Munshi Singh & Others Etc. Etc. v. Union of India Etc. Etc.

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals No. 2356 of 1968. Appeal by certificate under Article 133 of the Constituti0n of India from tlte judgment and ordrr dated March 26, 1968 of _the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ No. 662 of 1971 and Civil Appeals Nos. 1139, 1475 and 1476 of 1971. Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated April 2, 1968 of the High Court at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ, No. 3671, 3670 and 3669 of 1967 respectively and Civil Appeals Nos. 1140 and 1785 of 1971 Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order dated April 2, 1968 of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Nos. 3667 and 3668 of 1967 r:spectively and Civil Appeal No. 1888 of 1970 Appeal by certificate from the judgment and decree dated March 26, 1968 of the. Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 465 of 1967. K. R. Chowdhry, for tl:e appellant (in C.A. No. 2356 of 1968). G. L. Sanghi and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1 (in C.A. No. 2356/68) and G. N. Dikshit, M. V. Goswami and O. P. Rana, for the State of U.P., Collector of Meerut & Special Land Acquisition Officer, Meerut (in all the appeals).

0. P. Rana, for the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad (in all the appeals). U. P. Singh and Shiv Pujan Singh, for the appelfo.nt in C.A. Nos. 1139, 1140 and 1785 of 1971). (1973] 1 S.C){. L. M. Singhvi, P. C. Bhartari, for the appellants (in C. A. Nos. 1475 and 1476 of 1971). L. M. Singhvi, U. P. Singh and S. C. Dingra, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 1888 of 1970). A. K. Sen, G. P. Goyal and M. V. Goswami, for respondent No. 4 (in C.A. No. 1888/70). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. These appeals from the decision of the Allahabad High Court involve a common point and shall stand disposed of by this judgment. It is necessary to •tare the facts only in C.A.1888 of 1970. The U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act 1958 received the assent of the Prelident on October 8, 1958. On December 10, 1958 a notification was issUl'.,d by the U.P. Government declarii:ig Ghaziabad a regulated area under s. 3 of the aforesaid Act. In February 1959 the Controlling Authority under s.

4 of the Regulation Act was constituted. On July 16, 1960 a notification was issued under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State Government declaring its intention ito acquire land measuring about 34,000 acres in fifty villages of Ghaziabad for planned development of the area. On December 23, 1961 a notification was issued under ss. 6 and 17 of the Acquisition Act in respect of an area of 19. 7 5 acres. This was folfowed by successive piecemeal notifications on various d<rtes in 1962 and 1. 963. On February 9, 1962 another notification was issued under s. 4 of the Acquisition Act modifying the earlier notification dated July 16, 1960. By this notification the proposed area from 34,000 acres was reduced to 6158 acres. On July 4, 1962 the appellants made an application to the Special Land Acquisition Officer Ghaziabad for supplying a copy of the scheme of the planned development for which notification under s.

4 had been issued to enable them to make representations at the hearing of 1the objections filed under S. SA of the Acquisition Act. It was mentioned inter alia in that application that the Government had not published the scheme of the planned development and without a copy of the scheme for which the notification had been published "no forceful arg11- ments could be submitted·'. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made the follgwing order on th~t application : "The scheme of the planned development is not necessary for a notification under s. 4 of the Act, as such, no such scheme of the planned development is available in this office." On September 4, 1962 the Stat.e Government sancitioned the Master Plan of Ghaziabad under the Regulatio'n Act. On September 27, 1962 a writ petition was filed by the appellants in the ll MUNSHI SINGH v. UNION (Gro1·er, J.) !J7 i' High .Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid notifications.

Several oiher writ petitions were also filed by other petitioner!. On December 10, 1965 a batch of 39 writ petitions including the. appellants' petition were allowed by the High Court and the notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisitions Act were· quashed on the jl,found of invalidity of piecemeal notifications. Another batch of writ petitions was similarly allowed quashing the notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisition Act on the same ground. On February 9, 1966 this court decided in State of Madhya Prade1h & Others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma & Others(') that 'piecemeal and 'uccessive notifications under s. 6 of the Acquisition Act was not permissible. On February 20, 1967 the President of India promulgated the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) O:-di- 1mace No. 1 of 1967. The validity of this Ordinance apart from the legality of the notifications issued was challenged in the High Court by the appellants in February 1967.

