Supreme Court of India
Francis Coralie Mullin v. the Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Ors.
| Decided | 13-01-1981 |
|---|---|
| Bench | P.N. Bhagwati |
| Case type | Writ Petition |
| Subject | Constitutional Law |
| Result | Case Allowed |
| CNR | ESCR010001181981 |
Judgment
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 3042 of 1980. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.) N. M. Ghatate (Dr.) and S. V. Deshpande for the Petitioner. lfardayal Hardy and M. N. Shroff for the Respondents Nos. 1-2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BnAGWATI, J. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution raises a question in regard of the right of a detenu under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as COFEPOSA Act) to have interview with a lawyer and the members of his family. The facts giving rise to the petition are few and undisputed and may be briefly stated as follows: The petitioner, who is a British national, was arrested and detained in the Central Jail, Tihar under an Order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act.
She preferred a petition ih this Court for a writ of habeas corpus challenging her detention, but by a judgment delivered by this Court on~ 2'1fh February 1980, her petition was rejected with the result that she continued to remain under detention in the Tihar Central Jail. Whilst under detention, the petitioner experienced considerable difficulty in t. having interview with her lawyer and the members of her family. Her daughter aged about five years and her sister, who was looking after the daughter, were pemiitted to have interview with her only once in a month and she was not allowed to meet her daughter more often, though a child of very tender age.
It seems that some criminal proceeding was pending against the petitioner for attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country and for the purpo~e of her defence in such criminal proceeding, it was necessary for her to consult her lawyer, but even her lawyer found it difficult to obtain an interview with her because in order to arrange an interview, h0 wa~ F. C. MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwati, J.) required to obtain prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi and the interview could take place only in the presence of a Customs Officer nominated by the Collector of Customs. This pro~ cedure for obtaining interview caused considerable hardship and inconvenience and there were occasions when, even after obtaining prior appointment from the District Magistrate, Delhi, her lawyer <:ould not have an interview with her since no, Customs Ofticer nomi~ nated by the Collector of Customs remained present at the appointed time;
The petitioner was thus effectively denied the facility of interview with her lawyer and even her young daughter 5 years old could not meet her except once in a month. This restriction on interviews was --~posed by the Prison Authorities by virtue of clause 3 (b) sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention laid down by the Delhi Administration under an Order dated 23rd August 1975 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under section 5 of the COFEPOSA At- Act. These two sub-clauses of clause 3 (b) provided inkr alia as under: "3, The conditions of detention in respect of classifica~ tion and interviews shall be as under :- (b) Intenriews : Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under :- (i) Interview with legal adv~er :
Interview with legal adviser in connection with defence of a detenu in a criminal case or in regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/ Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention. (ii) Interview with family members: A monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife, . children or parents of the detenu ......... "
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VWV3 ü Iü ? ü ü ü ü fü ü ü á¹ ü eü g-ü ü ü ¸ Ì*ü I ü ü aü J ü đʪƏ˦˾ Ǎɫʪ ǎɍʪȈʦɎɏȜʪ ɬȫʪʼnŹńʪ ǣʪǾǐSCʪ ɭƳźʪ CLƧɯLSżɰǑȬȉʪ ŊEɮʍŻEgʪ *Y ñ®×ðü ¨,H oü ü J,Alü ²,ë p9ü ü ü gü e, âÃÚºü 1 F. C. MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhpgwati, J.) the question of validity of con~tions of detenti~n. TJ;t.e~~ }~ . ~ ~it~F A distinction between these two. kinds of detention. 1p'unitive deten~19.!'.;~. is intended to inflict punishment on a person,' . who\ is f~uhd "bi th't . . I judicial process to have committeCI an offence, while 'preventive <kt~mi6n' is .riot by way of punishment at all, but it is intended to: JSte:~mpt ~: ~rson from indulging in conduct ~njur.ious to the . society. . B The power of preventive detention has been recognised as a n~cessary:. evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger in,terest of1security . of the State and maintenance of public order.
