Jeewan Nath Wahal & Ors. v. Sheikh Mahfooz Jan & Ors.

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. The question arising in this appeal, by certifitate, may be stated thus : When an applicant applies for a permit to run a passenger bus service on the ground that the route for wl<.:h he applies, thou,,,h one .not yet opened, is necessar'. in public interest, but the Regional Transport Awhority comes to the conclusion that it does not, and thereupon rejects hi; application, whether his n;Jer is OIL under s. 48 of the Motor Vehicles Act, -4 of 1939 and is, therefore, appeal able umler s. 64 (a) of that A .. ·:? The route involved in this case was the one between Meerut and Da,,':aur which had no direct passenger bus service.

There were, lwwevcr, two routes which were being operated, namely. one fn11-1 Meerut to Bulandsharhar and the other from Siana to D~~n ·1ur. one crossing: the other, so that if one wanted to go from M ·erut to Dankaur there was no direct ·service, and therefore, he ·muld have first to travel in the bus running from Meerut to Bul<•··dshahar, get down at a place near Gulsothi and catch the bus ·unning from Siana to Dankaur. This was the position when t' , appellants, amongst others, applied to the Regional Transrn'· · Authority for oermits to operate a direct service from Meerur .. , Dankaur. This was, therefore, not a case where the R.T.A '·ad already decided upon opening the new route, fixed the num''er of permits necessary for such a route and then invited applic<"' ms from operators. Nevertheless, the R.T.A., follow- J. N. WAHAL V. S. M. JAN (She/at, !.) ing the procedure laid down in s.

57 of the Act, published these applications, to which objections were raised amongst otheci by tho~e who were operating on the routes earlier referred 'to. These applications came up for consideration in the meeting held before the R.T.A. on July 28, 1965 when Item 3 of the Agenda for that meeting was : "To pronounce decision regarding recognition and classification of Meerut to Dankaur via Hapur Gulsothi Sikandarabad route and grant of permits thereon." I! is apparent that Item 3 involved two questions for determination of the R.T.A.; (a) whether the route proposed by the appellants and others should be opened, and (b) if so, to whom, amongst the applicants, should permit or permits, depending upon the number of permits he should decide upon, should be granted. After hearing the applicants and those who opposed them, the R.T.A. was satisfied that there was no sufficient demand for such a direct service, and therefore, there was no justification for opening the proposed new route.

Having arrived at that conclusion the question of granting or not granting permits to· individual applicants did not arise and he rejected the applications of the appellants and other applicants. Appeals having been filed before the Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal reversed the· order of the R.T.A. and granted permits io the three appellants. The respondents thereupon filed writ petitions in the High Court for quashing the order of the Tribunal contending that no appeiil against the order of the R.T.A. lay under s. 64(a), and that con sequently, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain such· appeals and grant permits to the appellants. The learned Sin61e Judge of the High Court, who heard the writ petitions in the first instance, dismissed them, but on appeal against his order the Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that no· appeal against the said order of the R.T.A. lay under s.

64(a), and accordingly, allowed the writ petitions and quashed the Tri· bunal's order. This appeal is directed against this order. Counsel for the appellants urged that there was no provision: in the Act separately providing for the R. T .A. to decide first as to whether particular route proposed by an applicant should be opened or not. It was argued that the provisions of Ch.• IV. and in particular ss. 47 and 57, show that once an application for a permit is made ana is published and objections thereto are invited and the R.T.A. applies his mind to it and rejects it, no matter what his reasons for such rejection are, his order amounts to a refusal· under s. 48 and is appealable under s. 64 (a). The rival c<;mtention, on the other hand, was that s. 4 7 ( 3), which L2Sup. Cl/70-4 ·contains the power of the R.T.A. to first determH1e the. number of permits necessary for a particular route, [which dec1s1on,. as held by this Court, is not appealable under s.

