in Re : Shri S. Mulgaokar v. --

Judgment

special jurisdiction. These diverse indicators, carefully considered, have persuaded me to go no further, by a unilateral decision of the bench. This closure has two consequences. It puts the lid on the proceedings without pronouncing on the guilt or otherwise of the opposite parties. In a quasi-criminal action, a presumption of innocence operates. Secondly, whatever belated reasons we may give for our action, we must not proceed to substantiate the accusation. if any. To co"ndemn unheard is not fairplay. Bodyline bowling. perhaps. is not crick•et. So my reasons do not reflect on the merits of the charge. Poise and peace and inner harmony are so quintessential to the judicial temper that huff, 'haywire' or even humiliation shall not besiege; nor, unveracious provocation, frivolous persiflage nor terminological i"nexactitude throw into palpitating tantrums the balanced cerebration of the judicial mind.

The integral yoga of shanli and neeti Is so much the cornerstone of the judicial process that criticism, wild or valid, authentic or anafhematic, shall have little purchase over the mentation of the court. I quite realise how hard it is to resist, with I IN RE : s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, /.) 17 3 sage silence, the shafts. of acid speech; and, how alluring it is to succumb to the temptatton of argumentation where the thorn, not the rose, triumphs. Truth's taciturn strategy, the testimony' of history says, has a higher power than a hundred thousand tongues or pens. In contempt jurisdiction, silence is a sign of strength since our power is wide and we are prooecutor and judge. Why did I concur in the short order ? Why do I now strike a variant note to that of the learned Chief Justice ? I do not take up the position that ~andalising the Judges d-Oes not come within the contempt clutches of the court.

The Court's jurisdiction to initiate proceedings and punish for constructive contempt suo motu crystallized l'1 the eighteenth century ev·~n though it is clear that the Court's inherent powers in this regard were not as wide as Wilmot J. made them out to be in his posthumously published opinion in R. v. Almon [1765 published in (1802) Wilmot's opinions] ( 1). Fortunately, the attacks on the judiciary have been comparatively few in most cou'ntnes, having regard to the character assassination of the personnel in the other great branches of Government. Even so. the law which punishes those who scandalize judges is as old as the Common Law itself. The exMence of the contempt power, however, does not obligate its exercise on every occasio'n but triggers it only in special situations, not routinely. What then are the complex of considerations dissuasive of puniti\'e action ? To b~ exhaustive is a baffling project; to be pontifical is to be impractical; to be flexible is to be realistic.

What, then, ate these broad guidelines-not a complete inventory, but precedentially validated judicial norms ~ The first rule in this branch of contempt power is a wise economy cf use by the Court of this branch of its jurisdiction. The Court will act with seriousness and severity where justio~ is jeopardiz~d by a gross and/or unfounded attack on the judges, where the attack is calculated to obstruct or destroy the judicial process. The court is willing to ignore, by a majestic liberalism, trifling and venial offenses-the dogs may bark, the caravan will pass. The court will not be prompted to act as a result of an easy irritability. · Much rather, it shall take noetic look at the conspectus of features and be guided by a constellation ot constitutional and other considerations when it chooses to use, er desist f.rom us.ing, its power of contempt.

The second principle must be to harmonise the constitutional value; of free criticism, the fourth estate included, and the need for a f;!arless curial process and its presidii1g functionary, the judge. happy balance has to be struck, the benefit of the doubt being given generously against the judge, slurring over marginal deviations but severely proving the supremacy of the Jaw over pugnacious, vicious, unrepentant and malignant contcm'ners, be they t\le powerful press, gang-up of vested interests, veteran columnists or olympian establishmentarians. Not because the judge, the human symbol of a high value, is personally (I) See further R. Dhavan : "Contempt of Court and the Phillimore Committee Report" (1976) 5 Anglo A1nerican Law Review, 186 at 194 and the literature cited there. .ll (1978] 3 S.C •. R. armoured. by a regal privilege but because 'be you-the contemnerever. so high, the law-the People's expression of Justice-is above you.

Cun.al courage overpowers arrogant might even as judicial bonignity fo'.g1ves cr~ailt or ex~ggerated critics. Indeed, to criticise the judge fauly, albeit fiercely, is no crrrne but a neo;,ssary right twice blessed in a democracy. For, it blesseth him that gives and him that takes. ~here freedom of expression, fairly exercised, subserves public interest m re'.IBo~able measur~, public justice cannot gag it or manacle it, conshtutmnally speaking. A free people are the ultimate guarantors of fearless justice. Such is the cornerstone of our Constitution; such is th.e touchstdnc of our Contempt Power, oriented on the confluence of free speech and fair justice which is the scriptural essence of onr Fundamental Law. Speaking of the social philosophy and philosophy of law in an integrated manner as applicable to contempt of court, there is no conceptual polarity but a delicate balance, and judicial 'sapience' draws the line.