It is a drastic power to · detain a person without trial and there are many countries where it · is not aHowed to be exercised except in times of war or aggression. -~ ~~j ~tnfitit~tion, do.es 1~ec.~ise _the exi~tence. of ~is power, but it is heiigchl!ifl:>by v~nous safeguards set out m Articles 21 and 22. Art. 22 r \o • 0 n:i ~clauses ( 4) to (7), . deals spe<;rfically w1th saf(.:g_u~rd~ ~~;:qn~~ pr!!- ventive detention and .ally law of preventive. d,et~ntjon-.Pt -~·c.mm by . way of preventive detention ~e~ 11fid~r s,uch l~w. ~~st "~e :in . conformity with the restri~tions laid· down by tho~e ).Clauses 3on p,ain of i~va!idation. But apart from Art. 22, there is also Ari. 21 whiCh lays · D do\%. ·resttictions on the power of preventive detention. Until the decisfon ·~r tbts·· Court in Maneka Gandh~ v. Union of lndia(l), a very narrow and constricted meaning was given to the guarantee embodied in Art. 21 and that article was understood to embody only that aspect of the rule of law, which requires that no one shall be deprived of. his life or personal liberty without the authority of law.
It was construed only as ·a guarantee against executive action unsupported by law. So long as there was some law, which prescribed a proce:d~re authorising depriv~tion of life or personal ~berty, it _ was . sdpPO~~d ~o tneet .the ~equlre~ent of Art. 21. But in Maneka, Gandhi's ca~e . {supra),. this .cou~ Jor t4e _first time opened-up a _ne~ gilp~nsion of Art. 2l and laid down that Art. 21 is not. only a guarantee against ·-.ei.e~qtive action unsupported by law, butfs also a re~~ri~iio~ on .law ll:iaking .. It is not enough to secure compliance wit4 the . prescription .. of Adic;le -21 that thefe should be a law prescribing some semblanee of a 'proqedore fot' depriving a t>erson of his life or personal liberty, but · tli'e pi-oc~l:ue· t>rescribed by the law must be reasonable, · fair and just and if it is not so, the law would be void as violating the guarantee of Art. 21. This Court expanded the scope and ambit of the right to life and personal liberty enshrined in Art. 21 and sowed_ the seed for future development of the law enlarging this most fun~a mental of Fundamental Rights.
This decision in Maneka Gandhi's case became the starting point-the-spri'ng-board-for a most spectacular evolution of the law culminating in the decisions in M. 0. Hoscot v. (l) [1979] 1 sec 248 R State of ;u aharashtra, ( 1), H ussainara Khatoon' s case (2), the first Sunil Batra's case(') and the second Sunil Batra's case.(4-) The position now is that Art. 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary, whimsical or B fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise. The law of preventive detention has therefore now to pass the test not only of Art. 22, but also of Art. 21 and if the constitutional validity of any such law is challenged, the 1- Court would have to decide whether the procedure laid down by such law for depriving a person of his personal liberty is reasonable, fair and just.
But despite these safeguards laid down by the Constitution and creatively evolved by the Courts, the power of preventive detention is a frightful and awesome power with drastic consequences affecting personal liberty, which is the most cherished and prized possession of man in a civilised society. It is a power to be exercised with the greatest care and caution and the courts have to be ever vigilant to see that this power is not abused or misused. It must always be remembered that preventive detention is qualitatively different from puuitive detention and their purposes are different.
In case of punitive detention, the person concerned is detained by way of punishment afl';;:r he is found guilty of wrong doing as a result of trial where he has the fullest opportunity to defend himself, while in case of preventive detention, he is detained merely on suspicion with a view to preventing him from doing harm in future and the opportunity that he has for contesting the action of the Executive is very limited. Having regard to this distinctive character of preventive detention, which aims not at punishing an individual for a wrong done by him, but at curtailing his liberty with a view to pre-empting his injurious--~ activities in future, it has been laid down by this Court in Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir(") "that the restrictions placed on a person preventively detained must, consistently \\ith the effectiveness of detention, be minimal."