64 (a)], contams also the power to decide whether a proposed route . should be opened or not, and that it is only after these two pomts are first decided, that the question, who amongst the applicants showld be granted permits, arises. It is at this latter stage that the question of granting or refusing to grant a permit arises under s; 48, and it is against an order under that section that an appeal under s. 64(a) is provided. The argument was based on the principle that a right of appeal is not something which is inherent, but is that which and to the . extent it is provided for by the · statute. The provisions of the Act relevant to the questions raised in this appeal as also their scheme have been more than once examined by this Court. There is, therefore, no necessity to analyse them once more. In Abdul Mateen v. R. K. Pand'ey(') the question was whether the Bihar Governnent acting under ·s.

64-A, as amended by the Bihar Amendment Act, 1950, had the power to increase the number of permits for which rpplica- - tions had been invited by the R.T.A. In neg~tiving the claim that the State Gov~rnment had such power, this Court inter a/ia held thats. 47(3) was concerned with a "general order" limiting stage carriages on a consideration of matters specified in s. 4 7, and that such an order can be modified by the R.T.A. if it so decides one way or the other. But such a modification is not a matter' llf consideration when it is dealing with the actual grant of permit under s. 48 read with s. 57, for, at that stage what the R.T.A.·has to do is to choose between various applicants who may have applied under s. 46. The Court held that that is not the stage when the "general order" passed under s. 47(3) can be reconsidered, for, the order under s. 48 is subject to s. 47 including the provisions of s. 47(3) ander which the "general order" limiting the number of permits is passed.

At page 531 of the Report, the Court further held that the appeal contemplated under s. 64 is by a person who is aggrieved by the order specified therein and does not contemplate - any appeal against "the general order" passed und.;r s. 4 7 ( 3). Ori this view of s. 47, it was lastly held that when an appeal is taken from an order under s. 48 and a revision is applied tor under s. 64-A · o.f the Bihar Amendment Act, the power of the Appellate Autho- ~1ty, as also of. the State Go 0vernment as the revisional authority, is as much subject to s. 47(.>) as the power of the RT.A. under s. 48, i.e., it cannot grant a permit beyond the limit alreadv decided upon under s. 47(3). In Mis. Java Ram Mo.tor Sen·i;e 11) [t963J 3 S.C.R. 523. J. 1''. WAHAL v. s. M. JAN (She/at, !.) v. S. Rajarathinain, (') the R.T.A. had already introduced the new bus route and then had invited applications for permits. ~.applicants applied fur p~rmit~.

The R.T.A., howev~r, rejected thein all on the ground that there was after all no need for the new route. "On these facts the question was, whether a person, whose applicatio'n is rejectei:I. by the R:T.A. on the ground that there was no need for a new route, in spite of his decision previQ.Usly arrived at that such a route was necessary, could appeal under s; 64(a) against such rejection .. J'.ollowing the decision in Abdul Mateen's case(') we held that : "the Authority had already resolved to introduce a new bus route and invited appiications for a permit under sec. 57 (2). It could no doubt have acted under sec. 4 7 ( 3) and modified its earlier decision. Instead, what it did was that while considering the, question as to who amongst the 34 applicants should· be granted that permit, i.e.; at the stage not under section 4 7 (3) but under sec. 48 ( 1), it decided to refuse all applications on the ground that there was no longer any need for any such permit.

In other words, though the earlier order was still intact, the authority rejected the applications on the ground that there was no need for any fresh permit. The order was clearly contrary to the previous order nassed under sec. 4 7 ( 3) and therefore cannot be said fo be in consonance with sec. 4 7 as required by sec. 48 ( 1). The order was not one under sec. 4 7 ( 3) but under sec. 48 (1) refusing thereby the applications including those of the appellant and the respondents and was therefore subject to an appeal under sec. 64(a)." Does it make any difference to the principle laid down in thes~ decisions. whether the RT.A. invites applications having previously decided to introduce a new route or whether an applicant proposes such a new route and ~p;>]ics for a permit. Abdul Mateen's case('). and the case bf Java Ram Motor Service(') were cases where the R.T.A. had first decided to introduce a new route and had then invited application. On the other hand, in R. Obliswami Naidu v. The Addi.

