B. N. Mutto & Anr. v. T. K. Nandi

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAILASAM. J.-This appeal is by special lea1·c bv the landlord against the judgment of the High Oiurt of Delhi whcrdov it allcwed a revision of the respondent-tenant and set aside the order of evicdon passed by the Rent Controller. Delhi, rejecting the application of th<c responden[ seeking permission to contest the proceedings for eYiction filed by the appellants under section 14(A)(l) of the Delhi Re~t Control Act. The appellant, Shri B. N. Muttoo, Inspector General oI Police, leased the property No. F-9, East of Kailash. New Delhi, to the respondent from 15th September, 1972 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,200/- cxclusive of electricity and water charges. The lease was for the i:se of the premises for residential and/ or professional purposes only and not for commercial purposes. The lease agreement was renewed from time to time and the respondent became a monthly tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

On 18th July, 1974 the landlord filed a petition for eviction of the respondent on the grounds of mis user, subletting and bona fide requirement. The petition was registered as Suit No. 182 of 1974 and is still pending. The first appellant, B. N. Muttoo. ~etireq_ as Inspector General. o~ Police on 30th November, 1975. While m office he was occupym: "lllllf premises bearing No. C-11177 Moti Bagh I .. New Delhi, allotted to him by the Government. On 9th September, 1975 the Government took a decision that Government servanjs who own houses in the locality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them within 3 :mnths from !st October, 1975. On 9th December, 1975 a nC>tice was served on the first appellant by the Deputy Director (Admn.) stating that the Government by its Office Memorandum No. !

2'.)31 ( 1) / 74-Pc>l.TI dated 9th September, 1975 required all Government ofhcials wh•1 own houses in Delhi and New Delhi and have also been allotted Government residence to vacate the Government residence before the stipulated date failing which penal rate of licence of market rate st.all be charged besides necessary action to evict him from the Government residence. On the same day the appellant filed the present suit for eviction of the respondent. On 16th January, 1976 the respondent appEed for leave to defend. On 10th March, 1976 the Rent Controller refosed leave and decreed the suit filed by titc landlord. revision petition was filed by the respondent before the High Court which allowed the revision and set aside the order of the Rent Controller and remanded the proceedings to the Rent Controlier for disposal according to law. Against the order of the High CC>urt allowing the revi,ion by the respondent the present appeal has been preferred to th;s Coe.rt by the landlord.

The question that arises in this appeal is whether the Rent Controller "'"'' right in refusing leave to the respondent to ddend the eviction petition filed by the landlord. ln order to appteciatc the point that arises for consideration it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1958) came into force on l-.' B. N. MUTTO v. T. K. NANDI (Kailasam, !.) 3 lst December, 1958. By Chapter III the right of the landlord to evict the tenant was restricted. Section 14 prohibited any order or decree for recovery of possession of any of the premises being made by any court in f'!,vour of a landlord except under certain circumstances. The landlord was required to make an application to the Controller for recovery of the possession on one of the grounds mentioned in sub-clauses (a) to (1) in section 14(1). The provis:ons of section 14(1)(e) which are relevant may be referred to:- "14. (1)

Notwithstandi11g anything to the contrary contailied in any other law or contr~ct, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises sh~ll be 'llade by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant; Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or moie of the following grounds, namely:- x x x x x x x x x x x x ( e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for h1mse!f or for any member of hi_s family dep,>:ndent on him, if he i• the owner thereof, or for any pocson for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable 'esidential accommodation;

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause "prcmisos kl for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used ii1cidentally for commercial or other purposes; By the Delhi Rent Control Act (Amendment) Ordinance (Ko. 24 of 1975), 1975 the Delhi Rent Control Act was amended. The Ordinance was eventually replaced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act No. 18 of 1976. The Amending Ac? continued the provisions of the Ordinance but extended the summary procedure which was applicable to •ection 14 (1 )( e) to evictions· on the ground set out in section 14A of t1ie Act. The Amending Act came into focce on February 9, 1976 but by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 1 it was 0 4 l 4 deemed to have come into force on 1st December, 1975 i.e. og the date on which the Ordinance came into force. Section l 4A conferred a right to recover immediate possession of premises to certain pcrsons.

