Firm Panjumal Daulatram v. Sakhi Gopal

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 991/76. (Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21.1.1976 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No. 415 of 1971) S. Choudhury, D. N. Mishra, 0. C. Mathur and Shri Narain for the appellant. G. L. Sanghi, V. K. Sanghi, R. K. Sanghi and S. S. Khanduja for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. A suit for eviction of an accommodation from the tenant to whom it had been let for residential and non-residential purposes resulted in dismissal by the! trial Judge. But in an appeal, the final court of fact took the view that the landlord (respondent) was entitled to eviction. The tenant challenged the appellate decree before the' High Court in Second Appeal without success and has therefore come up to this Court with this appeal by special leave. A short point has been raised which deserves only a short answer.

Since we agree with the Hi~ Court which in tum has agreed with the first appellate court, ,our judgment can afford to be brief, A statement of necessary facts may now be given. The landlord had let out the premises, which is a storeyed building, to be tenant as per Ex. P-1 of 1955. The significant clause irt the lease deed runs thus : "1 xxx 2. I take your house for "my own use i.e. for opening a cloth shop and for residential purposes and I will net sublet your house to anybody. xxx xxx xxx xxx." The tenant has thus put the building to business and residential purposes. The landlord, who is an M. Sc., claimed the building back on the scorn that he wanted to run a medical store on the ground floor---a non-residential purpose---and sta:ron the first floor with his wife-a residential purpose. Thus the acommodation was let out for dual purposes, was being used presumably for these requirements and was being claimed back by the landlord for the twin purposes mentioned above.

The final court of fact has held that the landlord needs the building for his chemist's shop and for his residential use. The High Court in Second Appeal has upheld this finding and added that "the finding as to his bonafide requirement was rightly not challenged before me ...... ' The conclusion that the courts have reached is the only conclusion possible on the evidence on record in the light of the circumstances appearing." This statement by the High Court that the bonafide requirement of the landlord was not challenged before it has not been questioned, in the memorandum of appeal to this Court. It must therefore be taken that the bonafide need of the landlord is validly made out. The short point that survives is as to whether the composite purposes of the lease would put it out of the ground, set out for eviction under s. 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The said Act defines 'accommodation' thus :

" 'accommodation' means any building or part of a building, whether residential or non-residential and includes,-- xx xxx xxx." FIRM PANJUMAL v. SAKHI GOPAL (Krishna Iyer, J.) It follows that an accommodation can be residential, non-residential or both. S. 12 bars an actiun of eviction of a tenant from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds set out therein. 12(l)(e) and (f), bearing on the present case, may be appropriately extracted here : "12. ·Restriction on eviction of ten en ts (1) (a) to (d) x x x x x ( e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in the occupation in the city or town concerned;

(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose 'of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner there. of or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; . xxx xxx xxx." The residential portion is a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The non-residential portion is also a part of the building and is an accommodation by definition. The lease has been given for residential a·s well as non-residential purposes. The landlord is entitled to eviction of the residential portion if he makes out a bonafide residential requirement. Likewise he is entitled to eviction of the non-residential portion which is an accommodation if he makes out a non-residential requirement.

We havel already found that the final court of fact, affirmed by the High Court, has found in favour of the landlord regarding his residential as well as non-residential require. ments. Therefore, nothing more can be done in defence of the tenant in the light of the present law. Counsel contended that in a decision of this Court, viz, S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand,('). it has been held that it is not permissible for the court to split up a contract in an eviction proceeding. We agree. There is no question of splitting up of the contract in the present case, as is abundantly plain from what we have stated. The contract was integral but had dual purposes. The landlord has put forward dual requirements which neatly fit into s. 12(1 )(e) and (f). The consequence is inevitable that the eviction order has to be upheld. --o·~l~r1~9~6B~l ~1 =s.=c~.R-. ~si~6-. [1,977] 3 S.C.R. It i~ seen; that the tenant has been doing a thriving cloth business, with goodwill attached to it, for well knigh 30 years.

It is therefore but fair that the tenant is given sometime to rehabilitate himself by securing an alternative but suitable accommodation. In our towns where scarcity .of accommodation i~ the rule it is not that easy to secure alternative premises. Taking: due note of this reality, we direct that while dismissing the appeal the eviction order shall not be put into execution before 1st January, 1978. Parties will bear their respective costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed. >. 41