State T"f'tfnsport Appellate Tribunal, Madras(') no such decision had been previously taken by the RT.A. and the.appellant had applied for a permit on a new route. The question canvassed there was whether the R.T.A. ha~ first to decide the necessity of such a new route, and then havmg come to such a decision proceed (I) CA95of1965decd. on0ctober27,1967. (2) ]1963] 3 S.C.R. 523. (3) CA 1426of1968, dee. on Feb. 17, 1969. to examine the question whether an applicaQ.t should or should not be· granted the permit. The Appellate Tribunal had held that the procedure foilowed by the R.T.A. was not in accordance with law as it had failed to determine the question of the J!eed for a service for the new route applied for by the appellant before deciding his application for permit, and had contravened the provisions of s. 4 7 ( 3). The appellant challenged the order by a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed.

In the appeal in this Court against that order, Hegde, J., speaking for the Court, uoheld the view of the Appellate Tribunal and held that though s. 47(3), if read by its~lf, did not throw light on the question, secs. 47 and 57, when read together, made it clear that the R.T.A. had first to arrive at a decision whether there was the necessity fo\. the new route", and then decide under s. 48 whether the appellant should be granted a pem1it or not This decision clearly shows that it makes no difference between cases where applications are invited by the R.T.A. aft.er having come to the conclusion as to the necessity for a new route, or where an applicant himself proposes a new route and applies for a permit. In both the cases, the R.T.A. has to decide, before reaching the stage of s. 48 when he considers individual applications for deciding as to whom amongst the applicants the permit should b~ granted, whether the new route is necessary in the interest of the public.

The decisions referred to above, in our opinion, clearly Jay down that the R.T.A. has first to make "a general order" as stated in Abdul Mateen's case(') under s. 47(3} as to the number of permits necessary for a new route and he cannot exceed that limit while he is at the uext stage when he considers under s. 48 read with s. 57 as to who amongst the applicants should be granted the permit or permits. Such a "general order" limiting the number of permits presupposes that he has come to a decision that the new route either proposed by him or by an applicant or applicants is necessary in public interest. Obviously, he does not have to decide the number of permits necessary for such a new route unless he first decides that the new route should be opened. If the order as to the number of permits is a "general -order" passed under s. 47(3), in respect of which the individual applicants are not concerned with and is anterior to the stage under s.

48 when applications of the individual operators are takenfuto ccnsideration,and therefore, not "appealable under s. 64(a), it must follow a fortiori that the decision as to whether the new route is necessary or not is equally a "general order" arrived at either earlier or contemporaneously with the decision as lo the number of permits. If the latter order is not appealable, (I) [1963] S.C.R. 523. 0 J. N. WAHAL v. s. M. JAN (She/at, J.) it cannot be that the former, i.e., the decision wheth~r the new route is necessary or not, is not an equally "general order" with which iPdividual applicants are not concerned, and can appeal against it under s. 64 (a). On this view, it would at first sight appear as if the R.T.A. has an· unlimited or unbridled power in .connection with the decision as to whether a proposed route should be opened or not. That it is not so is clear from s.

64-A introduced in the Act by Act 100 of 1955 which confers revisional power on the State Transport Authority, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, to call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by the RT.A. and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that such an order is improper or illegal, to pass such of'ler as it deems fit. In our view the Division Bench of the High Court correctly interpreted ss. 47, 48, 57 and 64, and the decisions of this Court in Abdul Mateen's.case(') and the case of Jaya Ram Motor Service('). The appeal, consequently, must fail and has to be dismissed. The oppellants will pay to the respondents the costs of this appeal. R.K.P.S. Appeal dismissed. (I) (1%3) 3 S.C.R. 52J. (2) C.A. No. 95 of 1965 d<ed. on Oct. 27, 1967.