In April 1967 an Act was passed on the same lines as the Ordinance. The provisions of the Act were also challenged before the High Court by necessary amendment in the writ petitions filed. by the appe!l1mts. This Court in Udai Ram Sharma & Othrs etc. v. Unin,n of India & Others(') upheld the validity of the Acquisition Amending Act of 1967. On March 26, 1968 the High Court dismissed the writ petition of the appellants. In view of the judgment of this Court the High Court repelled the contentions of th» appellants impugning the validity of the Acquisition Amendment Act 1967. Another point which was agitated before the High Court was that the notification under s. 4 was too vague and afforded no adequate basis for the lodging of objection under s. 5A of the Acquisition Act Certain other points were also raised' which need not be mentioned. The High Court observed thf<t all these points had been urged in the writ petition No. SS of 1963 which had been heard along with any other writ petitions by the Division Bench which, by i•ts judgment dated December 24, 1965, had negatived them.

For the reasons mentioned in that .iudgment these contenti011s were also repelled. Dr. L. M. Singhvi sou!!ht to raise a number of points before us but ultimately he confined his arll.'Uments mainly to one queslion. Reference has been made to the notification dated Julv 1" 1960 issued under s. 4 as also to subsequeoit notification dated February 9, 1962 amending the earlier notification. The earlier notification to the extent it is material h ai follows :-· "In pursuance of the provisions of under (?) sub-s. ( l) of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. J of 1894), the Governor of U.P. is pleased (IJ lt966] 3 S.C.R. 557. (2) [1968] J s.c.R. 41. B-Ll72Sup Cl/73 [1973] l s.c.R. to notify for general information that the land mentioned in the schedule is likely to oo needed for a public purpose. 2.

Under Section 5-A of the said Act, ~ny person interested in the land may, within thirty days after the issue of this notification, make an objection to the acquisition of the land for any land in the locality in writing to the Collector, Meerut. For what purpcse : For ]Jlanned development of the area. Note :-A plan of the land may b.~ inspected in the office of Collector, Meerut." In the writ petition a specific plea was taken in paras 35 (b) an<l 36 'that no proper, reasonable or effective opportunity was available to the appellants to file any objections under s. SA of the Acquisition Act inasmuch as the notification gave no indication that different pieces of land wo1,1ld be acauired for different authorities in different circumstances and for different purposes. Accordinlo( to para 36 the appellants did not get any effective or reasonable opportunity of objecting under s.

5 A of the Acquisition Act inasmuch as the purpose shown was extremely vague and there was no definite scheme before the State Government at the material time to show how the land would be developed and to what use it would be put. Para 33 of the petition may also be noticed. It is stated therein that different notifications published under s. 6 of the Acauisition Act from time to time clearly indicated that the State Government did not have any specific scheme of development at the time the notification under s. 4 was published, nor had it any idea as to whether the land would be utilized by it or would be utilized for the purposes of U.P. State Industrial Corporation or the Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad. In the return which wM file<l para 9 contained the reply to para 33 and this is what Wll.5 stated : "That the allegations made in paragraph 33 of the petition are denied.

The scheme for the planned develooment of the area was there when the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued although the scheme at that stage had not been finalised in the details". No r.ep!y is to be found in the return to paragraphs 35 lb) and 36 of the writ petition. We mav also refer to paragraoh 14 of the petition in which the order of' the Special Land Acauisition Officer was reproduced in respect of the applications filed by the Jl MUNSHI SINGH \', UNION (Grover, !.) appellaI1ts for supplying the copy of the scheme of the planned development. It is noteworthy that in the return nothing was said about this order. Dr. Singhvi has based his argument on the above significani facts. , According to him 1the words in the notification, namdy, 'for planned development of the area" gave no indicatioa whatsoever as to the precise purpose for which the land was required. Planned development could be of various kim,J. It could be for residential, industrial or some similar purpose.

Moreover for devdopment' of a particular area ihe Governmerit mav acquire the land itself and develop it or it may control the development of that area by making a scheme or a Mgster Plan. It is\ urged that the scheme of the Acquis~tion Act shows that public purpo"~ for which the land is needed or is likely to be needed shou)d be stated with sufficient particularity and in such a manner that a land owner should be able to file an objection under s. SA. The whole object of s. SA would be defeated if the public· purpose is stated vaguely and without any indication of the nature of the purpose for which the land is being or is intended to be acqui~ed. It is necessary to examine the scheme of the Acquisition Act. This Act was enacted to amend the law for the acquisition of land for public purpose and for companies. The expression "public purpose" is defined by s. 3 (f). By the Land Acquisition (U.P. Amendment) Act 1954 s.

