Ram Dayal v. Narbada and Another

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by. MATHEW, J. This is an appeal, by special leave, from a decree of the High Court of Rajasthan passed in appeal by which it dismissed the suit for recovery of possession of the plaint property filed by the appellant. IWI DAYAL v. NAlUIADA (Mathew, I.) One Ram Prasad was the owner of the property in question. He was not heard of by his wife Pani since 1950 for more than 7 years. On June 4, 1962, she made a gift of tlJe property to the appellant, Ram Dayal, on the basis that Ram Prasad was dead. The appellant, alleging that respondents forcibly took posses· sion of the property, filed the suit for declaration that he was the owner of the property and for recovery of its possession. The respondents contended that Ram Prasad was alive on June 4, 1962, that his wife had no right to execute the gift deed and that the appellant was not in possession of the property at any time.

The trial Court held that there was no proof that Ram Prasad was dead on June 4, 1962, and, therefore, his wife was not com· petent to execute the gift deed and dismissed the suit. In appeal, the Court held that Ram Prasad must be deemed to have been dead at the time when the gift deed was executed by his wife and so the gift was valid and reversed the decree of the trial Court. It was against this decree that the appeal was filed before the High Court. The High Court reversed the decree of the appellate Court and restored the decree' of the trial Court on the ground that there was no proof that Ram Prasad was dead on the date -0f the execution of the gift deed. The respondents have filed an application for revocation of the s~ial leave to appeal on the ground that the appellant did not avail himself of the provision for leave to appeal to a division Bench of the High Court and that the value of the propertv in question is only Rs. 200.

We heard counsel on both sides on the question of the revocation of the special leave to appeal and we are of the opinion that the leave to appeal should be revoked. Section 18(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinance No. XV of 1949) provides : "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the suoerintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal."

(1973} 3 S,C.R, Rule 97 of the Rajasthan High Court Rules, 1952, states that where a special Appeal from the judgment of one Judge does not lie unless such Judge has declared that the case is a fit one for appeal, an application for such declaration may be made orally be.fore or at the time when.the judgment is delivered and that the Court shall thereupon record an order granting or refusing to grant such declaration. In this case, it is admitted that no appli· cation was made at or before the time when the judgment was delivered for leave to appeal to a Division Bench. The fact that no such application was made was also not stated in the petition for special leave. In the Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Brot/zers(1) the Court said that although this Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order of a Court when an appeal lay . from that order to another Court, the Court should not give special leave and thereby shortcircuit the legal procedure prescrib· ed.

In the Stare of Bombay v. Ml s. Ratilal Vadilal and Brothers(') this Court held tbt the proper course for an appellant is to exhaust all his remedies (including those in the High Court) before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136. We are also of the opinion that the value of the property in question is too small and that'the question of law involved is not cf such paramount public importance that we would be justified in entertaining the appeal. It has become imperative that no case be. taken on the file of this Court which does not rise to the measure of importance which this Court has set fcir itself. One case is not just one case more, and does not stop with being just one more case.

By revoking the spe.cial leave we would be discourag· ing future applications for special leave of a similar kind, and thereby enforcing those rigorous standards in this Court's judicial administration which alone will give us the freshness and vigour of thought and spirit that are indispensable for wise decisions in the causes that are legitimately committed to us (see Frankfurter, J. in Ex-parte Peru(') Time is required for adequate reflection in those causes. Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, li.ke good wine, require~ maturing (see Kinsella v. Krueger(') We revoke the special leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal with costs. V.P.S. (1) AJ.R. 1959 S.C. 1362. (3) 318 U.S. 578 (1943). Appeal d1'.<missed. (2) AJ.R. 1961 S.C. 1106. · (4) 351 U.S. 470 (1956) 483-485.