The amended section l 4A (1) reads: "(I)

Where a landlord who, being a person in ocaupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority is required. by, or in pu:suance of. any general or special order made by that Go, . ernment or authority, to vacate such residential accommodation, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns, in the union territory of Delhi a residential ac-::on1n1odation either in his own n_'!_me or in the name of his wife or dependent child, there shall Jccrne, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time beiq__g in force or in any contract (whether express or implied), custom or usage tc the contrary, a right to recover immediately possession of 1ny premises let out by him:" rfhis section confers on a landlord \.Vho owns a residential accommodation in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child in the Union territory of Deihi and was in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any 1oc<Jl aut_hority and is required by any general or special order made by the Government or the authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in Delhi either ;n his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child, a right shall accrue to such landlord to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him.

Apart from conferring rights under section 14A a summary procedure for trial of applications made nuder section 14(1)(e) and section 14A is provided under sections 25A, 25B and 25C. Section 25A provides that the provisions of Chapter IIIA which contains sections 25A. 25B and 25C and any rule made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere in this Act or any other law for the time bei_ng in force. The special procedure for disposal of application for eviction under section 14( l) (c) and section 14A is prescribed by section 25B. The procedure envisaged is that when an application under section 14(1)(e) B. N. MUTTO v. T .. K. NANDI (Kailasam, !.) ~ 15 or Section 14A is filed by the landlord the Controller shall issue summons in the prescribed form.

Sub-section ( 4) to section 25B restricts the right of the tenant to defend by providing that the tenant shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unkss he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller. In default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the sJatement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenan\ anJ the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground a[orcsaid. Sub-sec.tion (5) te section 25B states the conditions under which the Controller shall give leave !o the tenant to contest the application.

It requires that the _affidavit filed by the tenant should disclose such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for foe recovery ot possession of tile premises on the ground specified 'n clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, or under sectiono 14A. When once the leave is granted to the tenant to contest the application the Controller shall commence hearing of the application as early as practicable. The introduction of section 14A became necessary as the Government took a decision on 9th September, 1975 that the Government servants who own houses in the Union territory of Delhi shall be required to vacate Government accommodation allotted to them within 3 months from 1st October, 1975. If they fail to vacate the accommoda'.ion they were to be charged licence fee at market rates. The Government servants who were owing houses in the Union territory o[ Delhi could not get possession of their residential accommodation.

It became necessary to confer on them the right to recover immediate possession of their premises and also to prescribe an expeditious procedure for achieving the object. According to the procedure specified in section 25B it was lllade incumbent on the tenant to apply for and obtain leave to contest the application for eviction, Coming to the facts of the case the Government took the decision to r~quire the Government officers who have been allotted premises by the Government and who own their own houses in the area specified to vacate the premises allotted by the Government within 3 morrths from 1st October, 1975. Notice of snch intention was conveyed to the landlord on 9th December, 1975. In the meantime on 30th Nmcmber, 1975 the officer retired from service. Thus on the date on which notice was served on him he had already retired. The petition for eviction was also filed on 9th Dec~mber, 1975 after the I officer retired.

The main contentions raised by the tenai1t in the petition for leave to contest were; (1) the landlord cannot invoke the provisions of section 25B ( 5) a~ he was not a Government servant on the date of the petition; (2) the landlord had already filed a petition for eviction which was registered as O.S. No. 182 of 1974 and was pending before the Additional Rent Controller. As the eviction is sought on the same ground in the present petition it was submitted that this petition could not be entertained; (3) the premises which the respondent is occupying were let for the purpose of residential or professional purposes and therefore the landlord is not entitled to ask for eviction as the premises are not let for residential purposes. The Rent Contrail.er rejected all the contentions put forward by the respondent.

He held that the question as to whether the landlord was a Government servant or not on the d_ate when the notice was received and on the date when he filed the. petition is mclevant so long as he satisfied the requirements laid down in section 14(1) of the Act. On the second contention the Rent Controller found that the ground for eviction under section 14A is a new cause of action and different from the one that was raised in the previous petitions and hence the present petition is not barred. On the t)iird point the Rent Controller found that it is not necessary for an application under section 14(1) that the building should have been let for residential purposes as required under section 14 (I) ( c) and it is sufficient if the landlord niquires the premises for residential accommodation. The Rent Controller held !Ji!!t the grounds on which leave to resist an application can be granted are those that are specified in section 25B ( 5) alone.

On appeal the High Court allowed the revision by the tenant rr,ainly on the ground that the application for eviction must fail on account of the admitted fact that the landlord had retired from service on 30th Novemhcr, 1975 before the Ordinance came into fore~ and was on that account liable to vacate the premises independently of his ownership of the premises in dispute. The hnportant question that arises for consideration is whether the landlord who retired from service on 30th November, 1975 before the Ordinance came into force could avail himself of the provisions of section 14A(l). A reading of section 14A discloses that a right to recover immediate possession of premises accrues to certain persons if the requisite conditions are satisfied. The conditions are: (1) the landlord must be in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority; (2) such B. N. MUTTO v. T. K. NANDI (Kailasam, !.) landlord is required by a general or special order made by the Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns in the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent d1iid.

If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied a right shall accrue to such a landlord on and from the date of such order to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him. It may be noted that the section does not require that the person who is in occupation of the premises allotted by the Government should be a Government servant. It is necessary that the person is required by the Government or authority to vacate such accommodation imposing certoin consequences in the event of his not vacating. The policy decision take_n by the Government on 9th September, 1975 only related to Governlll.ent servaRts who were in occupation of premises allotted to them by the Government. If the Government servant had another house in the locality he was to vacate within 3 months from the 1st October, 1975. This general order no doubt relates only to Government servants.

After the decision was taken it was realized that some provision should be made to enable the persons in occupation of buildings allotted to them by the Government to get possession of the hous.es they own but have been let to tenants. In order to enable them to get possessioa of the premises let by them expditiously section 14A ( 1) was enacted and the expeditious procedure under section 25-B was made applicable. It may also be noted that the order served on the landlord on 9th December, 1975 mentions that all Government officials who own houses in Delhi and have also been allotted Government residence are to vacate Government accommodation.

The general circular dated 9th September, 1975 as we!l as the notic ~ served on the landlord thus support the view that the intention of the Government was to enable only those Government servants who are in occupation of Government accommodation and who own houses to get immediate possession, though section 14A does not restrict the right to recover immt:diate possession to Government servants alm1e. In these circumstances, the conclusions arrived at by the High Court that a Government servant who had retired before the date on which he had filed the application is not entitled to the benefits of section 14(1) is understandable. This view was expressed by this Court in Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand Jain(') wherein it was observed : "There appears to be some force in the view taken by the High Court that the provision of section 14A(l) was not intended for Govern- (1) (1978] 2 S.C.R. 183 at p. 190. ment servant who have retired from Government service or who have been transferred outside Delhi--."

But tTiis Court did not decide the issue because on the facts of the case it was of the view that the landlord was entitled to invo~c the provisions of section 14A(l) notwithstanding the fact that he had retired from Go\'ernmcnt service with effect from 30th Novemba,. 1975. In t11at case the notice was served on the appellant-landlord on 30th September. 1975 which was before the date of retirement which was on 31st November, 1975. On the ground that the right to c\'ict the tenant accrued to the landlord when he was in sen-ice it was held that lie was entitled to the rights conferred under section 14A. Jn this case the nctice was sened on 9th December; 1975 and ·,he olliccr had retired on 30th November, 1975. On the reasoning in the above case the appellant will not be entitled to the relief.

The question therefore .squarely arises in this case as to whether a Government ~ervant \\'ho retired before the notice was served on him requiring to quit the Government accommodation is entitled to the benefit of section l 4A (1). It is not clear as to why the right to recover immcciiate possession is not confined to Government servants alone under section 14A. It is clear that according to Government's policy statement the intention was only te require the Government servants to vacate the premise~ allotted to them by the Government if they had their own houses in the area. It cannot be said that it was by inadvcrtance that the Legislature mentioned persons instead of Government scrvailts and made the section applicable to persons other than Government servants. It is stated at the Bar that Government accommodation is provided not only to Government servants but also to Members of Parliament and other non-officials who occupy important positions in public life.

The Court will not he justified in presuming that when the legislature used the word "persons" it meant only Government servants. The rule as to constructio!il of the statutes is well-known and has been clearly laid down. Craies on Statute Law (6th Ed. p. 66) relying on Tasmania '· Commonwealth(') has stated the rule as follows:- "The cardinal rule for the constructions of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves." The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do m (1) [190411 C.L.R. 329. y B. N. MUTTO v. T: K. NANDI (Kailasam, J.) ~uch a case best declare the intent:on ol the ~awgiver.

Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficuHy in giving the plain meaning to the word "person" as not being confined to Government servants for it is seen that accommodation has been provided by the Government not only to Government servants but to others also. In :he circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning to the section. It Il!ay l:>e that the retired Government servants as well as others who are in occupation of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special advantage, but the purpose of the legislation being to enable the Government to get possesskn of accommodation provided by them by enabling the allottee to get immediate possession of the residential accommodation -0wned but let by them, the Court will not be justified in giving meaning which the words used will not warrant. On this question therefore we find ourselves unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court.

