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Supreme Court of India

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satya Narain Prasad

[1970] 3 S.C.R. 1981969 INSC 319
Decided30-10-1969
BenchS.M. Sikri
Case typeCivil Appeal
SubjectProperty & Transfer of Property
ResultDismissed
CNRESCR010002271970
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Judgment

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH SATYA NARAIN PRASAD October 30, 1969 [S. M. SIK.RI, G. K. MITTER AND P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, JJ.] Northern India Ferries Ac/, 1878 (17 of 1818), s. IO-Notice under section must be given by or under authority ojl State Government .. Pleadings-Validity of notice challenged in suit-Not necessary to ,'i/ate every legal ground in support of challenge. The respondent was granted the lease of a public ferry by the State of Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years. Under s. 10 of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878 the State Government was empowered to cancel such a lease on the expiry of six months notice in writing to the lessee of its intention to cancel the lease. Befcte the expiry of the full term of his lease the respondent's lease was ordered to be ,terminated, the notice under s. 10 having been given by the Executive Engineer.

In a suit for permanent injunction restraining the State Government from terminating his lease and taking possession of the ferry, the respondent challenged the validity of the notice unde'r s. I 0 given by the Executive Engineer. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and the trial court's decree was affirmed in second appeal by the High Court. The State appealed by special leave to this Court. The requirements of a notice under s. 10 of the Act fell for consideration. HELD : ( i) In construing s. 10 of the Act it has to be borne in nund that it deals with the cancellation of a lease of tolls of a public ferry. In other words, once the notice is effective valuable rights of the lessee come to an end. This is recognised by the Legislature by providing a six months' notice. This period is given so that he can wind up this particular business. In this context the notice of intention to cancel the lease cannot be an empty formality.

The notice must be such that the lessee cait safely act upon it and reiJllate his affairs; he must not speculate at his peril as to what is the true position. Therefore a notice undelr s. 10 of the Act must on its face show that what is being conveyed is Government's intention to cancel a lease and that it is being conveyed either by the Government itself or an officer duly authorised on its behalf. [200 E- 201 Al In the present case the body of the notice did not fulfil the above requirement of s. 10. Merely because the notice was signed by the Executive Engineer an.d mentioned s. 10 it could not be said that the Executive Engineer was cxpTessing the intention of the Government. An officer of the Government has no general authority to act on its behalf. Even if he holds out on behalf of the Government that he has the right to do a particular thing. the right must in fact exist. [200 G-HJ (ii)

When the validity of the notice was challenged in the plaint it was not necessary that every legal ground of challenge should have been stated therein. [20 I B-Cj C1vn. APPELLATE JuRrsmcnoN: Civil Appeal No: 1117 of 1966. 11 U.P. STATE >'. S. N. PRASAD (Sikri, J.) Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated 8 October 11, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in Second Appeal No. 81 of 1957. C. B. Agarwala and 0. P. Rana, for the appellant. L. M. Singhvi and U. P. Singh, for the respondent. The Judgment ct the Court was delivered by Sikri, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad i;n Second Appeal No. 81 of 1957, whereby the High Ccurt (S. N. Katju, J.) allowed the appeal, set ·aside the decree of the court below and decreed the suit in terms of the decree passed by the Trial Court.

A very short point arises in this appeal and this is whether the notice dated July 22, 1953, which we will reprqduce presently, was in compliance with the provisions of s. 10 of the Northern India Ferries Act, 1878-hereinafter referred to as the Act. In order to appreciate the points raised before us it is necessary to give a few facts. Sa1ya Narain Prasad, respondent before us, was granted a lease of ·oazi Tolla Ferry for three years on October 18, 1951. The agreed :ent was Rs. 46,500/-. Before the date of the expiry of the leas~. G. D. Mathur, Exec11tive Eugineer, Banaras Provincial Division, gave a notice to the respondent, dated July 22, 19 5 3, i.n the following terms : "Subject Lease of Qazitola Ferry Notice is hereby given to you under Section 10 of the Northern India Ferries Act and included as clause 14 of your lease agreement that on expiry of six months notice from today, the lease of the above mentioned ferry in your favour as lessee will be terminated."

Section I 0 of the Act, referred to iitl the notice, rea<ls as follows : 'The State Government may cancel the lease of the tolls of any public ferry on the expiry of six months notice in writing to the lessee of its intention to cancel such lease. When any lease is cadlcelled under this section, the Magistrate of the District in which such ferry is situate shall pay to the lessee such compensation as such Magistrate may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, award." The notice expired on January 21. 1954, and on February 17, 1954, the notice termina·.ing the lease under s. 1 O was given. Jn the meantime, the respondent had given a notice under s. 80, C.P.C., and on February 18, 1954, he filed a suit challenging the order of termination of the kasc. The plaintiff h•1d prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the State from determining the lease and taking over possession of the Qazitolla Ferry. The Trial Court decreed the suit.

The State appealed and the Civil· Judge, Ghazipur, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The High Court held that the notice dated July 22, 1953, did not comply with the provisions of s. 10 of the Act. Katju, 1., observed: "There must be a notice in writing saying that the lease shall be cancelled after the expiry of six months from the date of the ;notice. Furthermore, the notice must show that it is the intention of the State Government that lease should be cancelled after the expiry of six. months. It is manifest that the notice on the face of it should show that the State Government intends that the lease shall be terminated after the expiry of six months from the date of the notice. In the notice given by Sri C. D. Mathur, there is nothing to indicate that the State Government had decided that the lease should be cancelled. The notice on the face of it shows that it was given by the Executive Engineer.

It was open to the appellant to interpret the notice to mean that the Executive E;ngineer desired to terminate the lease and it did not show that the· State Government also intended that the lease should be terminated." In construing s. 10 of the Act it has to be borne in mind that it deals with the cancellation of a lease of tolls of a public ferry. In other words, once the notice is effective valuable rights of a Jessee come to an end. This is recognised by the Legislature by providing a six months notice. This period is given so that he can wind up this particular business. In this context the notice of intention to cancel the lease cannot be an empty formality. The notice must be such that the Jessee can safely act ·upon it and regulate his affairs. It follows from this that the notice must on the face of it comply with all the requirements of 5. 10. The first requisite of a valid notice under s. 10 is that it must express· the intention of the Government.

The body of the notice in this case does not do so. It is urged that the notice is signed by C. D. Mathur, Executive Engineer, and mentions s. 10 of the Act, and these facts should have led the Jessee to conclude that the Executive Engineer was expressing Government's intention. It is not disputed that Government can authorise an officer, either by a general order or a special order to give a notice of Government's intention. But in that event, the officer should say so in the notice. An officer of a Government has no general authority to act on its behalf. Even if he holds out on behalf of the Government that he has th~ right to Jo a particular thing, the right niust U.P. STATE v. S. N. PRASAD (Sikri, /.) in fact exist. In cannot be that the lessee must speculate at his peril as to what is the true position. It seems to us that in view of these considerations a illotice under s.

10 of the Act must on its face show that what is being conveyed is Government's intention to cancel a lease and that it is being conveyed either by Government itself or an officer duly authQrised on its behalf. It is urged that this particular ground was not mentioned in the plaint. But the validity of the notice was challenged and it is not necessary that every legal ground of challenge should have been stated ill1 the plaint. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. G.C. Appeal dismissed. M 6 Sup. Cf/70-14