P. J. Gupta & Co. v. K. Venkatesan Merchant & Ors.

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 254 of 1971. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated the 3rd September, 1970 of the Madras High Court in C.R.F. No. 1676 of 1966. S. T. Desili and A. S. Nambiar, for the Appellant. P. Ram Reddy, P. P. Rao, A. V. V. Nair and T. V. S. N. Chari, for the Res.pondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BEG J.--The appellant was a tenant who obtained a lease of nonresidential premises situated in the City of Madras at Rs. 450/- ]per month from the landlord on 21-8-1944. On 9-3-1957, a portion of the premises wa~ sub.-let to Shcwaran Lach~andas. On 12-7-1957, another portion was sublet to Umasar Corporation. At that time, there was nothing to prohibit sub-letting either in the lease deed or in the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control)

Act, 1949, which was applicalble then. on 3-4-1963, the landlord executed another registered lease de~d of the ;&ame property in favour of the appellant for a period of five years ftom 1-10-1961 at Rs. 600/- per month (incidentally, this period has also expired), This lease contained a provision against sub-letting. Furthermore, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent contro 1) Act, 1960, (herei~after referred to as 'the Act'), repealing the Act of 1949, had come mto force. The Act conferred a right under section 10(2)(ii)(a) to evict the tenant on the ground : "(ii) that the tenant has after the 23rd October 1945 without the written consent of the Jandlord- (a) transferred his right under the lease or sub-let the ehtire building or any portion thereof, if the lease do•es. not confer on him any right to do so". On 26-4-1963, the appellant is said to have sub-let another portion of the premises to the Umasar Corporation.

On 27-5-1964, Venkatesan, ; the respondent before us, became the landlord under a sale deed. In December, 1964, the respondent landlord filed an application under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act to evict the appellant tenant and his sub-tenants from the whole property. On 20-9-1965, the City Rent Controller passed. an ordier of eviction. On 26:-3-1966, the Court of Small Causes at Madras allowed the tenant'sappeal because it held that the tenant had the right, under the original lease of 21-8-1944, to sub-let, and also because even violation of a clause of the subsequent lease of 3-4-19'63, · prohibitingsubletting, did not entail a forfeiture of tenancy rights undar the provision of the Transfer of Property Act. Its view was that, in a case of what P. J. GUPTA & CO. V. K. VBNKATESAN (Beg, /.) it described as "a contractual tenancy". the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act applied to the exclusion of the remedies provided by the Act so that, unless the lease deed itself provided for a termination of tenancy for sub-letting in addition to a condition against sub-letting, the tenancy right itself.could not be forfeited or determined by such a breach of the contract of tenancy .

Upon a revision application under _Section 25 of the Act, the -High Court of Madras reversed the judgmeht and order of the Small Cause Court. It held that the relief against forfeiture was not obtain· able in cases governed by Section 114{A) in the Transfer of Property Act where, as in the case beforo us, there was an express condition against assigning, letting, or parting of possession. The lease of 3-4-1963, by which the rights of the landlord and tenants were held by thr. High Court to be governed on the date of application under Section 10(2)(ii)((a) of the Act, contained a prohibition against subletting which involved parting with possession. It also referred to Ex. P. 7, dated 12-11-1964, which was a notice of determination of tenancy on the ground of sub-letting.

It held that, · in any case, there was· a proved sub-letting on 9-3-1957 to Shewaran Lachmandas and that, although, there was no prohibition Of sub~Jetting at that tim'l, the provisions of Section 10(2)(ii){a) of the Act became applicable on a parity of reasoning adopted by this Court in Goppil!al v. Thakurji Shriji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji & Anr.(1) with regard to _a similar situation under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) . Act.· Hence, it allowed the respondent landlord's application and restored the order of eviction passed by the City Rent Controller. This Court granted special leave to appeal against the judgment and order of the Madras High Court passed on 3-9-1970. It is clear from the majority view of this Court in M/s. Raval & Co. v. K. C. Pam:ichJndran & Ors(2). dismissing an appeal. from a judgment of Full Bench of Madras High .Court, reported in 'AIR 1967 Madras 57 (FB) that the Act" has a scheme of its own and it is intended to provide a complete code in respect of both contractual tenancies as well as what are popularly called litatutoryteMncies".

In other.words, the special procedur.:: provided by the Act displaces the requirem•mts of the procedure for eviction under the 1 ransfer of Property Act and by an ordinary civil suit. Therefore, we need not concern ourselv<is with the pNvisions of Tran~fer of Property Act. We Med only determini: here whether the landlord respondent satisfi1d the conditions of Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of the Act set out above. Tho High Court had held that a sub~fotting .had undoubtedly taken place in 1957. The Small Caus-. Court l!ad con~idered this fact to be immaterial on the ground that the provisions of the Act did not apply to a case, such as the one before us, which was, in its 9pinion, governi:d by the provisiom of the Tran~for of Property Act. only. We think that the provisions of the Act must necessarily apply to all teMncies. A teMncy is essentially basP.d on and governed by an agreoment or contract ev.::n when a statute intervewis to limit the area within which an agreemP,nt or contract (1)

[1969] 3 S.C.R. 989. 11-2SSSup.CI/7S (2) A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 818, 823 [1975] 2 S.C.R· operates, or, subjects contractual rights to statutory rights and obligations. In the case before u.s, the sub-letting was certainly subsequent to 1945 so that, on th~ plain language of the provision, the sub-letting of 1957 would be covered by Section 10(2)(ii){a) of the Act. Mr. S. T. Desai, appei.ring on behalf of the appellants, has advanced a nova! argum11nt which h:id no.t been put forward in the Courts below. It was that the rights of the parties were governed by the provisions of the Act as they stood when.the Act was passed in 1960. His contention was that, under the provisions of the Act, before its amendment by the Madras Buildings (Lease & Rent Control Amendment Act XI of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Amending Act'), which omits clause (iii) from Section 30 of the Act, the appellant was protected from eviction.

