Baradakanta Mishra, Ex-Commissioner of Endowments v. Bhimsen Dixit

Judgment

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 312 of 1971. Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated July 8. 1971 of the Orissa High Court in Original Criminal Misc. case No. 9 of 1970. C. K. Daphtary, A. K. Verma and B. P. Singh, foir the appellant. Lal Narain Sinha, Solicitor-General of India and U. P. Singh, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dw1vEm,.J. The appellant is a member of ~he Superior Judictal Service of the State of Orissa, He was at one time officiating as District Judge. · At the relevant time he was filn~tioning as ff Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowmi;nts, . Onssa. . '.fhe office of the Commisisoner is created by the Onssa Hmdu Religious Endowments Act. I ll. MISHRA l'. H. D!Xll (D11fredi, /.) In .-ilbge Sanabagalpur there are two deities. The Additional Assistant CommissioPer of Hindu Religious Endowments took action under s. 27 of the said Act for appointing an interim trustee of the deities.

The person incharge of the deities made an objec• tion unde1' s. 41 of the s:1id Act that the Act did not apply as the deities were consecrated under a private endowment made by him. The Additional Assistant Commissioner rejected the objection by im order dated July 26, 1967. Without making any inquiry under s . .+I. he held that prima facie there was a public endowment. He did not appoint the objector as a trustee of the deities. The objector filed a revision under s. 9 o{ the said Act before the appellant. During the period intervening 'between the rejection of the objection by the Addi. Assistant Commissioner and the filing of the revision by the objector, the identical issue was raised before the Orissa High Court in Bhramarbar Santra and others v. State of Orissa and others( 1). In that case the High Court held that the Asstt. Commissioner cannot appoint an interim trustee under s. 27 of the said Act until he has held an inquiry under s.

41 ancl has found that there was no hereditary trustee of the religious institution ... At the hearing of the revision the aforesaid decision was cited before the appellant by the applicant. After hearing the parties, the appellant made the following order : "1. .... It is said on behalf of the petitioner that he has filed a petition under section 41 of the Act. But no evidence is produced tci that effect, thereby d:sclosing that their plea is humbug. The next argument rs that the · karned Assistant Commissioner should have first decided that the institution has no hereditary trustee. The Assistant Commissione·r has impliedly done so. 2. The next argument that without a final declaration as to the nature of the institution, no appointment under Section 27 can be made, does not seem to be correct. The decision in the High Court on Bantala case would not be applicable to this instance.

Further against the order, .we have moved the Supreme Court, and. as such, the matter can be safely deemed to be subjudice. 3. In order to establish that the petitioner is the her~ditary trustee, he has to file an application under section 41 of the Act. No doubt the coµrt can initiate such a proceeding, But we should not do it where the institution appears to be safely a public one. in this instance, a Siva temple." fl) 1.L R. 1970 Cutfnck 54. . The applicant filed a writ petition in the High Court against this order. The Division Bench, on hearing the applicant, issued notice for contempt of the High Court to the appellant. The High Court took exception to the following sentence occurring at the end of paragraph 2 in his order : "Further against the order we have moved the Supreme Court, and as su'ch, the matter can be safely deemed to be sub judice." The appellant appeared before the High Court in response to the notice.

According to him the apparently objectionable sentence in his order "was not at a!l the basis for (his) decision." He said that the revision was dismissed by him after distinguishing the case before him from the facts of Bhramabar Santra.( 1 ) He further pleaded "that under the Constitution the decisions of the Supreme Court are law of the land. So, I bonafide, was of the opinion that when a matter is under appeal, or otherwise before the Supreme Court, the point of law, becomes subj1,1dice and only a decision of the Supreme Court in the matter, wodld be binding on the Subordinate Court.." It was also pleaded tliat the proceeding before him was an administrative proceeding and that the act of not following the decision of the High Court in such a proceeding "may not amount to contempt of court." The High Court did not accept his pleas in justification. It was held that the appellant "refused to follow" the decision in Bhramarbar Santra and others.(')

The High Court further held that "we do not find any trace of bonafides of the contemner in the order dated 19th January, 1970. . ..... The contemner is a senior judicial officer who has already put in 23 years of service; having been recruited as a Munsif he has now risen to the rank of District Judge. We regret to find that though he has functioned as a judicial officer for about 23 years he has not been able to pick up the approach and attitude of a judicial officer and has actuated. by the bias so often manifested in action of the executive today while disposing of a judicial· proceeding and when found fault with has come up with the stand that he was acting administratively." After examining the matter further, 1he High Court 5aid : "The conduct of the contemner far from being bonafide is clearly a malafide one and he intentionally avoided to follow the decision of this Court by advancing grounds which were most inappropriate."

On that view of the matter the High Court found him guilty of contempt of court and admonished him in open court and directed him to pay Rs. 301) as costs of the proceedings. Shri Daphtary, counsel for the appellant. rightly did not seek to support the justificatory pleas. His argu•nent now is that the (I) I.LR. 1970 Cuttack 54. 1 I B. MISHRA V. B, DIXIT (Dwivedi, J.) appellant is not guilty of contempt of Court, for the sentence in the appellant's order; found objectionable by the High Court, Ii~ither interferes with the administration of justice nor scanda- Jises the High Court. Shri Daphtary as well as the. Solicitor-General appearing for the State have stated before us. that there is no decided case either in support of or against the argument. But the absence of a precedent should. not preclude an act being held to be ·contempt merely becau.e it is novel or. unusual provided it is comprehended by the principles underl~ing .the Jaw of Contempt of Court.

