Malojirao Narasinghrao Shitole v. the State of Madhya Pradesh

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 302 of 1966. referred to. Appeal by special leave from the judgment 3(lld o;der dated November 13, 1962 of the Madhya Prades_!i. High Court, Gwalior Bench in Misc. Civil Petition 64 of 1961. B. Sen, P. W. Sahasrabudhe, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and S. V. Tambwekar, for the appellant. · l. N. Shroff, for the respondent. Ji' The Judgment, of the Court was delivered by Mitter, J'. This is an appeal by special leave from an order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution refusing to quash an order made by the Board of Revenue of the State throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it was barred by time. The facts are ·as follows. The appellant was a Sardar and a Jagirdar in the former Gwalior State. His J agir known as Pohari Jagir was resumed by the State on December 4, 1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951., He received a memorandum from the Jagir Commissioner on February 23.

1958 regarding the compensation payable to him under s. 13 of the Act in respect of the resumption of his jagir. On February 24, 1958 he applied to the Jagir Commissioner for a copy of the MALOJJRAO v. M. P. STATE (Mitter, /.) 90 3 judgment. The memor~ndum received by him gave the total amount of compensation detennined and the deductions to be made therefrom. It did not contain the data forming the basis of the calculations nor did it show how the authority disposed of the appellant's claim to compensation and made its o'\Wl computation. At the hearing, a copy of the judgment of the Jagir Commissioner 8 . running into twenty three pages was handed up to us giving full details of the claim and showing how the same were dealt with for fixing the amolJil]t payable to the appellant. It appears that the application of the appe!lant for a copy of the judgment was returned to him on March 11, 1958 with an endorsement that the same could be had on payment of fees.

On the very neii:t day the appellant applied for a copy of the judgment after paying the fees mentiqoed and a copy of the judgment was given to him on March 18, 1958. The appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of Revenue on June 2, 1958, As already stated, the Board did not go into the merits of the case holding the appeal to be barred by time under the provisions of s. 29 of the Act. It is necessary to note a few of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of .Jagirs Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to find out whether the appeal to the Board of Revenue was out of time. Under s. 3 of the Act the Government had to appoint a date for the resumption of an jagir }ands in the State, as soon as may be, after the commencement of the Act. The consequences of the resumption of the jagir land are given i,n s. 4.

By the operation of that section the right, title and interest of every jagtrdar and ol every other person claiming through him in his jagir lands including forests, trees etc. whether being worked or oot, were to stand resumed to the State free of all encumbrances and certain other consequences were to follow. Section 5 of the Act however enabled the Jagirdar to continue to remain in possession of lands personally cultivated by him and of certain other items of property mentiqm:d .in cl. (b) of the said section. Under s. 8 the Government was to be liable to pay to every jagirdar whose jagir land was resumed under s. 3 such compensation as would be determined in ·accordance with the principles laid down in Schedule I. Under s. 12 every Jagirdar whose jagir land had been resumed ~er s. 3 was to file in the prescribed fonn within two months from the date of. resumption, a statement ,<:J. claim for compensation before the Jagir Commissioner. Sub-s.

(2) of the section prescribed the particulars which such statement of claim had to furnish. On receipt of a statement of claim under s. 12 or if no statement was received by him within the period fixed, it was the duty of the J agir CommissiQrier to determine (a) the amount of compensation payable to the Jagirdar under s. 8, (b) the amount recoverable from him under cl. (e) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 4, ( c) the amounts of the annual maintenance allowances payable to maintenance holders, if ainy, under s. 9; ( d) the amounts payable annua,!ly to the Zamindars of the J agirdar, if any under s. 10 and ( e) the amount payable to the cosharers of a Jagirdar, if any, under s. 11. The section casts a duty on the Jagir Commissioner to cornmlljilicate !tls decision to the Government, the Jagirdar, the maintenance holders, the co-sharers and the Zamindars, if any, as soon as may be practicable. Under s. 29 the Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissio.ner under ss.

4, 10, 11, 13 or 14 had the right to appeal to the Board of Revenue within 90 days from the date of the communication of such decision to it or him and the decision of the Board of Revenue was to be final. From the above provisions of the Act, it is amply clear that neither the Government nor the Jagirdar nor any person aggrieved by the decision of the J agir Commissioner under s. 13 can file an appeal to the Board of Revenue to any purpose without a copy of the judgment showing how the decision under s. 13 was arrived at. In this case, the memorandum of compensation merely showed that a sum exceeding Rs. 1 7 lakhs had been determined as the amount payable to the appellant. 'l'he memorandum did not show how the same was computed or how the claim for compeinsation preferred by the petitioner under various heads was dealt with. In order that an appeal may be effective the appellant must be able to formulate his grounds for challenging the judgment which has gone against him.