As it happens, our Constitution-makers foresaw the need for balancing all these competing interests. Section 2(1) (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides : "Criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of a·ny matter or the doing of any other act whatsover which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or Jowers or tends to lower th•o aulhorily of any court." This is an extremely wide definition. But, it cannot be read apart from the conspectus of the con5titutional provisions within which the Founding Fathers of the Constitutio"n intended all past and future statutes to have meaning. All Jaws relating to contempt of court had, according to the provisions of Article 19(2), to be "reasonable restrictions" on the exercise of the right of free speech. The courts were given the power-and, indeed, the responsibility-to harmonize conflicting aillllS, i"ntercsts and values.

This is in sharp contrast to the Phillimore Committee Report on Contempt of Court in the United Kingdom (197~) bu11d. 5794 prs. 143-5, pp. 61-2) which did not recommend the defence of public interest in contempt cases. · The third principle is to avoid confusion between personal protection of a libelled judge a·nd prevention of obstruction of public justice and the communitv's confidence in that great process. The former is not contempt, the" latter is, although overlapping spaces abound. Because the Jaw of contempt exists to protect public confidence in the administration of justice, the offence will not be committed by attacks upon the perso\101 reputation of individual judges as such. As Professor Goodhart has put it : "Scandalising the court means any hostile criticism of the judge as judge; any personal attack upon him, unconnec'.ed with the office he holds, is dealt with nnder the ordinary rules of slander and libel." IN RE : s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, !.)

(See 'Newspapers and Contempt of Court' (1935) 48, Harv. L. R. 885, 898.) Similarly, Griffith, C. J. has said in the Australian case of Nicholls(') that : "In one sense, no doubt, every defamatory publication concerning a judge may be said to bring him into contempt as that term is med in the law of libel, but it does not follow that everything said of a judge calculated to bring him into contempt in that sense amounts to contempt of Court." Thus in ln the matter of a Special .Reference from the Bahama Island(') the Privy Council advised that a contempt had not been committed through a publication in the Nassau Guardian concerning the resident Chief Jus:ice, who had himself previously criticised local sanitary conditions. Though couched in highly sarcastic terms the publication did not rder to the Chief Justice in his official, as opposed to personal, capacity. Thus while it might have been a libel it was not a contempt.

The fourth functional canon which channels discretionary exercise of the contempt power is that the Fourth Estate which is an indispensable intermediary between the State and the people and necessary instrumentality in strengthening the forces of democracy, should be given free play within responsible limits even whe'n the focus of its critical attention is the court, including the highest Court. The fifth normative guideline for the judges to observe in this jurisdiction is not to be hypersensitive even where disortions and criticisms overstep t11e limits, but to deflate vulgar denunciation ~'Y dignified bearing, condescending indifference and repudiation by judicial rectitude.

The sLtth consideration is that, after evaluating the totality of factors, if the court considers the attack on the judg.; or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond co'ndonabk limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenge> the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream. Speaking generally, there arc occasions when the right to comment may be of suoreme value (for instance. the thalidomide babies cases in England)(') and the law of contempt must adjust competing values and be modified, in its aoplication by the requirements of a free society and the shifting emphasis on paramount public in~erest in given situation. (I) (1911) 12 C.L.R. 280, 285. (2) (1893) A.C. 138. (3) I prefer the judgment of Lord Denning M. R. in the Court of Appeal to those in the Divisional Court or House of Lords in the Thalidomide case: All. Gen. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1972) 3 All. E.R. 1136 (D.C.) ;

(1973) I All. E.R. 815 (C.A.) ; (1973) 3 All. E.R. 54 (H.L.). SUPREME COURT, REPORTS · [1978] 3 S.C.R. Indeed, there is an interesting Australian decision R. V. Brett(') which has a meani'ngful relevance for our cai;e and I quote from the Australian Law Journal : 11 "In R. v. Brett, the publisher of a: newspaper was called on to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of court. It appeared that the newspaper, under the heading "Mr. Justice Sholl-Diehard Tory" had criticised the appointment of Mr. Justice Sholl and inferentially of all his brethren except one not specified, because they were out of touch with. the life of the people and had no experience (it was alleged) in the Criminal Court "the only court where even a semblance of the problems of the people arise". and it concluded that his appointment showed that the judiciary was "an institution forming an integral part of the repressive machinery of the State". "O'