The absence of precedent should' however put the court on guard that the ar!a of contempt is not being unduly expanded ( Vide 17 Corpus Juris Secundum 21). The present case tl'ien is to be decided on principles and analogy. Contempt of Court is disobedience to the court, by acting in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof. It signifies a willful disregard or· disobedience of tbe court's order; it also signifies such conduct as tends to bring the aµthority of the. cQurt and the administration. of)'aw il}t\l' disreP.µ,te. • ( Vide 1 'l Corpus Juris Secundum pages S··aQt 6; :Contempt by Ed'!l'afd N.. D~gel (.1939 Egn.) page 111 .. •Osiwfcl's Contcrilpt c{COu.rt { 1910 Edn:) pages· s ·and 6). · · It' is a comnionplace 'that where the superior court's oi:der staying proceedings is disobeyed by the inferior court to' whom it is addressed, the latter eourt commits contempt of court for 1t a9ts in disobedience to the authority of the fotmet' ,court. .

The a~t of disobedience is calculated to undermine public respect for the superior court and jeodardisc the preservation of law and order. The appellant's case is to be eiramined in the light of the foregoing principles and analogy. The remark in the appellant's order found objectionable by the High Court is this : "Further, against the order we have moved the Supreme Court, and as such the matter can be safely deemed to be subjudice." It maybe observed that on the date of the order · . nothing was pending in the Supreme Court; only a pefo:ion was pending in the High Court for a certificate to appeal to· the Supreme Court from the decision ·in Bhramarbar Sanlra.( 1) The app~Jlant has thus made a wrong statement of fact. Secondly, the use of the personal pronoun "We" is also significant. It indicates that the appellant identified himself as a Htigant in the case and did not observe due detachment and decorum as a quasi judicial authority.

Lastly, we agree with the High Court that it is not possible to believe that the appellant could hav~ entertained the view that as soon as a petition for :ertificate ·lo appeal to the (!) I.LR. 1970 Cuttack 54. SUPRE~fE COURT REPORTS Supre~e. Court was filed in the High Court against its decision, the bmdmg character of the decision disappeared. He has 23 yea_rs' judicial experience and he could scarcely entertain that belief. We agree with the High Court that the appellant delibe- · rately avoided to follow its decision by giving wrong and illegitimate reasons and that his conduct was "cleai:Iy mala fide". Under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with the power of supermtendence over the courts and tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the appellant was suiJject to the superintendence of the High Court. Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him.

He could not get away from them by adducing factually wrong and illegitimate reasons .. In East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and Another v_ The Collector of Customs, Calcutta(') Subba Rao J. observed : "The Division Bench ·of the High Court heldthat a contravention of a condition imposed by a · lic~nce fl issued under the Act is not an offence under s. 5 of the Act. This raises the question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court ln the State and initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, everyHigh. Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 22(), it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the enfo;cement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any petson or authority, including in appropriate cases any ·Government, within its territorial jurisdiction .. Under· Art. 227 it has jurisdiction over ail courts and tribunals · throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction.

It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court has superintendence can ignore the la'w declared by that court and start proceedings in direct violation of it. If a tribunal can do so, all ·tlie subordinate courts can equally do so, for there is no specific provision, _just like in the case of Supreme Court, making the law declared by the High Court binding on subordinate courts. It is implicit in the power of supervision conferred on a superior tribunal that .all tbe tribunals subject to its supervision ~hould . cqnform ·to. the l!!w laid down by it. Such 'obedien'Ce \vould also be · . '~ .· con!fucive· to their smooth· .workin.g;· ·other.Wise · there · would be confusion in the admini.stration pf law an4.' · · · .H r~spect for law would frret_rieyably/su_ffer."' (Jl [!96J] 3 S.CR: JJ~ at 366. n B. MISHRA v. B. DIXIT (Dwivedi, J.)

The conduct of the appellant in not following the previous decision of the High Court is calculated to create confusion in the adwinistration of law. It will undermine respect for law laid down by the High Court and impair the constitutional authority of the High Court. His conduct is therefore comprehended by the principles underlying the iaw of Contempt. The analogy of the inferior court's disobedience to the specific orde~ of a superior court also suggests that his conduct falls within the purview of the Jaw of Contempt. Just as the disobedience to a specific order of the Court undermines the authority and dignity of the court in a particular case, similarly the deliberate and malafide conduct of not following the Jaw laid down in the previous decision undermines the constitutional authority and respect of the Hi~h Court.

Indeed, while the former conduct has repercussions on an mdividual case and on a limited number of persons, the latter conduct has a much wider and more disastrous impact. It is calculated not only to undermine the constitutional authority and respect of the High Court, generally, but is also likely to subvert the Rule of Law "'1d engender harassing uncertainty and confusion in the administration of law. Our view that deliberate and malafide conduct of not following the binding precedent of the High Court is contumacious does not unduly enlarge the domain of contempt. It would not stifle a bona fide act of distinguishing the binding precedent, even thcugh it may take out to be mistaken. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we think that the High Court has rightly found the appellant guilty of contempt. So wi: dismiss the appeal. s.c. A11pea/ dismissed.