Md. Rafique @ Chachu v. State of West Bengal

Judgment

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1Challenge in this appeal i~ to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court c. which by the impugned judgment upheld the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') while setting aside the conviction under Section 398 IPC as done by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ali pore, in connection _with' 0 Sessions trial No.6 (1) of 1997.

2Prosecution case·in a nutshell is as follows: On 1st August, 1996,. at about 11.40 in the. night .the present appellant along with others came in a white Ambassador car having fake numberplate in front of the grocery shop unde~ the name and style "Prabhat Stores" situated at 7/1, Bampass Road, Calcutta-29. The persons who - came in the Ambassador car were armed with weapons like pistol, nepala etc. and they entered into the grocery shop and demanded key of the cash box from the proprietor of the shop namely Guiab Mehata (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). At that relevant time Guiab Mehata alongwith his sons Mukesh Mehata was about to take their dinner and the FIR maker Shyam Mehata just cam·e inside the shop with drinking water.

Since Guiab Mehata refused to hand over the · ~ key of the cash box the present appellant shot at the deceased from the front side at his chest and on receiving the injury, he fell down and thereafter the appellant and other accused persons inflicted cut injuries on· the -person of the deceased. A The miscreants. also assaulted Mukesh Mehata with the butt of the revolver. Soon after the occurrence, hearing the alarm :of the FIR maker, Shyam Mehata and his brother Mukesh Mehata, the neighbours· ofthe locality rushed in the shop and Guiab· Mehata and_Muk~sh Mehata were taken to the n~arby hospital B where subsequently Guiab Mehata succumbed to his injurie~. .. One of the neighbours informed Tollygunge Police Station immediately about the occurrence and Tollygunge Police Station officials soon thereafter arrived at the spot and started investigation.

On completion of the investigation, police submitted the charge sheet against the present appellant along with others under Section 302 read with Section 34, Section 307 read with Section 34 and Section 398 read with Section 34 IPC. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial· was held. Before the High Court the learned counsel for the appellant · accepted that there was no challenge to the fact relating to the occurrence. It was also conceded that from the evidence of the FIR maker and also from the evidence of the other witnesses examined during the trial it was establi~hed that the present appellant was physically present inside the shop room. It was also conceded that there was little scope to deny the prosecution charge that accus~d had assaulted the deceased Guiab Mehata· with. the help of fire arm. It was, however, submitted that the circumstances under which firing has been done were not very clear.

Brother of the FIR maker who was also injured at the time .of occurrence did not identify the appellant as the person who shot at his father and, therefore; there was scope to raise a doubt _as to whether the appellant with the intention of causing death to Guiab Mehata .shot at him. In other words, it was submitted that a case under Section 302 ·is not made out The High court did not accept this piea, though it accepted the starid that there was no scope for the conviction under; Section 398 IPC. The stand taken before the High Court was re-iterated ·by learned 'counsel for the appellant In support of the appeai,' it was subm,itted that the High c'ourt has MD. RAFIQUE@ CHACHU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 531 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] erroneously recorded certain concessions which in fact were not made. It is submitted. that in any event, -no offence under Section302 IPC is made out. It is also submitted that there was no identification of the appellant as claimed. 3 ..

Learned counsel for -the State on ttie other hand·: B subrriitted -that the factual scenario clearly established the commission of offence under Section 302 IPC.

4So far as the aspect of concession is concerned it is to be noted that there is no ground taken even in the memorandum of appeal that there was no concession as recorded by the trial c Court.

5It would be logical to first deal with the plea relating to absence of concession. It is to be noted that the appellant conceded certain aspects before the High Court. After having done so, it is not open to the appellant to turn around or take a D plea that no concession was given. This is clearly a case of sitting on the fence, and is not to be encouraged. If really there was no concession, the only course open to the appellant was to move the High Court in line with what has been said in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak (1982 (2) SCC 463). In a decision Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. (2003 (2) sec 111) the view in the said case was reiterated by observing that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the Court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still ~resh in the minds of the judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. The above position was highlighted in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani (2003) 6 SCC 595). SUPREME, COURT REPORTS

6Tl)is brings us to the crucial question as to whjch was . the appropri.ate .. prov.ision to ,be applied. In the scheme of the. IPC culpable homicicf_e is. g~nqs ,and. '.murder' its. spe~ie . .,All 'murders' are 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking generally; 'culpable homicide' ·sans 'special characteristics of rnurder.is·culpabie homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate .to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The.first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable c· homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, th.e_re i~. ·~ulP.a.ble homicide of the third degree'.

