motive for the attack on Parbati is not clear. Raghubir was attacked because he tried to intervene. The defence plea was of insanity. The Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court concurrentlv reiected this defence. [1969) I S.C.R. We may briefly notice the evidence bearing on the plea of insanity. Since 1958 the appellant was an employre in the Stores Branch of the Northern Railway Headquarters in Baroda House. New Delhi. In 1958 and 1959 he had altercations with other clerks in the office. On May 20, 1959 his superior officer observed that he was prone to lose temper in no time. In his moments of excitement. he became dangerous and used to hit his co!leagues with anything that he could lay his hands on. But at the time of his greatest excit.,ment he could distinguish betwe.cn right and wrong. After May 1959 he worked at his desk as a nonnal man.

In March 1960 he again quarrelled with another clerk. He was suspended and sent for medical examination. At this stage he was suffering from mental illness. On October 12. I 960 he was examined bv a psychiatrist who found that be exhibited symptoms of acute schizophrenia and showed disorder of thought. emotion and perception of external re:1lities. The psychiatrist said that he was harbourinir certain delusions. The naturr of the delusions is not stat.~d. It is not proved that th·~ appellant suffered from any particular delusion or hallucination. The appellant was put on a drug named largactil and w:Ls given convulsive electrn-therapy treatment. On January 12. 1961 he was cured of his illness and was advised to join his duties. On resuming his duties the 3ppcllant worked in the office in the normal manner. There is some evidence that on the morning of November 25. 1961 and the prccedin!! night, the appellant complained that he was unwell and took medicine.

But on the morning of November 25, he went to his office as usual. He was late in attendance and wa.s marked absent. He applied in writing for one day's casual leave stating that he had an urgent piece of work at home. Nobody noticed any symptoms of mental disorder at that time. He left the office at abcut 11.30 a.m. and returned home alone. At 1.45 p.m. he stabbed Leela. Parhati and Raghubir with a knife. He concealed the knife and a search for it has proved fruit!=. At 2.45 p.m. the investigating officer arrived on the spot, arrested tho appellant and interrogated him. He wa.s then found nomial and gave intelligent answers. On the same date he was produ~ before a Magistrate. His brother was then present but the Mapstrate was not infonned that he was insane. On November 27. he was interrogated by an Inspector. It does not appear that be was then insane.

On November 30, the appellant's brother filed an application before the committing magistrate stating that the appellant was insane at the time of the occurrence. The appellant was. l~ter remanded to judicial custody. On receipt of another apphcatmn from his brother he was kept under medical observation fi:om December 16 to December 23. On December 19 the mcd1cal 8 0 JAI LAL V. DELHI ADMN. (Bachawat, /.) officer noted that the appellant was indifferent to his surrounding' and personal cleanliness, preoccupied iu his thoughts muttering to himself, making meaningless gestures, losing track of conversations, given to delayed and repetitive answers and unable to give detailed account of incidents leading to his arrest. On December 23, he was declared to be a lunatic though not violent. The psychiatrist noted that the appellant had a relapse of schizophrenia and was suffering from disorder of thought, emotion and loss of contact with realities.

From his attitude and manner of talk he was found to be aggressive. On September 6, 1962 the psychiatrist reported that the appellant was cured and was in a position to understand proceedings in court. The commitment order'was made on January 4, 1963. The trial started in February 1963. The appellant was sane at_the time of the trial. The group of aihnents dubbed schizophrenia is discussed in James D. Page's Abnormal Psychology, Ch. XI, pages 236 to 261 and Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 14th ed., pages 349 to 401. Schizophrenia is a general term referring to a group of severe mental disorders marked by a splitting or disintegra!ion, of the personality. The most striking clinical features include general psychological disharmony, emotional impoverishment, dilapidation of thought processes, absence of social rapport, delusions, halluc'nations and peculiarities of conduct.

The question is whether the appellant is criminally responsible for the acts done on November 25, 1961. Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code says :- "Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to la\¥." To establish that the acts done ar' not offences under sec. 84 it must be proved clearly that at the time of the commission of the act the appellant by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of either knowing that the acts were either morally wrong or contrary to law. The question is whether the appellant was suffering from such incapacity. at the time of the commission of the acts. On this question, the state of his mind before and after the crucial time is relevant. There is evidence of a medical character that between October 12, 1960 and January 12, 1961 he was suffering from schizophrenia.

He was completely cured of this disease on January 12, 1961 when he resumed his normal duties. He had another attack of this disease in the middle of December 1961. The attack lasted till September 1962 when he was found to be normal again. But it is to be observed that the defence witnesses do not say that even during these two periods the appellant was incapable of discriminating between right and [1969] I S.C.R. wrong or of knowing the physical nature of the acts done by him. - After the appellant was cured of the disease on January 12. 1961 he was found to be normal. He had a highly strung temperament and was easily excitable. But there is positive evidence that even at the moment of his greatest excitement he could distinguish between right and wro11g. From January upto November 24, 1961 he attended his office and discharged his duties in a nonnal manner. On the morning of November 25. 1961 his mind was normal. He went to and from his office all alone.

He wrote a sensible application askinl! for casual leave for one day. At 1.45 p.m. he stabbed and killed a child and soon thereafter he stabbed two other persons. On bis arrest soon after 2.45 p.m. he gavenonnal and intelligent answer.< to th~ investigating officers. '\/othin!! abnormal in him was noticed till Dcccm bcr 16, 1961. The thing in farnur of the appellant is that though he had a motive for attacking Baburam, no clear motive for attacking the child Lecia or Parbati is discernible. But there is clear evidence to show that he knew that his act of stabbing and killiJ1~ W'1.~ wrong and contrary to law. He concealed the weapon ;if offence. The knife could not be recovered in spite of searches. He bolted the front door of his house to prevent arrest. He then tried to run away by the back door. When an attempt was made to apprehend him he ran back to his house and bolted the door. He then tried to disperse the crowd by throwing brickbats from the roof.

Jfo conduct immediately after the occurrence displays consciousness of his guilt. He knew the physical nature of stabbing. He knew that the stabbing would kill and maim his victims. 011 a compwhensive review of the entire evidence the two courts below concurrently found that the defence of insanity under sec. 84 was not made out. We arc unable to sa\· that !he verdict of the courts below is erroneous. If a pcrwn by reason of unsoundness of mind is incapable or knowin~ the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong nr contrary to law he cannot be guilty of any criminal intent. Such a person Jacks the requisite mens rca and is entitled to an acquittal. But it is not established in the present case that the appellant was suffering from this incapacity. The general burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt not onlv the actus rrus but also the mens rca. The r1'l1'Ccution satisfactorily dischar)!ed this burden.

The appellant was not in- .sane at the time of the killin~ and stabbin~ and he knew the consequences of those acts. We must hold that he is criminally responsible for the acts. In the result. the appeal is dismissed. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed.