Dulal Roy v. the District Magistrate, Burdwan and Ors.

Judgment

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No~ 428 oi 1974. Under Art. 32 of t.he Constitution of J ndia. A. K. Gupta, for the petitioner. G. S. Chattujee, for respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA J.-Dulal Roy, the petitioner challenges the order, dated August 21, 1972, of his detention made by the District Magistrate, Burdwan under s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the Act). The order ~tates that it is necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicia1 to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. The grounds of detention communicated to the detenue run as under: "1. On 21.7.72 at I a.m. you wit!\ your associates Kartick Kannaker and others committed theft of Electric wire from Tower Nos. 23 and 24 situated near Dhangachha village and QY such act you cause stoppage of electric supply which is essential for maintenance of supplies and services to the community, in Memari area and its vicinity.

2. On 29-7r 72 at 2 a.m. you with your associates committed theft of Tower Members from Tower Nos. 246, 247, 248 situated on the field near Dewandighi, P. S.. Burdwan and by commission of such theft the towers were likely to fall resulting in stoppage of supply electricity which is essential for maintenance of supplies and services to the community, in Calcutta area and its suburbs." F88 Jn connection with the above thefts, two cases, one on 21-7-72 :and the other on 1-8-1972, under s. 379, Penal Code were registered with the police. The petitioner was not named in the F.I.R His complicity was detected in the course of investigation. He was consequently arrested on 3-8-72 and sent up befori:: the Judicial Magistrate. After further investigation, the police submitted a· final report and the petitioner was discharged in both the cases on 3-9-72. On the same day, he was taken into custody pursuant to the impugned order of detention. Mr. A. K. Gupta appearing as amicus curiae fer the petitioner contends that the impugned order has been passed to subvert the process -of the ordinary penal law, as a colourable exercise of jurisdiction.

It is stressed 1hat on 21-8-72 when the detention order was passed, the petitioner was already in custody as an undertrial. In the absence -'Of anything in the counter affidavit showing that his custody w2,s going to terminate. soon, proceeds the argument, it was not reawnably possible for the authority to be satisfied that the petitioner might indulge in prejudicial activities unless he was detained. It is urged that the detaini!lg authoritly never applied its mind to satisfy itself with reg11rd to this impera1ive requirement of s. 3 and consequently the order of detention is illegal. To highlight the casualness of the authority in. taking the impugned action, Counsel has pointed out that the counter-affidavit has not been filed by the District Magistrate who had made the impugnled order. In support of these contentions, learned Counsel has relied upon Rameshwar Shaw v. DWrict Magistrate Burdwan( 1) Noor · Chand Sheikh v. State of Wes~ Bengal( 2 ) and the recent judgment of ·this Court in Sri Lal Shaw v. State of West Bengal.(B)

Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Respondent-Stale submits that the mere fact that the petitioner was on the date of the detention order in judicial custody did not stand in the way of the detaining authority being satisfied about his propensity to act preinliicially in future after his release from judicial custody. It is emphasised that the authori~y must have been aware that the petitioner was likely to be released shortly as in fact he was released by the Judicial Magistrate on 3-9-72, i.e. about 13 days after the making of the detention order. Reference, in this connection, has been made to Kartick Chander Guha v. State of West Bengal.(4 ) Section 3 of the Act provides that the Central Government or the State Government may if satisfied with respect to any perwn that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ...... , .

(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. Tt will be seen that the satisfaction of the authority as to the inclination of such person to act in any prejudicial manner indicated in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of s.3 (I )(a) is the sine qua non for making an order of his detention. The scheme of the section presupposes that on the date of the order of detention or in (1)[1964] 4, S.C.R. 921. (2) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 2120. (3) Writ Petition No. 453/74 decided on 4-12-1974. ( 4) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 2149. .... .. -.. 't" 8 DULAL ROY v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Sarkaria, /.) 18 9• the near future, the person sought to be detained has or will have freedom of actior..

If a person therefore is· serving a long term of imprisonment or is in jail custody as an undertrial and there is· no• immediate or early prospect ·of his being released on bail or otherwise,. the authority cannot legitimately be satisfied on the basis of his I past history or antecedents ·that he is likely to indulge in similar prejudicial activities after his release in the distant or indefinite future. There must be a proximate nexus between _the preventive action and the past. activity of the detenu on which it is founded. This Court has time and again emphasised that where in a habeas corpus petition a Rule Nisi is issued, it is incumbent upon the State· to satisf.y the Court that the liberty of the detenue has been taken away strictly in accordance with law and due compliance: with the constitutional requirements of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.

The best informed person, therefore, to file the counter-affidavit in response to Rule Nisi is the authority who made the detention order under s. 3 of the Act. In Sheik H,anif v. Stare of West Bengal,(') it was pointed out that the failure to furnish the counter-affidavit of the authority who had passed the order of detention where mala fides or eX:-:. traneous considerations are attributed to it, "may assume the ~lnpe. of serious infirmity leading the court to declare the detention illegal". This observation equally holds good in a case where the detention order is exposea to the risk of attack on the ground of being a colourable exercise of jurisdiction.

While it is true, as an abstract legal proposition, that an order. of preventive detention under the Act may be validly passed against a person in jail custody on the same facts on which he is being pros~cut­ ed for a substantive offence in a court, such an order of detention is more easily vulnerable--than the one against a person not in such custody-to the charge that without there being any basis whatever for the satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is a condition precedent for taking action under s.3, the power has been misused as a· cloak solely for the purpose of punishing the detenu for the substantive offence for which he was being prosecuted, by subverting and circumventing the penal law and irksome court procedure.

To make the detention. order immune against such an attack, the detaining authority in its counter-affidavit must particularise all the material circumstances on the basis of which he was satisfied :is to the neces• sity of the preventive action µespite the detenu being already in jail custody and having tio freedom of action on the. date of the detention· order. In the present case this has not been done .. No counteraffidavit has been filed by the person who had made· the impugned order. Even the Deputy Secretary who has filed the counter after gathering some information from the record, does not disclose all the material facts from which it could be rationally possible for the detaining authority to predicate that if the impugned order was not made . against the petitioner, though in judicial custody, he could be able to indulge in the prejudicial activities indicated in the impugned order. (1) A.J.R. 1974 S.C. 679;

There. is no averment whatever that the charges against the .petitioner were true but the evidence collected against the petitioner was deficient, or, for reasons other than the charge being groundles,, the prosecution of the petitioner for substantive offences was foredoomed to failure. The circumstances in which the petitioner was discharg- •.ed by the Judicial Magistrate have not been set out. A bare state· ment that a "final report" was submitted by the Police is neither here nor there. Such a report.coulJ have been made by the Police in any of the situations referred' to in Sections 169, I 70. and 17 3 of the ·Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Section 169 envisages two di !ferent situations in which an accused person can be released. On~ is ·when there is not sufficient evidence against him. The other is when ·'110 reasonable ground or suspicion is revealed by the investigation in regard to his being concerned in the commission of the offence.

Such ·a release can be made by the investigating olftcer himself without ~•ending the accused before a Magistrate. Section 170 contemplates .a situation where there is sufficient evidence or reasonable ground to jt:stify the forwarding of the accused under custody for trial to a Magistrate. It is s.173 that provides .for a final report, popularly 'known as Polic.e Challan or charge-sheet, which is submitted in the prescribed form after completion of the investigation. The counteraffidavit is silent with regard to the nature of this police report and ihe situation in which the petitioner was discharged. It does not say wliether this report had reference to deficiency or sufficiency of eviden- •ce or groundlessness of the charge against the petitioner. Mr. Chatterjee submits that since the petitioner was about 13 days after the impugned order, in fact, discharged by the Judicial Magisirate, it should be presumed that his discharge was due to paucity of ·evidence and not on account of the charge being baseless.

We are afraid no such conjecture can be drawn when the lib<:rty <Jf a citizen is at stake. The counter-affidavit apart, we asked Mr. 'Chatterjee if he could show us any official record to support his con· tention. Counsel was unable to do so. He however, submitted that if a sufficiently long adjournment was granted, he would be able to fornish a better and comprehensive affidavit of the officer who had passed the impugned order, clarifying all these obscurities. The case ·was instituted on a letter dated August 24, 1974 "from the detenu. Rule Nisi was issued on October 3, 1974 for November 25, 1974. ·On the latter date no counter affidavit was praduced, and on the request of the State Counsel an adjournment was granted to enable the Resoondents to file the return. Jnspite of this the counter filed is 1leither clear and complete nor by the best informed person. We are therefore, not disposed to put a further premium on this casualness ·and laxity on the part of the Respondent.

The grounds of detention relate to two incidents of theft simpliciter in respect of which the petitioner could easilv be prosecuted -under the penal law. In the absence of any explanation of appar.ent reason as to why his prosecution for the substantive offences resulted in his discharge and as to whv the making of the preventive order ·was deemed necessary even while he was in jail custody and had no 8 DULAL ROY v. DIST. MAGISTRATE (Sarkaria, J.) freedom ~f action, the conclusion is in ;:scapable that the impugned order has been passed mechanically and as a colourable exercise of jurisdiction. In the view that it is incumbent on the detaining authority in such cases to disclose to the court all the matf,rial circumstances on which its subjective satisfaction 'is based, we are fortified by the observations of this Court in Noor Chand Sheikh v. State · of ' West Bengal, (supra) wherein A. C. Gupta J. speaking for that Bench said :

"We do not think it can be said that the: fact that the petitioner was discharged from the criminal cases is entirely irrelevant and of no significance; it is a circumstance which the detaining authority cannot altogeth.er disregard, In the case of Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal(') this Court observed : " .... detention power cannot be quietly used to subvert, supplant or to substitute the punitive law of the Penal Code. The immune expedient of throwing into a prison cell one whom the ordinary law would take care of, merely because it is irksome to undertake the inconvenience of proving guilt in court is unfair abuse." If, a_s the petitioner has asserted, he was discharged because there was no material against him and not because witnesses were afraid to give evidence against him, there would be apparently no ratiom' basis for the; subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

It is for the detaining authority to say that in spite of the discharge he was satisfied, on some valid material, about the petitioner's complicity in the criminal acts which constitute the basis of the detention order. But, as stated already, the District J\fagistrate, Maida, who passed the order in this case has not affirmed the affidavit that has been filed on behalf of the State. Apart from the question whether the explanation is satisfactory, the fact remains that in 1his case there is nothing to show that tber.: was any rational material for the subjective satisfaction of the authority who passed the order of detention. Therefore, we find it difficult in the' circumstances of this case to reject the contention that the order of detention was passed mechanically and was a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act." The ratio of Kartik Chandra Guha v. State of West Bengal (supra), cited by Mr. Chatterjee does not advance his case.

There, the District Magistr<\te who had passed the detention order had clearly explained and disclosed-en affidavit all the material circumstances on which his satisfaction was based, and further averred : (1) A.LR. 1974 S.C. 806. [1975J 3 B.C.R. "Having regard to the activities o:E the detenu as disclosed in the grounds of detention and having regard to the possibility of (his) being enlarged on bail, I was satisfied that th1~ detenu should be detained under the Act." In the present case, there is nothing in the counter-affidavit to show that on 21-8-1972, the date of the detention order, the petitioner was about to be released on bail or discharged for deficiency of evidence or difficulty of its production in court. Nor is ther1! any averment that the District Magistrate was otherwise satisfied from credible information received that the charges against the detenu were true.

In the light of what has been said above, we would quash the impugned order, make the rule absolute and direct the lease of the petitioner. VM.K. Petition allowed,