Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries Ltd.

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. The Advocate-General of Bihar is the appellant in this appeal under Section 19 of the Contempts of Comts Act, 1971. Respondent No. 1, M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, represented by respondent No. 2, Om Prakash Agrawal, were the highest bidde.rs at an auction held by the Divisional Forest Officer, Garhwa South, of four forest coupes iu the State of Bihar. Under the terms of the agreements the respondents were required to deposit 25% of each of the four bids as security. The respondents were, however, able to make the deposit in respect of one coupe only and not in respect of the other three coupes. The responde.nts requested for time. Thereafter, there was a long course of correspondence with which we are not now concerned. Finally, on January 28, 1970, th~ Conservator of Forests determined the agreements. On February 28, 1970, respondent No. 1 served a notice on the Divisional FQl'est Offieer ADVOCATE GENL., BIHAR V. M. P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)

Garhwa South, intimating him that they had filed au application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court and that S. C. Deb, J., had been pleased to issue a rule nisi aud also an injunction restraining the Govt. of Bihar and the officials of the Forest Department of the Govt. of Bihar from giving effect to the proceedings by which the leases were. determined and further directing them to all9w M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries to carry on the work of cutting and felling of trees and removing the material in the, said forest coupes. Alleging that the Officers of the Forest Department of the Govt. of 13ihar had violated the order of injunction granted against them, the respondents filed an application to commit the Officers for Contempt of Court and in that application they prayed for and obtained an interim order directing the Officers not to interfere in any way with the activities of the respondents in removing the produce of the Khair trees.

The, State of·Bihar preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court aud on September 29, 1970, the Division, Bench passed arr order allowing the appeal and directing the respondents to furnish; security in a sum of Rs. 1,55,000 if they desired to remove the forest produce. Otherwise, they were restrained from selling the trees aud extracting the produce. The respondents offered certain property as security but that was rejected by the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court as the title was found to be defective. At this stage on J auuary 8, 1971, the State of Bihar filed money suit No. 3 of 1971 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Palam.au to recover a sum of Rs. 1,93,225 as damages. The State of Bihar also filed au application under Order 38, Rule 5, Code of Civil Procedure and obtained an order of attachment of the 'Kath' manufactured by the respondents alongwith. utensils, equipment, etc. The ~espondents were directed to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs and asked to show cause why the interim attachment should not be made absolute.

The attachment was effected on January 10, 1971. The respondents appeared before the learned Subordinate Judge and requested that the reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,000. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the ~ayer of the respondents and reduced the amount of security from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 75,ooo. The State od' Bihar preferred an appeal to the Patna High Court and ail, interim order was made by the High Court, stayi.ng the operation of the order of the learned Subordinate Judge but continuing the attachment. On March 29, 1971, after hearing both the parties, the Patna High Court made an order directing the respondents, to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000. It was directed that on such security being furnished the interim attachment would cease and the respondents would be allowed to remove the stock, utensils and equipment.

Without complying with the orde.r of the Patna High Conrt, Respondent No. 1 then moved the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on April 21, 1971, and obtained an order restraining the State of Bihar from continuing the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and further directing the State to take steps· to get the attachment vacated if security was furnished by the respondents as directed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The State of Bihar filed an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge and the operation of the order was stayed by an order of January 10, 1972 of the Divisio!\ Bench. It was directed that the proceedings in the money suit in the Conrt of the learned Subordinate Judge of Palrunau should proceed. In the· meanwhile on July 30, 1971, Respondent No. 1 moved another application before the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta; High Court offering to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and requesting that on such deposit being made, they might be allowed to remove the stock.

This application was allowed on July 30, 1971, by the learned Single Judge and the amount was directed to be deposited with the counsel for th~ State of Bihar. The order was later on modified on December 16, 1972, and the amount was directed to be deposited with the Registrar of the High Court. On November 20, 1972, the State of Bihar filed an application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau complaining that the· respondents had not furnished secnrity as di.reeled by the Patna High· Court and as the attached stock was deteriorating it might be sold by auction. Before anything further could be done Respondent. No. I filed a petition on 14th December, 1972, and obtained an order from the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court on December 18, 1972, staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau until the attached goods we.re released in compliance with the orders dated July 30, 1971 and February 16, 1972.

The State of Bihar preferred an appeal against the order of tbe learned Single Judge and on January 22, 1973, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and directed the proceedings in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Palamau, to go on. Vexed by the manner in which the 1st Respondent was filing repeated applications and procuring orders from a learned Single Judge r ADVOCATE GENL. B!llAR V, M· P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES ( Chlnnappa Reddy, J.) of the High Court, necessitating the filing of as, many appeals to the Division Bench, the State of Bihar filed an application for committing the Respondents for Contempt of Court alleging that, by their conduct the respondents were obstructing the administration of justice and interfering with the due course of judicial proceedings.

The Patna High Court held that the respondents' conduct was most unscrupulous one that there wa5 gross abuse of the process of the Court, which could in certain circumstances amount to contempt of Court. The High Court, however, dismissed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the period of one year prescribed by section 20 of the Contempt of Comts Act. The High Court held, on a: reading of the Contempt application, that the material allegation in regard to the contempt committed by the respondents was that relating to the filing of the application dated April 7, 1971, before tbe Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court to circumvent and nullify the order dated March 29, 1971 of the Division Bench of tile Patna High Court. As the contempt application was filed more than a year later it was time-barred.