The question which then arises is whether a person preventively detained in a prison has any rights which he can enforce in a Court (1) [1979] 1 SCR 192 (2) [1980] 1 sec 81 (3) [1979]1 SCR 392 (4) [1980] 2 SCR 557 (5) [1969] 3 SCR 574. t F. C. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (BhagwaO, J.) of law. Once his freedom is curtailed by incarceration in a jail, does he have any fundamental rights at all or does he leave them behind, when he enters the prison gate? The answer to this question is no longer res integra. It has been held by this Court in the two Sunil Batra cases that "fundamental rights do not flee the person as he enters the prison although they may suffer shrinkage necessitated by incarceration .. , The prisoner or detenu has all the fundamental rights and other legal rights available to a free person, save those which are incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. Even before the two Sunil Batra cases, this position was impliedly accepted in State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Sanzgiri(l) and it was spelt-out clearly -~ and in no uncertain terms by Chandrachud, J. as he then was, in D. B. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh( 2 ) :
"Convicts are not, by mere reason of the conviction, denuded of all the fundamental rights which they otherwise possess. A compulsion under the authority of law, following upon a conviction. to live in a prison-house entails to by its own force the deprivation of fundamental freedoms like the right to move freely throughout the territory of India or the right to ''practise" a profession. A man of profession would thus stand stripped of his right to hold consultations while serving out his sentence. But the Constitution guarantees other freedoms like the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property for the exercise of which incarceration can be no impediment. Likew:se, even a convict is entitled to the precious right guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution that he shall not be deprived of his life or pe~son~ liberty except according to procedure established by law."
This statement of the law was affirmed by a Bench of five Judges of X this Court in the first Sunil Batra case (supra) and by Krishna Iyer, J. speaking on behalf of the Court in the second Sunil Batra case (supra). Krishna Iyer, J. in the latter case pror.:leded to add in his characteristic style; "The jurisdictional reach and range of this Court's writ to hold prison caprice and cruelty in constitutional leash is incontestable" and concluded by observing; "Thus it is now clear law that a prisoner wears the armour of basic freedom even behind · bars a'nd that on breach thereof by lawless officials the law will respond to his distress signals through 'writ' aid. The Indian human has a constant companion-the Court armed with the Constitution." (1) [1966] 1 SCR 702 (2) [1975] 2 SCR 24. 1 .. {1981]
2 S.C.R, It is iriterestmg to note tltat tlie Supreme Colirt of th~ United ·States t .a.Iib . .taken the same view ill. regard to rights of p~isoners: - Mr. r~e~Douglas struck ·a humanistic note when he said in Eve Pati>i grs'{l)-: . "Prisoners are still persons entitled to all constitutional rights unless their liberty has been constitutionally curtailed by procedures that satisfy all the requirements of due proc~ss.'' S~.lUs~.in Charles Wolff's case,(2) Mr. Justice White made the same ~iU:tt: in1'n11;lhf!tic t~Ilis .·. ~i .. t;~ J~1iuf,.;thou~~ his rights may be dimi·riished by environment, a prisoner· is not wholly stripped off constitutional · protections, when he is imprisoned for crime.
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.u 0 Mr. l.JJStice Douglas reiterated lils thesis when he asserted·: ~·.Ey~ry prisoner's. li.,erty 'i.e. of courses, circumscribed by the very fact of his confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty left to him is then only the more substantial. Conviction of a crime does not render one a non-person whose rights are subject to the whim of the prison administtation, and tRerefore, the imposition of any serious punish· ~~~r .. ,within the system requires procedural safeguards." Mr. Justice Marshall also expressed himself clearly and explicitly in the same terms : ''I have previously statfd my view that a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights at the prison gate, and I fully support the court's holding that the . interest of inmates in freedom from imposition of serious . discipline is a 'liberty··, enlitled to due process proteetion." ~at;i~·.~t~ted by these ·l~arned Judg~ i~ :re~rd ~o the riih!~ 9(.~ pmoner under the Constitution of _the United States app~es equ~y. in regard to the rights of a prisoner or detenu under our · constitJ.- tionai system.