Bryan, J. pointed out that the fact that the article made ridiculous mistakes of fact and that its logic was greatly at fault, did 'not prove that it was a contempt. The question was whether the article, honestly though mi·stakenly and offensively, criticised the policy of this and previous administrations in appointinl;\ judges, or whether it did indeed set out to lower the authonty of the Court as sucn and to excite misgivings as to its partiality. With very great hesitation, his Honour came to the conclusion that a case for the exercise of the extra-ordinary summary .iurisdiction of the Court had 'not been made out and he discharged the order nisi." Another useful illustration from the Australian jurisdiction is contained in short report made of a decision in Australian Law Journal, 1928-29, Vol. 2, 145-146 : "The Tasmanian case (The King v. Ogilvie) concerned statements made by the respondent at public meeti'ngs, imputing lack of impartiality to Mr. Justice Crisp, and asserting that the respondent was personally disliked by his Honour, and that respondent's clients could not get justice from him.

Nicholls, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, agreed with the authorities that fair comment o:n judicial actions is not only justifiable, but beneficial. He then pointed out "that we regard these preceedings as instituted and our pow~rs conferred, not for the benefit or comfort of the Judges personally, to protect them from criticism or even from libel, but simply to secure that this institution, the Supreme Court, which in the final analysis has to declare and enforce the rules which hold the community together, shall be challenged only in the proper ways, which are two" first, by appeal, and secondly by approach i'n the proper form to Parliament." (I) (1950) C.LR. 226. IN RE: s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, l.) A quick flash back to English decisions also is instructive. As early as i900 in Queen v. Gray(') Gray published in a newspaper an article which was "personal scurrilous abuse of a judge as a judge" Lord Russel of Killowen C. J. observed :

"It is not too much to say that it is an article of scurrilous abuse of a judge in his character of a judgescurrilous abuse, in ref,rence to the conduct of the judge while sitti'ng under the Queen's Commission, and scurrilous abuse published in a newspaper in the town .in which he was still sitting under the Queen's Commission. It cannot be doubted-indeed it has not been argued to the contrary by the learned counsel who represents Howard Alexander Gray-that the article does constitute a contempt of Court; but, as these applications are, happily, of an unusual character, we have thought it right to explain a little more fully than is perhaps necessary what does constitute a contempt of Court, and what are the means which the law has placed at the disposal of the Judicature for checking and punishing contempt of Court. Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of Court.

That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with t~e due course of justice or .the lawful process of the Courts 1s a contempt of Court. The former class belongs to the category. which Lord Hardwicke L. C. characterised as "scandalising a Court or a Judge." The learned Law Lord, however. indicated a guideline which is extremely important : "Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public, good, no Court could or would treat that m· contempt of Court. The Jaw ought not to be astute in such cases to criticise adversely what under such circumstances and with such an object is published; but it is to be remembered that in this matter the liberty of the press is no greater and no less than the liberty of every subject of the Queen.

Now, as I have said, no one has suggested that this is not a contempt of Court a'nd nobody has suggested, or could suggest that it falls within the right of public criticism in the sense I have describ~d. It is not criticism : I repeat that it is personal scurrilous abuse of a .iudge as a judge ..... .'' (emphasis, added) The tone of R. v. Gray (supra) sharply contrasted with the much more liberal tone adopt·~d by the Privy Council in McLeod v. St. (1) (1900) Q.B.D. 36. [1978] 3 S.C.lt· Aubyn (') even though certain aspects of the latter decision assume a somewhat imperialist tone. Dr. Rajeev Dhavan has observed : II "For some stra'.ng;~ reason the Privy Council judgment was neither referred to by the Chief Justice or even cited to the Court even though a time Jag of nine months separates the two judgments".( 2 )

A harmonious blend and a balanced co-existence of a free press and fearless justice desidcrates that the law ought not to be too astute in such cases and that public criticism has a part to play, even if it oversteps the limit, in preserving the democratic health of public institutions. But beyond a point, the wages of contempt is committal. In Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad(3 ) the Privy Council pronounced on a case of public criticism of the administration of justice. Lord Atkin stated, with admirable accuracy, the law on this branch of contempt of Court : "But whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercise the ordinary right of cnticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice.