The question there.fore arises as to whether the time taken in obtaining a copy of the judgment which forms the basis of the decision in determining the compensation can be excluded from the period of 90 days mentioned in s. 29 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. There is no provision in the Act which expressly empowers the Board of Revenue to entertain an appeal filed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of the communication of the decision under s. 13. Under s.

30 of the Act "The Jagir Commissiqner, or any other officer conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the Board of Revenue and the Collector hearing appeals from the orders of the Jagir Commissioner or the Tahsildar, as the case may be, shall follow the procedure applicable to proceedings under the Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have the same powers, in relation to proceedings before them as a revenue officer has in rel~tion to original or appellate proceed- 8 MALOJIRAO v. M. P. STATE (Mitter, J.) ings, as the case may be, under the Act." (hereinafter referred to as the Ryotwari Act). Section 34 of the Ryotwari Act provides : "Subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act in force for the time being regarding the extension and 8 computation of the period of !imitation :- ( 1) no appeal to the Board shall be brought after the expiry of ninety days from the date of the decision or the order complained of; (2)

Section 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act provides that "Except where it is otherwise specially provided the general principles of law of Limitation for the time being in force in the United State regarding extensiOl)l of the principles of !imitation shall apply to claims made under this Act before a Revenue Officer." It is clear from the language of s. 34 that in hearing an appeal under the Ryotwari .Act the Board must guide itself by the provisions of the Limitation Act ·~ force for extension and computation of the period of limitation. It would appear thats. 149(2) was aimed at giving a similar guide .Jine to the Revenue Officer. To give the said interpretation to s. 149(2) it is necessary to read "extension of the principles of limitation" occurring therein as "extensiO\Il of the period of limitation" for otherwise the section would be devoid of any meaning.

The general principles of limitation are those contained in the Limitation Act of 1908 which were in force at the date when the appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 laid down that subject to the provisions c<Jilltained in ss. 4 to 25 (inclusive). every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after the period of l~itation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule was to be dismissed although limitation had not been set up as a defence. Under s. 5 ol. the Limitation Act of 1908 an appeal could be admitted after the period of !imitation prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring or making the application within such period. Under s. 29(2) of the Limitation Act:

"Where any special or local law prescribes for any · suit appeal or application ai period of !imitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or applicatiqn by the special or local Jaw- ( a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local Jaw; and (b) the remaining provisiOlllS of this Act shaU not apply." These sections go to show that unless excluded by the Jagirs Act or Ryotwari Act section 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to appeals filed before the Board of Revenue under any of those Acts. It has been held by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Brijrajsingh v. The Board of Revenue and another(') that the expressiqn "principles of limitation" in s.

149(2) mentioned above should be construed as extension of the period of !imitation. For the reasons given above, we are in agreement with the said conclusion of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In our view, the word 'principle' therein was inserted due to inept or careless drafting aind what was meant was "period" and not 'principles'. Even if we were to read the Statute as it is, the principle of the Limitation Act is to dismiss a suit, appeal or applioation if filed beyond time but also to extend the time for filing an appeal if the delay is explained. That principle is clearly capable of extension in the present case. H sections 34 aind 149(2) were applical:ile to the facts of the ~ase before the Board of Revenue and we hold to that effect, the time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment forming the basis or giving the reasons of the decision should have been excluded in computing the period of 90 days under s. 29 of the Jagirs Act.

The appellant was ,not guilty of any !aches in his appeal to the Board of Revenue.. He applied for a copy of the judgment of the J agir Commissioner 9n the day next after communication to him of the order of the Jagir Commissioner. Even if the application was unaccompanied by any fees prescribed for the purpose, the Board of Revenue should have taken this fact into consideration before holding the appellant's appeal to be out of time. If the application for the copy of the judgment made on the 24th February was in order, the appeal was in time. Even if the time taken in obtaining the copy of the judgment be reckoned from the 12th March to 18th March, 1958, the appellaint was out by two days only in filing the appeal to the Board of Revenue. If the 1st of June 1958 which (I) Misc. Civil Case No. 22{1962 decided on 18-3-63. MALOJIRAO v. M. P. STATE (Mitter, J.) happened to be a Sunday be left out of consideration, the appellant was out by one day only.

As appears from the order dated September 28, 19§1 the Board of Revenue refused to entertain the appeal on the ground of limitation without considering the question as to whether the appellant had made out a case for condonation of delay, if any. In our view, the Board of Revenue had not acted judicially in throwing out the appeal. The High Coun: was therefore not right in upholding the order of the Board of Revenue which ignored the provisiOtllS of ss. 34 and 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act and the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. A sounder view of the law was taken by another Division Bench of the same High Court in Brijrajsingh's case(') noted above. For the reasons given the appeal is allowed, the order of the Board of Reveinue is quashed and the matter sent back to the Board for disposal of the appeal according to law and in the ·light of the observations made by us. The appellant will have the costs of this appeal. G.C. Appeal allowed. (I) Misc. Civil case No. 22fl962 decided on !8·3-63 ..