It must, therefore, now be taken to be well-settled that a prisoner or detenu is not stripped of his fundamental or other legal rights, save those which are inconsistent with his incarceration, and if any of these rights are violated, the Court which is to use the words of Krishna Iyer, J., "not a distant abstraction omnipotent in the (1) 417 U.S. 817 : 41 L. ed. 2d 495 (2) 41 L. ed. 2d 935, J •. c.- MULLIN V. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwatj, J.) 52 7 1 books. but an activist institution which is the cynosure of public ho~; will immediately spring into action and run to his ·rescue. We must therefore proceed to consider whether any of the Fundamental Rights of the detenu are violated by sub-climses -(i) · and (ii) of clause 3(b) so as to result in their invalidation wh9Uy Qr i~ I>¥t :
Yi.e will fu~t t!ife -~!? for considerat~oll: the}~un~~~_pt_al j:i~ ~f :the <letenu under Article 21 because that is a Fundam~nt~ R,!ght which has, after the decision in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra), a highly activist magnitude and it embodies a constitutional value of supreme importance in a democratic society. It provides that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to ~oce~ure established by law and such procedure shall be reasonable fair, .and just.- Now what is the true scope and ambit of the right to ~~e ,J~a~anteed under· -t~i_s :~~cle ? While arri~iii~ at the pro.Per meaning and content of the right to life, we must .remember t!tat it is a constitutional provision which we are expounding and moreover it is a provision enacting a· Fundamental right and the attempt of the court should always be t<> ·expand· the reaeh and ambit of the fund~..: mental right· xathet than· to ·attenuate its: meaning and cnntent.
The luminous· guideline ·in ·the interpretation of a constitutional provision is::. provided. by the Supreme Court· of United States in Weems v. il.s._ 54 -~awyers Edition 801. "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional'is enacted, it is true, fto:tn an experience of · evils, but-its general language sliollld ,not, therefore, be necessarily colllined to the form that evil had, ·therefore taken . .Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and : purwses. · J:}!e(efore, a principle,· to~ be vital, mustbe capableof · wider a}.1plieation tha:n m.isch_ief. which gave it -birth. ·This is peculiary true of Constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments designed to meet passing occasions. TMy are, to use the word~ of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immOrality as nearly as htima'n institutions cim apPr~ach1t~. The "future is their care, ~nd provisions for evenrs. bf'go6d arid ·bad tendencies ·a.f which no prophecy· can ·t;e· made.
In the. application of a:. constitution, therefore: 6'\ir . contemplation cimnO't' be only of what has been, 'buf Of ·wnat 'may' be.' Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value, and be converted by precedent into important and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in the words might be lost in reality. And this has been recognised. The meaning and vitality of the Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction."
This principle of interpretation which requires that a Constitutional provision must be construed, not in a narrow and constricted sense_, but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that the Constitutional provision does not get atrophied or fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and chall~nges, app1ies with greater force in relation to a fundamental right enacted by the Constitution. The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must therefore be interpretated in a broad and expansive spirit so as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person. Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 can not be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival.
In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Prade.~h(l) Subba Rao J. quoted with approval the fo11owing passage from the judgment of Field J. in Munn v. lllinois(2) to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 : *"By the term "life" as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the· body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out, of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the. body through which the soul communicates with the outer world." and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of thls Court in the first Sunil Batra case {supra). Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and a fortiorari. this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling.
Now deprivation which is inhibited by Artide 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, depriva- (1) [1964] l S.C.R. 232 (2) [1877) 94 u.s. 113 *Sunil Batra v. Delhi Admn. P. 503. w F. C. MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwati, J.) 529· tion is not an act which is complete once and for all : it is a contnuing act and so lClng as it lasts, it must be in accordance. with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21. But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more.
We think that the right to life includes the right to 1ive with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include tne right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights.