Th~ path of criticism is a public way : the wrong headed are permitted to err therein : provided that members of the public abstain from imputing m1proper motive<; to those takmg part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the admi'nistration of jus!ice, th·~y are immune. Justice is not a cloistered virtue : she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken comments of ordinary men." Indeed, Loni Morris in Mcleod v. St. Aubyn (supra) has commenled: "Courts are satisfied to leave to public opinion attacks or comments derogatory or scandalous to them. But it most be considered that in small colonies, consisting principally of coloured populations, the enforcement in proper cases of committal for contempt of Court for attacks on the Court may be absolutely ne<:essary to preserve in such a community the dignity of and respect for the Court.''

In will not condemn the Indian people with the contempt manifest in Lord Morris' observation regarding small colonies and coloured populatims. We arc cultured people with traditions and canons and may at least be equated in these matters with English men. (I) [1899] A.C. 549. (2) See R. Dhavan : "Oonternpt of Court and the Phillimore Committee RePDrt" (1976) 5 Anglo A1nerica11 Law Rel'iew 186 at 205. (3) (1936) A.C. 322. I I JN RE: s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, !.) A very valuable and remarkably fresh approach to this question of criticism of Courts in intemperate language and invocation of contempt of court against the contemner, a person of high position, is found in Regina v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner ex. p. Blackburn('). Lord Dennin g's judgment is particularly instructive in the context of the obnoxious comments made by Quintin Hogg in an article in "Punch" about the members of the Court of Appeal.

The remarks about the Court of Appeal were highly obnoxious and the barbed words thrown at the judges obviously were provocative. Even so, in a brief but telling judgment, Lord Denning held this not to be· contempt of court. It is illuminating to excerpt a few observations of the learned judge : "This is the first case, so far as I know, where this court has been ca11ed on to consider an allegation of contempt against itself. It is a jurisdiction which undoubtedly belongs to us but which we will most sparingly exercise : more particularly as we ourselves have an interest in the matter. Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.

It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it. in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice. They can say that we are mistaken, and our decisions erroneous, whether they are subject to appeal or not. All we wou:d ask is that thos•e who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our offic•c, we cannot reply to their eriticismE. We cannot e·nter into public controversy. Still less into political. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication. Exposed as we are to the winds of criticism, nothing which is S3id by this person or that, will deter us from doing what we believe is right; nor, I would add, from saying what the nccas1on requires, provided that it is pertinent to the matter in hand. Silence is not an option when things are ill done."

The Indian precedents must naturally receive referential attention from us and so I switch over to the cases of this Court which have relevance to that branch of the contempt jurisprudence bearing upon scanclafoing the judges. After a brief survey, I will summarise the conclusions~ In Sambhu Nath Iha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha & Ors.(•) (I) (1968) 2 W.L.R. 1204. (2) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 183, 189. "ll would follow from the above that the courts have power to take action against a person who does an act or publishes a writing which is calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to lower his authority or to obstruct tho due course of justice or due administration of law .... in such cases. the court would exercise circumspection and judicial restraint in the matter of taking action for contempt of court.

The court has to take into account the surrounding circumstances and the material facts of the case and on conspectus of them to come to a conclusion whether because of some contumacious conduct or other sufficient rea- ~on the person proceeded against should be punished for contempt of court." Jn Perspective Publications Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra(') Grover, .J., speaking on behalf of the Court, reviewed the entire case law and stated the result of the discussion of the cases on contempt as follows : "(!) It will net be right to say that committals for contempt for scandalizing the court have become obsolete. (2) The summary jurisdiction by way of contempt must be exercised with great care and caution and only when its exercise is necessary for the proper administration of law and Justice. (3)

It IS open to anyone to express fair, reasonable and legitimate criticism of any act or conduct of a judge in his judicial capacity or even to make a proper and fair comment on any decision given by him because "justice is not a cloistered virtue and she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men." 1 ( 4) A distinction must be made between a mere libel or defamation of a judge and what amounts to a contempt of the Court. The test in each case would be whether the impugned publication is a mere defamatory attack on the judge or whether it is calculated to interfere with the due course ol justice or the proper administration of Jaw by this Court. It is only in the latter case that it will be punishable a8 Contempt. (5) Alternatively the test will be whether the wrong is done to the judge personally or it is done to the public. To borrow from the language of Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) (Brahma Prakash Sharma's Case) (1953) S. C. R., J 169) the publication of a disparaging statement will . be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability (1)

[1971] 2 S.C.R. 779. IN RE: s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, ].) or foirnes of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance u·pon the court's administration of justice or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties." Hidayatullah, C. J., in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(') observed : 8 "There is no doubt that the Court like any other insntution does not enjoy immunity from fair criticism. This Court does not claim to be always right although it does not srarc any effort to be right according to the best of the ability, knowledge and judgment of the judges. They do not think themselves in possession of all truth or hold that wherever others differ from them, it is so far error. Na one is more conscious of his limitations and fallibility than a judge but because of his training and the assistance he gets from learned counsel he is apt to avoid mistakes more than others . . . . . . . .