The next question that arises is whether the rights conferred under fection 14A(l) are available to premises that had been kt hr residential as well as profession;il puq>oses. It is admitted that the premises were let for residential as well as professional purposes. Section 14(1)(e) requires that in order to avail the provisions of section 14 (I)( e) the premises should be "let for use as a residence". 1t has been held that when premises ase let for residcnti~] as well as commercial or for residential and professional purposes lhe provis10ns of section l4(l)(e) will not apply. This ·court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S. K. Bhardwa; and Anr.,(') in construing section 13 (1 )( e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 held that premises let for residential purposes but used by the tenant with the consent of the landlord incidentally for commercial professional or other purposes cease to be premises let for a residential purpvse alone and as such the landlord would not be entitled to eject the tenant under section 13 ( 1 )( e) of the Act.

Section 13 (1 )( e) allowed a decree for -ejectment to be passed if the Court is satisfied that the premises l~t for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation. On the facts of the case it was found that right from the commencement of the tenancy a substantial part of the premises was used by respondent I for his professional purpose, and they have also found that this has been done obviously with the consent of the landlord. The Court held that the professional use of a substantial part of the premises with (1) [19621 2 S.C.R. 678. the consent of the appellant clearly takes the case outside section 13(1)(e). The view expressed in the above case was reiterated by this Court in Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal & Ors.(') On the facts it was found that the premises had been taken for residential-cnmbusiness or professional purposes.

By the rent deed the owner inducted as a tenant Labha Mal Arora who was practising advocate. Al0ng with the rent deed a letter was written by the landlord to the tenant stating that he had no objection to the tenant having his professional ollice along with the residence. After the tenant'> death in 1952 the premises were used only for residence by his sons anli widow till 1957. In August, 1957 the first respondent who qualified himself as a legal practitioner started having !In. office in the premises. Another son also started practising as a lawyer in the same premises sometime later. The landlord .served a notice on the sons and widow of the deceased for requiring them to vacate the premises. The court found two rooms were usecj by the original tenan! as his olfice, one room by his clerk and the premises had been Jet for resiuence-cumbusiness purposes.

The plea that the tenant was only gr~nted a licence to use the premises for residence-cum-profession which was personal to him and which came to an end on his death was not accepted. The court agreed with the view expressed in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case (supra) that a tenant could not be ejected under section 13(1)(h) because the tenancy of premises let out or used for residence and carrying on of profession could not be terminated merely by showing that the tenant had acquired a suitable residence. The court rejected the contention that the tenant, Labha Mal Arora, had been merely given a permission or licence which was of a personal nature Lo his office. It also was unable to find that any tost of dominant intention was applied in Dr. Gop,,z Dass Vernds case.

It is not necessary for us to go into the question whethet the words "let for residential purpo8es" would exclude premises let predominantly for residential purposes with a licence to u~11n insignificant part for professional purposes such as lawyer's or doctor's consulting room. The words used in section 14A are clearly different. Section 14A contemplates the owning by the landlord in the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommjldation. If he owns a residential accommodation he has a right to recover immediately possession of any premises Jct out by him. The emphasis is on residential accommodation. Jf the premises are one intended for residential accommodation it will not make any difference if the premises are Jet for residential (I) [1970J I S.C.R. 9. I B. N. MUTTO v. T. K. NAND! (Kailasam, J.) as weli as other purposes. Even though the residential accommoda - tion is let for professional o_r commercial purposes th~ premises will not cease to be for residential accommodation.

It is common ground that the premises l~t were put up under the Delhi Developi!lCnt Authority's scheme for residential purposes. The only plea wa~ that though it was put up for residential purposes it was let for residential as well as for professional purposes. The requirement in section 14 ( 1) ( e) that in order to enable the landlord to recover possession the premises <mght to have been let for residential purposes is not there in sedion 14A(l). ln this view we agree with the High Court that it is not necessary in a petition for eviction under section 14A to satisfy that it was let for residential purposes only. This view has been taken by this Court in Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P. T. Menghani and '.Anr. (')

The submission that as a previous application for possession by the landlord was pending this petition would not be permissible cannot be accepted as the grounds on which an application for possession is filed wider section 14A(l) are different and based on special rights ·conferred on the class of persons who occupied Government accommo- <lation. The cnly other question that remains to be considered is the scope ·of the right to contest the suit, that is, on what grounds can the tenant seek leave to resist the suit filed by the landlord under section 14A(l). The special procedure prescribed under section 25B is made applicable in cases where the landlord applies for recovery oE possession on any of the grounds specified in clause ( e) of the Proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 or under section 14A.