3 was amended and for clause (f) in the Central Act the following clause was substi1tuted : "(f) the expression "public purpose'; includes provision for or in connection with.,..-- (i) ......................... ', ... . (ii) the laying out of village sites, townships or the extension, planned development' or improvement of existing village sites or itown~hips; (iii) I n Section 4(1) provides for a notification to 1be issued and public notice of the same to be given whenever it appears to the appropriate Govermnent 'that land in any locality 1is needed or is likely to be needed for any pubiic purpose. Sub's. (2) is in these terms: "4(2) "Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorised by such Gov.~rmnent in this behalf. and 'for his servants and workmen,- to enter 1_:non 1nd survev and' take levels of ~!nv l~~qd in such Jncalirv: SUPREME' COURT REPORTS [1973]

1 S.C.R, to dig or bore into the sub-soil; 'lo do all other acts necessary - to ascertain whether the land is adopted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the land proposed 10 be taken and the intended line of the work: (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark: such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cul'ting trenches; and, where othern'ise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle : Provided that. .... , ... , ......... , ...... " Sub-sections (1) and (2) of s. 5A being material for purposes of the present appeal may be set out in extenso : ( 1 ) 'rny person intere~ted in any land which has ~n notified under section 4, sub-s.

(1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after th.e issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in t.he locality, as the case may be, ( 2) Every objection under sub-section ( 1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give 1the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section ( l) or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land ito the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections. together with the record of the proceedings held by him. for the decision of that Goverrunent. The decision of the appropriate Gov•;rnrnent on the objection shall be final".

Section 6(1) says, inter alia, that when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report made under s. 5A(2) that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for company adeclaration shall be made to that effect bv th~ authority mentioned therein. According to sub-s, (3) such a declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needeif for a public purpose or for a company as the case may be. After the n 8 MUNSHI SINGH v. UNION (Grover, J.) declaration under s. 6 the Collector has to \ake orders for acquisition tmder s. 7 Section 8 provides for land to be marked out, measured and planned and s. 9 for notices to persons interested. Section 11 d.J:Oals with inquiry into measurements, value and claims and the award by the Collector. It is not necessary to refer to any otber provision. It is apparent from sub-s. ( 2) that the public purpose which has to be stated in sub-s. ( 1) of s.

4 has to be particularised because unless that is done the various matters which are mentioned in sub-s:(2) carmot be carried out; for insta.,ce, the officer concerned or his servants and workmen cannot de any act necessary to a:.certain whether it is suitable for the purpose for which it is being acquired. If the public purpose stated in s. 4 (1) is planned development of the area without anything more it is extremely difficult to comprehend how all the matters set out in sub-s. (2) can be carried out by th'e officer specially authorised ;il this behalf and by his servants and workmen. Section SA embodies a very just and who~~some principle that a person whose property is being or is intended to be acquired ahould have a proper and reasonable opportunity of persuading the authorities concerned that acquisition of the property belonging to that person should not be made. ·We may refer to the observation of this Court in Nandeshwar Prasad & Anr. v. Tire State of U.P. & Others(') that the right to file objections under s.

5A is a substantial right when a person's property IS being threatened with acquisition and that right cannot be taken away as if by a side wind. Sub-section (2) of s. SA makes it obligatory on the Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all objections and making further inquiry Ile is to make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections is then final. The declaration under s. 6 has to be made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under s. 5A(2). The legislature has, therefore. mac!e comp~ete provisions for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been confen-ed on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of s. SA: (Sees.

17 ( 4) of the Acquisition Act). As already noticed in the notifications under s. 4 all that wa~ stated was . that the land was required for "planned development at the area". There was no indication whatsoever whether the (l) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 440. SUPREME· COURT REPORTS [l 973] 1 S.C.I!.. development was to be· of residential and building sites or of commercial and industrial plots nor was it possible for any one interested in the land sought to be acquired to find out what kind of planned development was under contemplation i.e. whether the land would be acquired and the development made by the Govcrmnent or whether the owners of properties would be required· to develop· a particular area in a specified way.

If the Master Plan which came to be sanctioned on September 4, 1962 had been available for inspection by the persons interested in filing objections or even if tM knowledge of its existence on ·the part of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved the position may have been different. In that situation the appellants could not claim that they were unable to file objections owing to the lack of any indication in the notification under s. 4 of the nature of development for which the area was being requisitioned. On behalf of the State it has been pointed out that the appellants had themselves filed a copy of the Master Plan which was sanctioned on September 4, 1962 and that it was a matter of common knowledge that the Master Plan was umlcr rrcparation.