W c are constrained to say also that while fair and temperate criticism of this Court or any other Court even if strong. may not be actionable, attributing improp<r motives, or tending to bring judges or courts into t.atred and contempt or obstructing directly or indirectly with the functioning of Courts is serious contempt of which notice must and will be taken. Respect is expected not only from those to whom the judgment of the Court is acceptable but also from those to whom it is repugnant. Those who err in their criticism by indulging in vilification of the instilution of courts, adn1inistration of justice and the instruments through which the administration acts. should take heed for they will act at th.cir own peril. We think this will be enough caution to persons embarking on the path of. criticism." In Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ( 2 ) this Court said :

"lt seems, therefore, that there are two primary considerations which should weigh with the court when it is called upon to exercise the summary powers in cases of contempt committed by "scandalising" the court itself. Jn the first place, the reflection on the conduct or character of a judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt of such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. It is not by stifling criticism that confidence in courts can be created. "The path of criticism", said Lord Atkin (Ambard v. Attorney-Oeneral for Trinidad and (1) (1970) 2 s.c.c. 298, 301. (2) (1953) S.C.R. 1169, ll78, ll80. R Tobago, (1936) A.C. 322 at 335) is a public way.

The wrong headed are permitted to err 'therein; provided that mem oers of the public abstain from imputing motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice, or attempt to impair the administration of justice, they are immune." Jn the second place, when attacks or comments .are made on a judge or judges, disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on the judge and what amounts really to contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so far as the judge is concerned does not necessarily make . it a contempt. The distinction between a libel and a contempt was pointed out by a Committee of the Privv Council, to which a referei1ce was made by the Secretary of State in 1892 (In the matter of a special reference from the Bahama Islands (1893) A. C. 13 8).

A man in the Bahama Islands, in a letter published in a colonial newspaper criticised the Chief Justice of the Colony in an extremely ill-chosen language which was sarcastic and pungent. There was a veiled insinuation that he was an incompetent judge and a shirker of work and the writer suggested in a way that it would be a providential thing if he were to die. A strong Board constituting of 11 members reported that the Jetter complained of, though it might have been made the subject of proceedings for libel, was not, in the circumstances. calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice or the due administration of the law and therefore did not constitute a contempt of court. The same principle' was reiterated by Lord Atkin in the case of Devi Prashad v. King Emperor (70 I. A., 216) referred to above. It was followed and approved of by the High Court of Australia in King v. Nicholls (12 Com. L. R. 280), and has been accepted as sound by this Court in Reddy v. The State of Madrus (1952)

S. C.R., 452). The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a judge may be a libel so far as the judge is concerned and it would be open to him to procc(d against the libeller in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. Tt will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regard-. ing the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the court's administration of justice, or if it Is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well I :i ' 'i • I 1 IN 11.E : s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, !. )

1 8 3 <"stablishcd that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration or justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is interference with the proper administration of law." ( \1•:. Mookerjce J. in /11 re: Motilal Ghosh and Others !LR, 45, Cal., 269 at 283.) There is no doubt that condign and quick punishment for scandalising publication has been awarded by this Court, (Vide c. K. Daphlary & Ors. v. 0. P. Gupta(') Another one is Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. The Registrar of Orissa High Court ·and Another('). In the latter case, I had occasioll to examine the root principles of Indian Contempt jurisprudence and I summed up thus : "Judges and Courts have diverse duties. But functionally, historically and jurisprudentially, the value which is clear to the community and the function which deserves to be cordoned off from public molestation, is judicial.

Vicious criticism of personal and administrative acts of Judges may indirectly mar their image and weaken the confidence of the public in the judiciary but the countcrveiling good, not merely of free speech but also of greater faith generated by exposure to the actinic light of bona fide, even if marginally over-zealour, criticism cannot be overlooked. Justice is no cloistered virtue." "The Court being the guardian of people's rights, it ha• been held repeatedly that the contempt jurisdiction should be exercised "with scrupulous care and only when the case i; clear and beyond reasonable doubt"." I relied on an observation made by Justice Gajendragadkar, C.J., In Special Reference No . .1 of 1964 and proceeded to state the key to the iurisdiction : "We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt, large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously. wisely, and with circumspection.

Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes affect it adversely. Wisc Judges never forget that the hest way to sustain the dignity and status o! their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments. the fearlessness, fairness and objectivity of.their approach, and by the restraint, dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct.'' Jf judges decay the contempt power will not save them and so the other side of the coin is that Judges, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. (I) (1971) Supp. S.C.R. 76, 92-93. ~2) (1974) I S.C.C. 374. n 8 ff, To wind up, the key word is "justice", not "judge"; the key-not thought is unobstructed public justice, not the selfdefence of a judge; the cornerstone of the contempt law is the accommodation of two constitutional valnes-the right of free speech and the right to independent justice.

The ignition of c_ontempt action should be substantial and mala fide interference with fearless judicial action, not tair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel." Indeed, I am convinced that democratic institutions, including the Court system and judges, must suffer criticism and benefit from it This approach has been emphasised by me in that ca'se : "Even so, if Judges have frailties-after all they are human-they need to be corrected by independent criticism. If the judicature has serious shortcomings which demand systemic correction through socially-oriented reform initiated through constructive criticism, the contempt power shouid not be an interdict. All this, far from undermining t!le confidence of the public in Courts, enhances it and, in the last analysis, cannot be repressed by indiscriminate resort to contempt power.

Even bodies like the Law Commission or the Law Institute and researchers, legal and sociological, may run 'contempt' risks because their professional work sometimes involves unpleasant criticism of judges, judicial processes and the system itself a_nd thus hover perilously around the periphery of the law if widely construed. Creative kgal journalism and activist statesmanship for judicial reform cannot be jeopardised by an undefined apprehension of contempt_ action." American legal history has lessons for us but when national conditions vary adaptation, not imitation, is the creative alternative, to avoid breakdown on the rock of real life. New York is not New Delhi and New York Times deals with different customers from the Times of India. The law of contempt fluidly flows into the mould .:if life. This fact once noted, there is instructive. thought in the American cases. Their lofty approach, grounded on constitutional values, has an appeal for us.

The issue is one of the w-avest moment for free peoples and to choose between the cherished basics of free expression and fair hearing is a trying task. For a free press it may be an;ued .~s did the U. S- judges : "What is at stake here is a societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs .... (P)ublic debate must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that First Amendment cieJncerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas as well as the I IN RE : s. MULGAQKAR (Krishna Iyer, J.) right of free expression. . . . . . An informed public depends on accurate and effective· reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic.

In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent selfgovernment. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment. That function is recognized by specific reference to the press i'n the text of the Amendment and by the precedents of this Court. The argument further asserts that a curtailment of press freedom is a seriou·s matter. If they can be justified at all, it must· be in terms of some serious substantive evil which they are designed to avert. The substantive evil here sought to be averted has been variously described below. It appears to be double disrespect for the judiciary; and disord~rly and unfair administration of justice.

The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than 1t would enhance respect." We may glance at the vigorous dissent cf Mr. Justice Frankfurter to this reasoning in Bridges v. California(') "Our whole history repels the view that it is an exercise nf one of the civil liberties secured by the Bill of Rights for a leader of a large following or for a powerful metropolitan newspaper to attempt to overawe a judge in the matter immediately pending before him.

The view of the majority deprives California of means for securing to its citizens justice according to law-means which, since the Union was founded, have been the possession, hith.:rt0 unchallenged, of all the states. This sudden break with the uninterrupted course of con~tit'!tion~l history has no ~on~ti­ tntional warrant. To find iusllfica!Jon for snch depnvat10n of the historic powers of the states is to misconceive the idea of freedom of thought and speech as gnaranteed by the Constitution .....• " (1) [19411 319 U.S. 252, 279; 283, 284. 13-211 SCI/78 A irial is not a "free yade in ideas," nor is the besl test of truth m a courtroom ' the power of the thought to get it- •el! accepted in the competition of the market" ........ A court i~ a forum with strictly defined limits for discussion. It 1s mcnmscribed i~ th.e range of its inquiry and m its 1'.'ethods bl'. the Consl!tutwn, by laws, and by age-old tradil!ons._ Its.