Now obviously. any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, bu~ no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. n would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This right to live which is comprehended within the broad connotation of the right to life can concededly be abridged according to procedure established by law and therefore when person is lawfully imprisoned, this right to live is bound to suffer attenuation to the extent to which it is incapable of enjoyment by reason of incarceration. The prisoner or detenu obviously cannot move about freely by going outside the prison walls nor can he socialise at his free will with persons outside the jail. But, as part of the II' .·A right ~ live with human dignity ~nd th~efore . as. a ·neces?a_ry: c,qD!pO; nent of the right to life, ,h_e wo~d l:!e entit_ledto have_in~e.rvi~~~w!~ ~h~ .. IJ1Cmb~rs :o~ his: fa~ly and friends aQd no pri_s~:m ·regulflf!ew;~ p~ure l;eid : dewp.. ·by :Prison regulation regulating the right -m ~ve ~nterviews with the members of the family and friends can be upheld as constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 21, unless it is reasonable, fai~ an~ j~t.
The sanie consequence would follow even if this problem is considered from the point of view of the right to personal Uberty enshrined · in Article 21, for the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal liberty guaranteed under that Article. The expression 'personal liberty' occurring in Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation in Maneka Gandhi's case (supra) and it has been held in that case that the expression 'personal liberty used in that'
Artjcle ·is of the widest · amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which ·go to constitute the personal liberty of a man and it also iricludes rights which "have be~n raised to the:status of dis~ tinct 'F~.uitlamental ' ~igbtS' and given.~- aaditionai p;rotectien . 'uflder ArtiCte ··19"'. - There 'can . therefore· be-- n5: doub't -that ·'persoriaf tiblriy' wourn-incliide •the. dgh:tto . sO<:iatis·e 'wifli members otth'e fatrrlly' ami ftlehels Si.ib]ect,· csf C'outse,· to any valid prison regulations· · aiid under Articles· 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it regulating the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck d·owri as invalid as being violative of Articles 14 and 21.
Now obviously \fhen an undertrial prisoner is granted the facility of interviews , with relatives and friends twice in a week under Rule 55~A. and . a oonviciect · p~o~r is ~~t~ - to have. inte~i~~ ~t)l his .. r~latives· ami .friends ·onee irr a wee~· under .Rule 550, it. is :diffi.eult to Understand how 6Ub-clause (.ii) of-CJ.ause •3 (b) of·the C~~.tion~ " Of Detention Order, which restricts the interview oil.ly to ·one in .a .month in case of a detenu, can possibly be regarded as reasonable and nonarbitrary, particularly when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an undertrial prisoner or a convict and, as held by this Court in Sampath Prakash's case (supra) restrictions placed on a detenu must. "consistent ~t!J;:th~ etJ:ectiv~qess _of detention,· be minimal." We would . tq~~~f~r_c -u1tt!~it~tingly.:ho!d sub-clause (ii) of ~l~1:1se ·3(b} to be vi~affi'~# }\JtiGl~:
14-~nd 21· if!. so-far: as i~ ·permitr. only_ one inte:r~,r~~:--, ~~-to. a,detenu. -W~:;are-of the.view that a-detenU-J!l.US~ ~;'~~t Je4-t~~~ye-atleast two ~iews in a week with relatiyes ·~.Jtiends and·it sbould be possible-_for a relative or friend to have inteniew with MULLIN v. UNION TERRITORY (Bhagwa01 J.) p, c. at any reasonable hour on obtaining permission h dctcoil f h J .l d . h l S pcrintendent o t c a1 an 1t s ou d not be necessary to fr rn the 0 D' t · "·I · ~. he rmission of t c 1s net 1v ag1strate, Delhi, as the latter S<"<k ·~ure~ould be cumbrous and unnecessary from the point of view . 1 prOC· 'ty and hence unreasonable. We would go so far as to say tha\ of secun I d 559 A .