In regard to the allegation relating to the filing of the petition dated December 14, 1972, the High Court observed that there was no specific allegation that any Contempt oe Court was ccmmittcd by the filing of this application. We may also mentioi;i. that the respondents tendered an unconditional apology to the High Court of Bihar. The question of accepting the apology was Mt considered as the application was found to be bey®d time. The A<lvocate General of Bihar has filed this appeal against the judgment of the Patna High Court. I"-- Before we consider the merits of the appeal we may mention here that the learned Single Judge who made the several orders in favour of the respondents was himself compelled in a later order dated AugusG 13, 1973 to state that the respondents had suppressed material facts and misled him on various occasions and obtained orders from him. Section 2 ( c) of the Contempt of- Courts Act defines Criminal contempt as follows :

"(c) 'Criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or any signs, or by visible rcprn· sentations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or 1I78 (iii) Interferes or tends to interfere with,· or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner". While we are conscious that every abuse of the process of the Court may not necessarily amount to Contempt of Court, abuse of the process of the Court calculated to hamper the due course of ai judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice, we must say, is a contempt of Court.

It may be that certain minor abuses of the process of the Court may be suitably dealt with as between the parties, by striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 or in some other manner. But, on tlie other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious infiueoce beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real i!lterest, and a vital stake in the effective; and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the pe.ril of all rights and liberties perishing.

The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the, Court against insult or injury as the expression "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage".(!) "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope''.(') In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn-Vol. 9, paragraph 38), there is a brief discussion of when abuse of the process of the Court may be a punishable contempt. It is said : "38. Abuse of process in general. The Court has power to punish as contempt any misuse of the court's process.

Thus the forging er altering of court documents and other deceits of like kind are punishable as serious contempts. Similarly, deceiving the court or the court's officers by deliberately S1'ppressing a fact, or giving false facts, may be1 a punishable contempt. (I) Por Frank Further Jin Offutt v. U.S. -34: U.S. p. II. (2) Per Judge Curtis-Raleigh quoted in Je11nisq11 v. Baker- [1972] I All E. R. 997@ 1006. r ADVOCATE GENL. B!HAR V. M· P. KHAIR INDUSTRIES: (Chlnnappa Reddy, !.) Certain acts of a lesser nature may also constitute an abuse of process as, for instance, initiating or carrying on proceedings which are wanting in bona {ides or which are frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. In such cases the court has extensive alternative powers to prevent an abuse of its process by striking ant or staying procee<lings or by prohibiting the taking of further proceedings without leave.

Where the court, by exercising its statutory powers, its powers under rules of court, or its inherent jurisdiction, can give an adequate remedy, it will not in general punish the abuse as a contempt of court. On the other hand, where an irregularity or misuse of process amounts to an offence against justice, extending its influence beyond the parties to the action, it may be punished as a contempt". In the present case, the respondents began 'the game' by filing an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Calcutta High Court, whereas in the normal course one would expect such as application to be filed in the Patna High Court within whose jurisdiction the subject matter of the dispute was situate. For some mysteriou~ ·reasons which nobody has been able to explain to us, the writ application was filed in the Calcutta High Court.

A justifiable prima facie inference from this circumstance may be that the application was not bona fide but intended to harass and oppress the opposite parties. We do not want to say anything more about this aspect of the case as we are told that this is a failing of the respondents which they shared with several others. Perhaps, as we had occasion to remark during the course of the hearing, some parties are unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that the Calcutta High Court has long since ceased to have jurisdiction over the area comprising the State of Bihar which it had several decades ago. The 'game' proceeded further. Application after application was filed before the learned Single Judge, everyone of them designed to circumvent, defeat o.r nullify the effect of the orders of the Division Benches of the Calcutta High Court an.ct the Patna High Court. . The order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court directing the respondents to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 1,55 ,000 was never complied with.

The order of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court directing the respondents to furnish security of immovable property in a sum of Rs. 75,000 and to deposit cash or furnish bank guarantee in a sum of Rs. 50,000 was also never complied with. Instead, an order was obtained from the; Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restraining the State of : Bihar from CO'Jltinning the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau., When this order was set aside by the Division Bench, an attempn was made to circumvent all earlier orders by obtaining an order from the Single. Judge that they may be allowed to deposit Rs. 60,000 in cash and permitted to remo'le the stock from the forest coupes.

When the State o[ Bihar moved the learned Subordinate Judge, Palamau for a direction to auction the attached stock, the respondents moved an application: on December 14, 1972, and obtained an order from the Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court staying the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau. In considering the question whether the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, amount to a Contempt of Court, the Court inust take into accoont the whole course of the continuing contumacious conduct of the respondents from the beginning of the "game". Clearly, not a single appliciition made to the Single Judge was bona fide. Every application was a daring 'raid' on the Court and each was an abuse of the process of the Court.

The application dated December 14, 1972 praying that the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge shonld be stayed was made despite the fact that earlier, ori January 10, 1972, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had expressly permitted the proceedings in the money suit to go on. The application of the respondents clearly showed that they were inten~ upon obstructing the due course of the proceedings in the money suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Palamau and to obstruct th~ administration of justice by abusing the process of the Court. The High Court expressed the view that there was no specific allegation that any contempt of Court had been committed by the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972. We are unable to agree with the view .of the High Court.

Paragraph 29 of the application to commit the responqents for Contempt expressly refers to the application dated December 14, 1972 and paragraph 31 states that all the facts and circumstances enumerated in the petition; estabiished that the respondents were obstructing and interfering with the due course and administration of justice. It was not necessary that every allegation made should be followed then and there by the statement that the allegation established a Contempt of Court. We are satisfied that the filing of the application dated December 14, 1972, was an abuse of the process of the Court, calculated to obstruct I ADVOCATE GENL. BIHAR V. M· P. KHA!R INDUSTRIES. (Chlnnappa Reddy, !.) the due course of a judicial proceeding and the administration of justice and was, therefore, a Criminal Contempt of Court.

The respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence each of the respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks. V.D.K. 11ppeal allowed.