Adhir Naia v. the State of West Bengal

Judgment

ADHIR NATA THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL October 16, 1974 [Y.V. CHANDRACHUD AND R.S. SARK:AR!A, JJ.] Conat/tution of India, Art. 32-Habeas Corpus-Detention based on 1ingl1 isolated incident-Sufficiency of grounds whether justiciable-Whether a court of appeal (f no r~asonable person can arrive at conclusion-Apprehension regarding f11/11Te arising but of past conduct. The petitioner was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act on the ground that on a particular day he along with his associates broke open a railway wagon loailed with foodgrains. Th~ petitioner in Writ Petition filed in this Court under Art. 32 contended that he was detained on the basis of a single isolated incident and that ho reasonable person could possibly come to the conclusion that it is necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the Maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the community.

It was contended by the respondent that the sufficiency or grounds of detention is not a justiciable issue and all that the courts can consider is whether tho JllOUnds of detention are germane to the grounds on which the detention .has been ordered. If wagon breaking for the purpose of committing theft of foodstuffs bears nexus with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. the detention must be upheld at all events and the courts have no jurisdiction to enter into the question whether any other conclusion was possible on the basiS of facts placed before the detaini~g authority. Setti!lg 11Side the detention, HELD : Following the decision of this Court in Debu Maliato v. State of West &ngal, (1974) 4 S.C.C. 135, it is true that the courts cannot sit in appeal over tho propriety of a detention order.

But there is a distinction between the Court's jurisdiction in regard to the sufficiency of grounds necessitating the detention and its jurisdiction to examine whether a reasonable person could at all reach the conclusion that unless a person was detained he would in all probability Indulge in a similar course of conduct. So long as the grounds of detention are germane to tho purpose of detention courts do not weigh the evidentiary value of the data placed before the detaining authority. In the present case, no reasonable person can come to the conclusion on the basis of a solitary act of wagon breaking that it is necessary to detain the petitioner.

Considering the nature of the act attributed tn the petitioner and its context and not merely the fact that the ground of detention refers to a single incident the satisfaction reached by the District Magistrate that tho petitioner, unless detained, was likely to commit similar acts in the future, is such as no reasonable person could possibly reach. The conclu,lon that the past conduct of the dctcnu raises apprehension regardina his future behaviour must at least bt rational. [452A-BDJ C:v1L APPELLATE JU1Uso1cnoN: Writ Petition No. 254 of 1974. Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. S. K. Gambh{r, for the petitioner. P. K. Cltatterjee and G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was deli~ed by CJIANDJlA()}IUI), J.-Byanotder dated May 29, 1972, the District Magistrate, 24 Parganas directed that the petitioner be detained under tho Maintenance oflnternal Security Act, 1971 as he wa~ acting in ll manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The particulars of the ground of detention refer to a sin.gle incident described thus: 0 That on 24-5·72 at about 10 ·35 hrs. you along with your associates broke BEX Wagon No. WR 75961 loaded with foodgrains at Mathurapur Goods sidings and decamped with 10/12 bags of wheat and rice. Your action caused disrup· tion of supply and services". Mter the rule issued in this habeas coprus petition was served on the respondent, the State of West Bengal, the District Magistrate filed a counter-affidavit in answer to the petition.

Paragraph 5 of the aforesaid affidavit says that the order of detention was passed after the District Magistrate was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; that the Distri,ct Magistrate was satisfied that if the patitioner was not detained he was likely to act in a manner described above; and that : "The nature of act, the manner in which the same was: committed, the1 effect and result of said activity upon the community and the question of supply of foodgrains wern taken by me into considere.tion before making the order of detention".

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner argues that the petitioner was ordered to be detained on the basis of l\ single, isolated incident and that n.o reasonable person could possibly come to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the .petitioner in order to prevent him from acting prejudicially to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. This submission, in our opi- ».ion, is well-founded and must be accepted. In Debu .Mahato v. Stat~ ~f West Be11ga/(l), tho Distt. Magistrate had passed an order directing that the petitioner therein be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.

Only one ground of detention was set out, namely, that the petitioner and his associates were found removing three bales of empty jute bags after breaking open a railway wagon and that when challenged by the Railway Protection Force they fled away leaving the booty behind. A Bench consisting of three learn~d Judges held that though it could not be laid down as an invariable tu.le that in no case can a single, solitary act form the basis for reaching tho satisfaction that the detenu might repeat iuch acts in future, in the circumstances of the particular case one soli• tary isolated act of wagon breaking committed by the petitioner could not possibly persuade any reasonable person to reach the satisfaction that unless the petitioner was detained he would in all probability indulge in. further acts of wagon breaking. This conclusion wM not reached by the Court on the basis that what was stolen was empty jute-bags. The conclusion is based on tho circumstance that (I) [1974) 4 S.C.C. 135.