1ud,ges are restrained in their freedom 1o'f expresswn oy h1stonc compulsions resting on no other officials of ~overnmcnt. . The~ are S? circumscribed precisely because Judges have m their keepmg the enforcement of rights and the protection of liberties which, according to the wisdom of the ages, can only he enforced and protected by observi!}g such methods and traditions. ........ The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a state to continue the historic process of prohibiting expressions calculated to subvert a specific exercise of judicial power. So to assure the impartial accompli'shment of justice is not an abridgment of freedom of speech or freedom of the press as these phases of liberty have heretofore been conceived even by the stoutest liberatarians. In fact, these liberties themselves depend upon an untrammeled judiciary whose passions are not even unconsciously aroused and whose minds are not distorted by extra-judicial considerations.

Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield power. Particularly should this freedom be employed in comment upon the work of courts, who ate without many influences ordinarily making for humor and humility, twin antidotes to the corrosion of power. But the Dill cf Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom of expression con hardly carry implications that nullify the guarantees of impartial trials. And since courts. are the ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state may surely authorize appropriate historic means to assure that the process for soch vindication be not wrenched from its rational tracks into the more primitive melee of passion and pressure. The need is great that courts be criticized, but just as great that they be allowed to do their duty." The representative thinking on the subject is neatly summed up by John R. Brown, Chief Judge :

"Thus does Alexander again confront the Gordhn Knot. For our history demands that breaches of the unqualified commands of the First Amendment cannot be tolerated and freedom of the press musf be given the broadest scope that a liberty-loving people can allow ...... On the other hand, our fundamental concepts of absolut~ fairness in trials dictate that the environment within which justice is administered must be maintained unpolluted by ~be I IN RE : s. MULGAOKAR (Krishna Iyer, /.) 18 7 potential infamous notoriety and biased predilections which a compietely unfettered but omnipresent press can irrevocably engender in an age of the mass media ........ " It is apparent from this long discussion that the future of Free Press and of Fair Justice desiderates a juristic socio-political national debate, not cx-cathedra admonitions from the Bench or assertions from the Bar. We must evolve a know-how for the co-existence of free speech and free justice in tune with the Preamble and Article 19.

Scurrilous attacks on judges or on parties to pending cases foul the course ot justice. Mischievous half-truths, brazen untruths and virulent publicity by partisan media, political organs and spokesmen for vested interests can be traumatic to the cause of social justice. In an area of competing social values absolutist approaches are sure to err. And yet benign neglect of courts to arreSt injurious publicity may be misread as importencc and timely affirmative action may stem the rot. Sheppard(') is an American case in point Remember, a 'free' press is often a monopoly press and has been made gargantuan by modern technology. Of course, we must also remember, courts work in public and publishing their proceedings fairly cannot be taboo. Please remember, further, that those who cry 'wolf' against Contempt Power are more often the Propriefariat, not the Proletariat, with exceptions which prove the rule.

Preju<licibl publicity, indulged in by a 'free' press owing no institutional responsibility or public accountability, cannot be all that good, especially when judges are personally vilified, assured that the 'robes' traditionally, and for good reasons, do not and should not wrestle with caluminating columnists or yellow journalists. Likewise, a litigant or judge, run down by powerful vested interests wearing the mask of mass media owned by them or hiring the pen of arch spokesmen of political or economic reactionaries, cannot run riot, raising the alarm that free speech is in peril and get away with it. Heroism on the face may often be villainy at heart and the law cannot retreat from its justice-function scared by slogans. Balancing of values is difficult, delicate but indispensable. Neither the Press nor the courts are above. the People.

Otherwise, even gutter talk or, to borrio'w the phraseology of justice Stevens in Nebraska("), shabby, intrusive· or persersely motivated media practices, may he dignified as free press and given protective constitutional status, leaving the citizen litigant demoralised and citizen judge powerless, panicked by the ballyhoo of Press restraint. The Court is not an inert abstraction; it is people in judicial power. And when drawing up standards for Press freedom and restraint, as an 'interface' wilh an unafraid court, we must not forget that in our constitutional scheme the most fundamental of all freedoms is the free quest for justice by the small man. 'When beggar~ (l) Sheppard v. Mawe// [1966] 384, U.S., 333. j2) Nebraska Press Association v. Stuarts [l976J 96 Sup. Ct. 2791. [I978] 3 S.C.R. die, there are comets seen' and 'when the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled'.

