A. K. Jain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.

Judgment

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 189 of 1966. Appeaf by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 4, 1966 of the Patna High Court in Crimi,nal W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966. B. R. L. Iyengar and U. P. Singh, for the appellants. V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. I. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. This appeal against the decision of the High Court of Patna in Criminal W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966 was brought af!Er obtaining special leave from this Court. The principal question raised herein is whether the investigation which is being carried on against the appellants under sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955 (to be hereinafter rofcrred to as the Order) read with s. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act) is in accordance with law. The appellants arc office bearers of M/s. S. K. G. Sugar, Ltd. (Lauriyll).

A complaint has been registered against them under sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of the Order read with s. 7 of the Act on the ground that they have failed to pay to the sellers the price of the sugarcane purcha~ed by them, within the time prescribed. The said complaint is being investigated. The appellants are objecting to that investigation on various grounds. They unsuccessfully sought the intervention of the High Court of Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution in Cr. W.J.C. No. 11 of 1966. Hence this appeal. A. K,' JAIN v. UNION (Hegde, !.) 67 5 Mr. B. R. L. Iyengar appearing for the appellants challenged: the validity of the investigation in question on various grounds. We shall now proceed to deal with each one of those grounds. The 1st contention. of Mr. Iyengar was that sub-rule (3) of rule 3 could not have been validly issued under s. 3 of the Act. According to him the said s.

3 cannot be used for controlling the payment of the price of food crops; it can only deal with foodstuffs; food .crops are o\itside its scope. This contention has been, negatived by the High ~ourt. We agree with the High Court that there is no merit in this contention. Section 2(a) of the Act defines "essential commodity". Sub-cl. (v) of that clause brings foodstuffs within the definition of essential commodity. Clause (b) of s. 2 provides that food-crops include sugarcane. The next im· portant provisions in the Act are els. (b) and ( c) of s. 3 ( 1). Section 3 ( 1 ) provides ·that if the-Central Government is of opinion· that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution. and availability at fair prices, it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting · the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Sub-s.

(2) of that section says that without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-s. ( 1) an order made thereunder may provide .. · ... "(b) for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land, whether appurtenant to a building or not, for the growing !hereon of food-crops generally or of specified food-crops, and for otherwise maintaining or increasing the cultivation of food-crops generally, or of specified food-crops;" Clause ( c) provides for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold. From the scheme of els. (b) and ( c) of s, 2 and s. 3 of tile Act, .it is clear that the Parliament intended to bring under control the cultivation and sale of food-crops. In view of these provisions it is idle to :ontend that sugarcane does not come within the ambit :if the Act. The question whether the cultivation and sale. of sugarcane can be regulated under s. g of the Act came up f(>r the consideration of this Court ih Ch.

Tika Ramji and Ors. e.·..:. v. The State of U.P. and Ors.(') At page& 432 and 433 of the report it is observed : "Act X of 1~55 included;;Within the definition of essential commodity foodstuffS which we have seen above would incfode sugar as Well as sugarcane. This Act was enacted 'by Parliament in exercise of the conm (1956) S.C.R. 432. ·676 [1970] l S.C.R. current legislative power under Entry 3 3 of List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops of sugarcane and section 3 ( 1 ) gave the Central Government powers to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein for maintaining or increasing the supplies thereof er for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.

Section 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government to provide inter alia for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not for growing thereon of foodcrops generally or specified foodcrops ans section 3 (2 )( c) gave the Central Government power for controlling the price at which any ess~ntial commodity may be bought or sold. These prov1s1ons w.:mld certainly bring within the scope of Central legislation the regulation of the production of sugarcane as also the controlling of the price at which sugarcane may be bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control Order, 1955 which was issued by the Central Government on 27th August, 1955, it also issued the Sugare11ne Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing it With the power to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment thereof as also the power to regulate the movement of sugarcane.

Parliament was well within its powers in legislating ill regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was also well within its powers in issuing the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 in the manner it did because all this ',las in exercise of the concurrent power of legislation under Entry 3 3 of List UL" It 1-i needless to say anything more on this question. It '!+as next contended by Mr. Iyengar that the regulation of ·the IJCi:ce of sugarcane is expressly dealt with by the Bihar Sugar Factorlell Control Act, 1937 and therefore we should not impliedly ~pell out the same power from the provisions of t.he Order and the Act. Mr. Iyengar is not right in cmltending that the power that is sought to be exercised in the instant case is an implied one.

Sub-rule (3) of rule 3 specifically provides that unless t~ere is an agreement in writing to the contrary between the par- !ies the purc~as~r shall pay to the seller the price of the sugarcane purchased w1thip .14 days from the date of the delivery of the s~garcane .. Tins 1s a specific mandate. If the Bihar Act pro- ·v1des anythmg to the contrary the same mnst be held to have been A. K. JAIN' v. UNION (Hegde, J.) altered in view of Art. 372 of the Constitution which· provides that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until ~ltered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. Quite_ clearly the Bihar Act is a pre-Constitution Act and it could have continued to be in force only till it was altered, repealed or amended by a compe.ent legislature or other competent authority.

We shall presently see that the authority that altered or amended that law is a competent one. The next contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that the Parliame.nt had no competence to enact any law relating to the control of sugarcane as that subject is within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the State, the same being a part of agriculture. This contention is again unsustainable in view of Entry 33 of List III of the Constitution which empowers the Parliament to legislate in respect of production, supply and distribution of foodstuffs. It is not disputed that the Parliament had declared by law that it is expedient in public interest that it should exercise control over foodstuffs. That being so it was well within the competence of Parliament to enact the Act and hence the power conferred on the Government ·under s. 3 of the Act cannot be challenged as invali:I. There is no substance in the contention that the impugned order contravenes the fundamental right guaranteed to !he citizens under Art. 19 (1).

No fundamentai right is conferred on a buyer not to pay the price of: the goods purchased by him or to pay the s~me whenever he pleases. The contention that in view of s. 11 of the Act, no cognizance could have been taken of the offence alleged is premature. 111is question does not arise in this case. No court has yet taken co~nizance of the case. That stage has still to come. There is no substa)lce in the contention that the compfaint made before the police does not disclose a cognizable offence and as such the police could not have taken up the inves.igation of that complaint. The offence complairied of is punishable with three years· imprisonment and as such it falls within the 2nd Sch. of the Cr. P.C. and consequently the same is a cognizable offence as defined in s. 4(l)(f) of the Cr. P.C. Hence it \\as open to the police to investigate the same. For the reasons mentioned above we. are unable to accept any of the c?ntention advanced on &half of the appellants.

In the result this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. G.C. Appeal dismissed.