"'pendently of Ru es an ,.,., we would regard the pre· e~en tn"" scnt uorm of two interviews m_ a wee or pnsoners as furnishing a cri- . , f ... b,t we would consider reasonable and non-arbitrary tenon•nu The same reasoning must also result in invalidation of sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) of the Conditions of Detention Order which pres- , cnbes that a detenu can have interview with a legal adviser only after obtaining prior permission of the District Magistrate, Delhi and the c interview has to take place in the presence of an offtcer of Customs/ · 1 Central Excise/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector uf CustomsjCentral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who bas sponsored the case for detention.
The right of a detenu to conmit 11 legal adviser of his choice for any purpose not necessarily limited to defence in a criminal proceeding but also for securing release fro?I preventive detention of filing a writ petition or prosecuting any ~aun or proceeding, civil or criminal, is obviously included in the fight lo live with human dignity and is also part of personal liberty and the detenu cannot be deprived of this right nor can this right of ~~ dete~u be interfered with except in acc~rd'ance with reasonable, ~~~and Just procedure established by a valid Jaw.
A prison regula- U~nb may, therefore, regulate the right of a detcnu to have interview "11 Blegalad' bt it VtSer m a manner which is reasonable, fau an JUst u lat~annot prescribe an arbitrary or unreasonable procedure for regu- A:gl &uch an interview and if it does 50 it would be violative of 1c es 14 a d 21 · . \1ve · • Now in the present case the kg'Jl a viscr can F tntervicw I ing pe • • Wit n dctcnu only by prior appointment n ter o t~tn-- tly ca:SSIOO or the District Magistrate, Delhi. This would obvi?U- .\)U}d h &reat hardship and inconvenience because the legal adviser 'r.d lht:ve to apply to the District Mugistrate, Delhi well in a~vance ~ be _also the time fixed by the District M:~gistrate, Delhi may 1 ~ittitj~UJ!able to the legal adviser who would ordinarily be a busy riV!t to :ns and, in that event, from a practicnl point of view the the lntervie ult 8 legal adviser would be rendered illusory. Moreover, ~a! l:
V.: rnust take place in the presence of an officer of Customs/ Cq_~torn:~~/Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collect~r 'Ponso entral Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement w o 11 ::able p/~d the detention and this too would seem to be an uttrea• <~Ce ti{ :~ural requirement because in order to secure the yJ;~i c officer at the interview, the District Magistrate, 1 [1981] 2 s.c.a, would have to fix the time for the interview in consultation w·th "E .
I Collector of Customs/Central ~elSe or t e epu~y Director of Enforcement and it ~ay ~come d~cult to s~ncbro'nise tbe time which suits the legal adviser With the. time convement to the concemed ofli. • cer and furthermore if the nommated officer does not, for any reaso attend at the appointed time, as seems to have happened on quite 0 few occasions in. the case of the petitioner, the interview cannot ~ held at all and the legal adviser would have to go back without m~t- · ing the detenu and the entire procedure for applying for an appointment to the District Magistrate, Delhi would have to be gone through once again. We may point out that no s-atisfactory explanation has been , given on behalf of the respondents disclosing the rationale of this reqwrement. We are therefore of view that sub-clause (i) of clause 3(b) regulating the right of a detenu to have interview with a legal adviser of his choice is violative of Arts. 14 and 21 and must be held to be unconstitutional and void.
We think that it would be quite reasonable if a detenu were to be entitled to have interview with his kgal adviser at any reasonable hour during the day after taking appointment from the Superintendent of the Jail, which appointment should be given by th~ Superintendent without any avoidable delay. We may odd that ~~ intcrvie\Y heed not necessarily take place in the presence of a notiU· nated officer of CustomsjCentral Excise/Enforcement but if the presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of th: interview without involving any postponement of the interview, then liuch officer and if his presence cannot be so secured, tbcn any other Jail official may, if thought necessary, watch the interview but .not 50 as to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the Jagal adVISe!• We accordingly allow the writ petition and grant relief to the e~~~:nt -1. indicated above. v.o.K. 11.-·(J. Petition II V" MGIPP-$7SCJ/81-8-7-19Sl-2SOO