The contempt sanction, once frozen by the high and mighty press' campaign, the sufferer, in the long run, is the small Indian who seeks social transformation through a fearless judicial process. Social justice is at stake if foul press unlimited were to reign. As Justice Frankfurter stated, may be 'judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions' (a question I desist from deciding here), but when comment darkens into ~oercive imputation or calculated falsehood, threats to impartial adjudication subtly creeps. Not because judges lack firmness nor that the dignity of the bench dem_ands enhanced respect by enforced silence, as Justice Black observed in the Los Angeles Times(') case but because the course of justice may be distorted by hostile attribution. Said Justice Jackson in Craige v. Harney(2) :

"I do not know whether it is the view of the Court that a judge must be thickskinned or just thickheaded, but nothing in my experience or observation confirms the idea that he is insensitive to publicity. Who does not prefer good to ill report of his work ? And if fame-a good public name-is, as Milton said, the "last infirmity of noble mind," it. is frequently ·the first infirmity of a medicore one." I do not dogmatise but indicate the perils. Of course, the evil must be substantive and substantial, not chimerical or peripheral. A concluding note. I have launched on this long, inconclusive essay in contempt jurisprudence bearing on scandalizing the judges qu" judges, aware that not high falstaffllln rhetoric but hard-headed realism, illumined by constitutional values, must set the limit and interpret the statute.

It is a disturbing devefopment in our country that the media and some men in the trade of traducement are escalatingly scandalizing judges with flippant or motivated write-ups wearing a pro bona publico veil and mood of provocative mock-challenge, The court shall not meditate nor hesitate but shall do stern justice to such 'professional' contemners, not shrink because they are scurrilous, influential or incorrigible. Even so, to be gentle is, to be just and the quality of mercy is not strained. So, it is that benign neglect not judicial genuflexion, is often the prescription, and to inhiPit haphazardness or injustice it is necessary that the ~ar and the Press evolve a dignified consensus on the canons of ethics in this area, with due regard to the Constitution and the laws, so that the Bench may give it a close look and draw the objective line of action.

The process of arriving at these norms by those mighty forces who influence public opinion, cannot be delayed and until then the law laid down in precedents of .this court will go in.to a~tion when judge-baiting is indulged in. by m~sked .men or media mt~!. Freedom is what Freedom does and Justil;e fails when Judges quail. (I) 314 U.S. 263, (2) 331 us. 367. IN RE : s. MULGAOKAR (Kailasam, /.) For sure, my plea is not for judicial pachydermy, but for dignified detachment which ignores ill-informed criticism in its tolerant stride, but strikes when offensive excesses are established. Frankly, all these are hypothetical and have no specific reference to the present case.

These obiter-dicta are intended to indicate the pros and cons, not to pontificate on the precise limits for exercise of contempt power and to emphasize what Chief Justice Warren Burger mentioned in Nebraska Press Association(!) as 'something in the nature of a fiduciary duty' of the press to act responsibly and I may add, respectfully. An afterword. An afterword has become necessitous because the learned Chief Justice has, in his reasons, made some critical observations on men and matters based on his rich experience, .high responsibility and urge to right wrongs. While respecting his feeling of hurt ahd attempt to set the record straight regarding his prior judgment and letters on canons of judicial ethics, I desist from comments on the author or the article, including its correctness and propriety, for fear that an indelible word, writ incautiously, may fester into an incurable wound. I am in no mood to pronounce on these subjects or to judge these generalities.

Many an arrow at random sent hits a mark the archer never meant, and ex cathedra generalisations run the genetic risk of noetic imperfections .. The Almighty does not share His omniscience with the Judiciary. KAILASAM, J.-I had the benefit of reading the Judgments proposed to be delivered by My Lord the Chief Justice and Justice Krishna Iyer. I would have been contented with stating that, in my view, on taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case this is .not a fit case to be proceeded with under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. But now it has become necessary for me to state whether I agree with the judgments to be delivered. My learned Brother Justice Krishna Iyer in his concluding note has expressed that he had launched on this long inconclusive essay which relates to hypothetical questions and has no specific reference to the present case. The Judgment which he himself characterises as obiter dicta may be left alone without any comments.

When the matter was taken up in the Court on 27th January, 1978, the contempt proceedings were dropped without calling upon the learned counsel who was appearing for the respondent in response G to the notice. Without hearing the parties concerned, it is not right and proper to make any comments about the facts of the case. In this view I refrain from referring to the publication in "The Indian Express" or about the article in the newspaper by Shri Noorani. Contempt proceedings will stand dropped. P.B.R. Proceedings dropped. (l) 96 S. Ct. 2803.