Sub-section (5) of section 25B says that th~ Controller shall give leave to the tenant to <0ontest if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts that would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified in clause ( e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) oE section 14 or section 14A. Under section 14(l)(e) the tenant may resist the application on the grounds specified namely that the premises arc not let for residential purposes. tbat they are not required bona fide etc. So far as the facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order under section 14A are concerned they can only be that the landlord is not a person in occupation of residential premises allotted to him by the Central ·Government or that no general or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to vacate such residential accommodation (1) [1977] 3 S.C.R. 3t2. ff on the terms specified in the section.

Leave to contest 0cn application under section 14A (1) cannot be said to be analogous to the provision& of grant cf leave to defend as envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXVII, Rule 2, sub-rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of Order XXXVII lays down the procedure to obtain leave. Under the provisions leave to appear and defend the suit is to be given if the affidavit disclG>ses such facts as would make incumbent ou. the holder to. prove considerati0u or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient to support the application. The scope of section 25B(5) is very restricted for leave to contest can only be given if the facts are such as would dJ>cntitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ground specified in section 14A.

The learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the requiremects of section 14(l)(e) should also be satisfied before the landlord could take advantage of the procedure provided under section 25B. The learned counsel drew our attention to section 25C (] ) and section 25C(2) and submitted tha: the reading of these two sub-sections would indicate that before an eviction could be ordered under an application under section 14A(l) the requirements of sections 14(6) and (7) should be satisfied. While section 14 (1) enumerates the grounds on which the landlord can get a decree for recovery of possession against a tenant sub-sections (2) to (11) place certain restrictions. Subsection (2) provides restriction as to right for recovery of pcsscssion under sectio1_1 14 (1 )( e). Restriction regarding the right to recc>ver possession under claus!'. (e) is laid down in sub-sections (6) and (7) of section 14.

Section 14(6) states that where a landlord has acquired any premises by transfer no application for recovery of posse55ion shall lie under sub-section ( 1) 01_1 the ground specified in clause ( c) of the proviso thereto, unless a period g_f five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Sub-section (7) to section 14 lays down that where an order for the recoTery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (I) , the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof befog the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Section 25C makes an exception to the requirement of 'ection 14(6) to the effect that where a landlord is in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him. by the Central Govern_ment or anv local authority and who fulfils the reqwrements of section 14A(l) the requirement under section 14(6) that he would not be entitled to y B. N. MUTTO v. T. K. NANDI (Kai/asam, J.) possession unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of his acquisition of the premises is not applicable.

In other words, he can straightway obtain possession without the impediment imposed under section 14(6). Great stress was laid by the learned cour;sel for the tenant on section 25C(2) which provides that in the case of a landlord who, being a·person of the category specified in sub-section (1), has obtained, on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 or undersection 14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions of subseclion (7) of section 14 shall have effect as if for the words "six months", occurring therein. the words "two months" were substituted.

The contention was that if section 14A(l) stood by itself and if a landlord applying under section 14A(l) would straightway g.et the possession after !he tenant cannot contest the suit on the grounds specified ;n section 25B ( 5) there is no need for mentioning the provisions of section 14(1)(6) and section 14(1)(7) and prescribing a lesser period for a prescribed period under section 14(7). In other words, the submission was that an application for possession under section 14A should also satisfy the requirements of section 14 (1) ( e). The provisions of section 25B and 25C are applicable to both applicatiom under section 14(1) (~) and under section 14A. Applications under section 14(1)(e) are governed by section 14(6) and section 14(7). By introduction of section 25C the condition imposed in section 14(6) is variecl.

The condition imposeli under section 14(6) i< made not applicable to persons who satisfy the requirements under section 14A meaning thereby that this restriction wi!L!J"e applicable only to an application under section 14(1) (e). Section 25C(2) makes it cfoar that not only in the case of an application under section 14(1)(e) but also under >ectinn 14A the term of six months prescribed in section 14(7) is ,·educed to two months. The reason for specifying the period at two mollths in the case of section 14A is understandable for otherwise an applicant under section 14A would be entitled to possession immediately. By prescribing a specific period of two months under .1ec:ion 25C(2) it is made clear that even an applicant under section 14A would have to satisfv the conditions laid down by section 25C i.e. a period of two mo~ths should elapse before the landlord is eiltitled to obtain possession from the date of an order for recovery of possession. This submission also fail-.

In the result we hold that the landlord who retired before the date on wliich the notice to quit was given by the Government is also entitled to the benefits of section 14A and allow the appeal. P.B.R. Appeal allowed.