Union of India and Anr. v. B. N. Prasad

Judgment

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1972. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgement and Order dated 29-Jl-!97i ot the Patna High Court in Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 25/71. U. R. Lalit and Girislz C/umdra for the Appellant. D. P. Mukherjee. A. K. Ganguli and Mrs. E. Udayarathnam for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAzAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Patna High Court dated 29-~1-1971 _by .which .the High Court has quashed an order of the magistrate, d1rectmg the respondent to be evicted from the railway premises. The appeal ari5's in the following circumstances : .The. resp?ndent was a contractor employed by the railway for supplymg food m the refreshment room at Kishanganj station. The last agreement signed with the contractor is dated 10-7-1967 which expfred on .10-7-1970.

Thereafter, a notice was given by th~ railway admrmstrahon to the respondent for vacating the premises and as he failed to do so, a complaint under s. 138 of the Indian R~ilways Act was filed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent N.F. Railway to the Sub-divisional magistrate for passing an order in terms of s. 138 of the Railways Act. The magistrate accepted the application and directed the eviction of the respondent. . The respondent thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court, mainly on the ground that s. 138 could not be invoked as the complaint was not made by an authorized person. It was alleged in the ,petition befoce the High Court that the complaint made by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent, was not maintainable, as it should have been filed by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, according to the provisions of the Railways Act. This plea appears to have found favour with the High Court which allowed the writ petition and quashed the order of eviction.

Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. U. R. Lalit submitted a short point before us. He argued thats. 138 does not require that the complainant should be specifically authorized by the Railways in order to make a complaint maintainable. All that section 138 requires is that the application should be filed on behalf of the railway administration. There can be no doubt that the appellant was a high officer of the railway administration and, therefore, in a position to file an application for eviction on behalf of the railway administration.

Section 138 runs thus :- "lf a railway servant is dischargc<l or suspended from his office, or dies, absconds or absents himself, and he or his wife or widow, or any of his family representatives, refuses or neglects, after notice in writing for that purpose to deliver up to the railway administration, or to a person appointed by the railway administration in this behalf, any station, dwelling-house, office or other building with its appurtenances. or any books, papers or other matters, belonging to the railway administration and in the possession or custody of such railway servant at the occurrence of any such even as aforesaid, any Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class may, on application made by or on behalf of the railway administration, order any police-officer, with proper assistance, to enter upon the building and ·remove any person found therein and take possession thereof, or to take possession of the books, papers, or other matters, and to deliver the same to the railway administration or a person appointed by the railway administration in that behalf."

In our opinion, a close perusal of this section ckarly reveals that the provision has widest amplitude and take~ within its fold not onlr a railway servant but even a contractor who 1s engaged for performmg UNION V. B. N. PRASAD (FAZAL Ali, J.) services to the railway, and the termination of his contract by the Railway amounts to his discharge, as mentioned in s. 138. As the provision is in public interest meant to avoid incoovenience and expense to the travelling public and gear up the efficiency of the railway administration, it must be construed liberally, broadly and meaningfully, so as to advance the object sought to be achieved by the Railway Act. Furthermore, the section only requires that an application should be made by or on behalf of the railway administration. The section does not require that any particular person hading a particular post, shoulcl be authorized to file a complaint. The matter was considered by this Court in Nanik Awatrai Chainani v. Union of India('), where this Court pointed out, while relying on decisions of the Lahore and Calcutta High Courts that the appellant in the case was a railway servant, and an order of eviction could be passed against him.

This court relied on the definition of the railway servant as contai~d in section 8 (7) read with s. 148(2) of the Act. The Court approved of the decision in S. L. Kapoor v. Emperor( 2) and R. L. Mazumdar v. Alfred Ernest(3), which had taken the view that even a contractor is a railway servant within the meaning of s. 138. In this connection, this Court observed : "The terms which govern the parties expressly reserve to the railway administration extensive power of directing and regulating the appellant's work and also to an extent, of controlling the manner of doing the work. Keeping in view the purpose and object of these agreements, namely, that of affording necessary amenities to the travelling public, retention of this over-all power by the railway administration is not only appropriate but necessary.

The retention of this power by the railway administration, in our· view, constitutes relevant material for sustaining the conclusion of the courts below that the appellant is a railway servant, as defined in s. 3 (7) read with s. 148(2), Indian Railways Act, against whom action can be taken under s. 138 of the said Act." This court' went to the extent of holding that such a servant in view of the precarious contract under which he had entered in the Railway service was not governed by art. 311. In the case of S. L Kapoor v. Emperor (supra), the following observations were made:- "The termination of his service by the railway under cl. 21 of the agreement amounts to his discharge within the meaning of s. 138 of the Act, and he is therefore liable to dispossession of the premises which he was occupying as a servant of the railway." As already indicated, this case was approved by this Court in the decision mentiooed above. In this view of the matter, it is manifest (l) [197!] (I) S.C.R. 650.

(2) A.LR. 1937 Lahore 547. (3) A.T.R. 1959 Cal. 64. K that the High Court has taken an erroneous view of law in thrnwing out the complaint filed by the Deputy Chief Commercial Superinte.1dent on the ground that he was not authorized to file the complaint. hen on the other question whether or not the respondent was a rh'lway s(:rvant, as pointed out, the matter is no longer res integra and is con· eluded by the decision of this Court referred to above. For the'c reasons, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the sub-divisional magistrate is restored. S.R. Appeal ullu1red.