He relied strongly on Section 3 of the Amending Act which reads as follows : "3. Certain pending proceedingsto abate. Every proeecding in respect of any non-residential building . or part thereof pending before any court or other authority or officer on the date of the publiCation of this Act in the Fort St. George Gazette .and .instituted on the ground that such building or part was exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue of clause (iii) of Section 30 of the principal Act, shall abate in so far as the proceeding relates to such building or part. All righis. and privileges which may have accrued before such date: to any landlord in respect of any non-residential building or part thefeof by virtue of clause (iii} of Section 30 of the principal Act, shall cease and. determine and shall not be enforceable :

Pwvided that nothing contained in this. section .shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding in which the decree or order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the date mentionfld in this section". The effect of Section 30 of the Act containing clause (iii), which was omitted by the Amending Act, may be ~t out in the language of Section 30 itself : · "30. Nothing contained iii this Act, shall appi)> to :- (ii) (iii) Any non-residential building, the rental va 'ue of which on the date of the commmcement of this Act, as entered in the property fa>i assessment book of the Municipal Council, District Board, .Panchayat or Panchayat Union Council or the Corporation of Madras, as the case may be, exceeds fout hundred rupees pe·r mensem". The obvious result of Section 30(iii) of the Act, as it stood before the amendment, was that, if the rental value of a non-residential P. J, GUPTA & CO, V. K. VENKATESAN (Beg, ].} building, as entered in the property tax book of the Municipality, ex.ceeded Rs. 400/- per mensem, a description which applies to the premises under consideration before us, the landlord would have no right to proceed against the ten:int for eviction under Section 10(2)(ii)(a) of tho A.ct.

Scctiori 3 of the Amending Act, on the face of it, applies · to tw? ~utds of cases. Its hoP.ding is misleading in so far as it suggests that it is meant to apply only to one of these two kinds. It applies : firstly, to cases in which a proceeding has been instituted "on the g~~tmd" that a non-residential building "was exempt from the prov1s1ons of the principal Act" by virtue of clause (iii) of Section 30 of the principal Act" and is pending; and secondly to cases where "rights and privileges, which may have accrued before ;uch date to any landlord in respect of non-residential buildino by virtue of clause (iii) of Section 30 of the principal Act" exist." In the kind of case falling in the first category, the amendment says that the pending proceedings shiill abate. As regards the second kind of case, the amendment says that "the rights and privileges of the landlord shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable". On admitted facts, the proceedings under section 10(2)

(ii)(a) cf the Act, now before us, could not fall under the J.st category of cases contemplated by Section 3. And, we have been unable to see how ·any "right l)r privileges of the landlord" in respect of any non-residential building, which could have conceivably accrued or existed "by virtue of.clause (iii) of Section 30 of the principal Act", are involved here. Whatever rights the landlord respondent had acquired were due to the pmission of clause (iii) from Section 30 of the Act by the Amending Act of 1964 only. Prior to the amendment, the effect of Section 30, clause (iii) Sec. 30 of the Act was that the landlord had no right to proceed under Section 10(2) (ii)(a) of the Act. The effect of the amrndment is that the landlord acquires a new right by the removal of this disability. Section 3 of the Amending Act could not ppssibly be so interpreted as to defeat the object of Section 2 which clearly amplifies the previously limited remedy by removing a restriction upon its use.

Hence, we fail to see how any argument built around Section 3 of the Amending Act could help the appellant at all. Apparently, this is the reason why no such argument was advanced anywhere earlier. It is not necessary, for the purposes of the c11se before us, to specufate about the types of cases which may ac!uall~ fall within the two wings of the obviously unartistically drafted Section 3 of the Amending Act. It is enough for us to conclude, as we are bound to on the language of the provision, that the case before us falls outside it. [1975] 2 s.c~.:t. . Learned 1 Counsel for the respqndent has, quite correctly, contend· ed that the right itself was cmated by the amendment of 1964 so far as the landlord respondent is concerned. Beforetthat, the special remedy provided by the Act W(lS denied to him because of the nature of the premises Jet and its monthly rent.

Its benefit was extended to l~im in 1964 so that, after the amendment, he could use the procedure contained in Section 10 of the Act. The amendment i:eceivcd the assent of the President on s. 6. 1964 and was published in the State Gazette on 10·6·1964. The proceeding under section 10(2)(ii)(e) of the Act was .commenced in December, 1964. We find no force whatsoever in tho appeP.1 before us.. The parties agree ihat the appel· Ia1.1ts will get six mo11ths from today to vacate the premises. Subject to this undertaking by the appellants and respo11dent landlord to give effect to this agreement this appeal is dismissed with costs. .P.B.R. A.weal dl1misse.-L