The details n;lating to the Master Plan and the Plan itself' had been published in the local newspapers and the appellants could have easily discovered what the proposed scheme was with regard to the development of the area in which they were int!rcc.~cd ._ In view of the peculiar circumstances of these cases we gave an opportunity to the State 10 apply for amendment of its return since nothing had been said about these matters therein and to produce additional evidence in support of its allegations. Such a petition was filed and certain documents were sought to be placed on the record. After a careful consideration of the petition for amendment and the evidence sought to be adduced we dismissed the prayer for amendment as well as for production of additional evidence as we were not satisfied that the documents sought to be produced were either relevant or were required to enable this Court to pronounce judgment.

Learned counsel for the State next contended that the proposed acquisition was in pursuance of the activity under the Regulation Act. Moreover planned development is one of the public purposes as defined ins. 3(f) as amended by the U.P. Amending Act 1954. Mere_mention of such a public purpose was sufficiwt to .satisfy the requirement of law. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Arnold Rodricks & Another v. State of Maha· rashtra( 1 ) in which in the notification under s. 4 it was stated that the land was needed "for a public purpose, viz, for development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area". It was said that the purpose specified was a public purpose within the Acquisition Act. The points which arose for (I) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 885. ll 0 MUNSHI SINGH 1'. UNION ( Gro1-er, J.) 9S3 ueterminati.:m in that case were entirely different.

At any rate, the public purpose was stated with sufficient particularity, namely, for development and utilisation of the land as an industrial and residential area. Once it was stated that the land will be utilised for the aforesaid purpose the persons interested could certainly object effectively. But the mere words, as are to be found in the notifications here "planned development of the area" were wholly insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the speciiic purpose for which the lands were to be utilised. It must be remembered that the Acquisition Act is silent ·as to the nature of objections that could be raised. In some of the States executing instructions have been issued or rules have been framed which indicate the classes of objections which are contemplated. In Madras the classes of objections that the Collector's inquiry should specifically deal with are the following . (a) that the purpose for which the land is acquired is not a public purpose;

( b) that the land notified is not the best adapted to the purpose intended or that its area is greater than is actually required for the purpose, and ( c) that the acquisition of the land or any land in the locality is not desirable or expedient. In Babil Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay & Others( 1) it was stated in the notification under s. 4 (I) that the land was likely to be needed for purposes of a company which was named. A challenge was made against the validity of that ·notification on the ground that it was not stated that the land was required for a public purpo>e. It was laid down that where the land was required for a company the requirement of t1•.e law would be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government was satisfied on a report under s. 5A(2) or by ari inquiry under s. 40 that the purpose of the acquisition was the same as contemplated by s. 40 of the Act.

This Court said that the purpose of the notification under s., 4 'was t•J carry out a preliminary investigation with a view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of levels and, if necessary, digging or boring into sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purposes for which it was sought to be acquired. It '.''"' nnJ~, nnder s. 6 that a firm declaration had to be made by the l'overnment that land with proper description and area was needed for a public purpose or a company. Hence it was not correct to say that any defect in the notification under s. 4 was fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to the suggestion on behalf o! the State that the observations made (I) •t%1] 1 S.C.R. 128. [ 1973 J l S.C.lt. in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present cases. The question which we are called upon to decide is of an entirely <lifferent nature. It relates to the notification under s.

4 in the light of s. 5A with a view to giving full effect to that section and not simply wiping it out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which. came into force on January 1, 1924 that s. SA was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of s. SA the position has completely change and it cannot be said that the owner's wishes arc not relevant and that he does not need -an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a view would render s. SA otios. If !t has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to SU bmit his Objections and that he can do Only if the notification under s.

4( l) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said pur, pose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. Jn the absence of such specific or particular purpqse being stated the objector cannot file any proper or coger.t objections under s. SA which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under s. 4 (I) and in the absence of any proof that the appellan!8 were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exerci5e their righ( under s. SA of the Acquisition Act. For the reasons given above these appeals must succeed and are hereby allowed.

The entire acquisition proceedings in respect ot the lands of the appellants in all the appeals are hereby quashed. In matters of this nature we would have taken· due notice of !aches on the part of the appellants while granting the above relief but we are satisfied that so far as the present appellants are concerned they have not been guilty of lacl\,es, delay or acquiescence at any stage. The appellants shall be entitled to costs in this Court. C.M. Petition No. 68S2 of 1971 is disposed of by observing that it will be open to the partly to file a suit foe damages, if any, .if so desired. s.c. Appeals allawed.