ADH!R NAIA v. WEST BENGAL (Chand~achud, J.) what was alleged against the petitioner was his involvement in a solitary, isolated act of wagon breaking and secondly, nothing was said by the District Magistrate in his counter-affidavit suggesting that wagon breaking had become so rampant that in the context of the peculiar situation, the District Magistrate arrived at the requisite satisfaction in spite of the fact that the act on which the satisfaction was founded was just o'ne single, solitary act of wagon breaking. No two cases can have precisely indentical facts but we are unable to see any material distinction in the facts of the case before us and the facts in Debu Mahato's case. A single act has been attributed to the petitioner and it consists of a theft of I 0 or 12 bags of wheat and rice after breaking open a wagon.

The act was not accompanied by violence or by show of force and the District Magistrate has not stated in his affidavit that by reason of the peculiarity or enormity of the situation, he formed · the requisite satisfaction as regards the necessity to detain the petitioner, even thouglt the .satisfaction was fotJRded on an isolated incident. Mr. Chattarjee who appears on behalf of the State of West Bengal, argues that the judgment of this Court in Debu Mahato's case was predominantly influenced by the consideration that the District Magistrate in his counter-affidavit had stated that the petitioner was "one of the notorious wagon breakers" and was engaged in system~. tic breaking· of railway-wagons. · We are unable to agree. Two grounds were urged in De bu Maliato' s case for invalidating the detention order.

The first ground was that the District Magistrate could not have possibly reached the satisfaction on the basis of a single incident that unless the petitioner was detained, he would indulge in further acts of· wagon-breaking. While considering this argument, no reference at q.11 was. made by the Court to the fact that in the counter-affidavit, the District M_agisti;ate had referred to circumstances which were not disclosed to the detenu. Having held ~hat the order W?.s liable to be set aside on the ground that the satisfaction of the DistriCt Magistrate w:.!s truly no satisfaction at all, the Court proceeded to consider the second ground of attack, namely, that the order of detention was· based on facts not disclosed to the petitioner. That is why the judgment on the second ground of attack begins by saying : ''There was also another angle from which the validity of the order of dete11tion was challenged on behalf of the petitioner".

It is ·manifest fromthe judgment that the order of detention was .held t? be bad. on two separate and distinct grounds and the reasoi:is wh1c)1 we1ghe~ with t?~ Court on the second aspect of the matter did not mftuence its dec1s1on on the first ground of attack. Counsel for the State then urged that the sufficiency of groul1ds of detention is not a justiciable issue and all tliat the Cotirts can consider is whether the grounds of detention are germane to the purpcse for which the· detention has been ordered. Learned c.ounsel argues· that if wagon-breaking for the purpose of committing theft of foodstuffs bears nexus with the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, the detention must be upheld at all events and the Courts have no jurisdiction to enter into the. question whether any 14-255Sup.CI/75 other conclusion was possible on the basis of facts placed before the detaining authority.

It is true that Courts cannot sit in appeal over the propriety of detention orders. · But the argument of the State overlooks the distinction between the Court's jurisdiction in regard to the sufficiency of grounds necessitating the detention and its jurisdiction to examine whether a reasonable person could at all reach the conclusion that unless the person w lS detained he would in all probability indulge in a similar course of :onduct. We are not concerned to consider whether the District Magistrate was justified in passing the order of detention on the strength of the material available to him. So long as the grounds of detention are germane to the purpose of detention, Courts do not weigh the evidentiary value of the data placed before the d~taining authority in order to determine the sufficiency of that data as justifying the order of detention.

The point of the matter is that considering the nature of the act attributed to the petitioner and its context, and not merely the fact that the ground of detention refers to a single incident, the satisfaction reached· by the District Magistrate that the petitioner, unless detained, was likely to commit similar acts in the future is such as no reasonable person could possibly reach. The conclusion that the past conduct of the detenu raises an apprehension regarding his future behaviour must at least be rational. Ar.cJrding\y, we set a~ide the prder of detention, make the rule in this p~tition absolute and direct that the petitioner shall be released forthwith. P.H.P. Petition allowed.