This is th_e lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments 0 provided.for the three grades·. Culpable homicide ·af this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304. : •T"The academic· distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide.hot amounting to murder' hasalways vexed the Courts. ihe confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope ahd meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these ·sections, allow themselves to be dmwn into niinute abstractions. The. safest way of approach. to the interpretation and a·pplicatiori of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections ·299 and 300. The following comparative table wiff be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences.

I Section 299 A person·commits culpable·homicide if the act by which the death is caused is. done - Section 300 Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is c(3used is done - INTENTION MD. RAFIQUE@ CHACHU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] (a) with the intention of causing (1) with the intention of death; or causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing · (2) with the intention of . such bodily injury as is li~ely causing such bodily injury to cause death; or as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3)

With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE with the knowledge that the act (4) with the knowledge that is likely to cause death. the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.

8Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that G such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the t.IJ · SUPREME COURT· REPORTS- {2008] 16 S.C.R. A likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, ·is sufficient to .br~ng the killing within the ambi.t of thi~ clause. Thi$ ~specf of_¢1_ause (2) is bqrne out by rnu.strat.ion (b) ;appended..to SeGtion 300. .

9Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death. by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that C particular pers'on as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen or the failure of ~he heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary cou'rse of nature to cause death, the D offence will ·not be-murder, ·even· if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given.

In clause (3) of Section 300, inste:ad of the Vl.'.Otds 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding Ciause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, E the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death arid a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in misca"ri"iage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of.Section 299 and clause (3) o.f Section 300 is one F of the degree of probability, of death resulting from the intended bodily ·injury. To put .it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium·or the.lowest degree. The word 'likely' in . clause (b) of .Section 299 conveys· the sense of probable· as G distinguished from 9 mere possibility;

The words "bodily injury .... ~ .. sufficient in· the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result ·Of the injury, ·ha\(ing regard to the ordinary·course of nature ...

10For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary MD. RAFIQUE @ CHACHU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [DR ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a, (Al R 1966 SC 187 4) is an apt illustration of this point.

11In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465), Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

12The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows: "To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present. Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. !2008] 16 S.C.R. ·- Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular .bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or ·unintentional, or that some other kind of injury. was intended. Ones these three elements are proved to be ·present, the e·n(luiry ·proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the. three. elements set out above is s'l.1ffiqient to cause.death in-the ordinary course of nature. Thi~ part Cit the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and·llas nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

13The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words: (at page 46~): 'The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict : a serious· injury or a trivial one but whether ~e intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality ofthe circumstances justify .. · . sue~ a!l inference, then of course, tlie intent that the section requir~s is not proved. But if there is nothing ,beyond the · injury. and. the fact that the· app'ellant inflicted it, the only possi.ble.inference is that he intended to i.nflict it. Whether he. knew of its seriousness or· intended serious consequences, is neither here or there. The question, so far as the intention is concemec:f, is not whether he intended to kill,, .or to inflict ·an 1njury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he ·intended to inflict the injury in · question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence . or: ttie cir~ums.tances. warrant an .opposite conclusion."

14These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case (supra) for the applicability of clause "Thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. MD. RAFIQUE @ CHACHU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that B1 there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

15Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's c case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point. ·

16Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as · distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

17The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment A to the matters involved in the second and .third stages.

18The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anf. - (1976 (4) SCC 382), Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and 8 Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 2002 (6) SC 274), Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003 (10) SCC 47_2), Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (9) SCC 650) and Sunder Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2007 (10) SCC 371) and Kandaswamy v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police (SLP C (Crl.) No.5134/2006 disposed of on 17.7.2008)

19Coming to the identification aspect the Judicial Magistrate .who conducted the Test Identification Parade has clarified the position. It has been stated that on 7.10.1996 there could not be identification of the present appellant because the D wrong person was put in the Tl Parade. The real suspect, i.e. the present appellant was not put in Tl Parade and this aspect has been noted in the report relating to Tl Parade. Subsequently, Tl Par~de was held where th_e appellant was identified.

20It is further relevant to note that during trial the present appellant escaped from jail custody at the time of transporting from Alipore Jail to the Court.

21Coming to the ·question as to whether the offence committed by the appellant is covered by Section .302 or Section 304 IPC. It is to be noted that the accused appellant shcit at the deceased from his fire arm as a result of which he sustained grievous injuries and died in the hospital.

22There are two eye witnesses to the occurrence i.e. PWs 12 and 24. Shyam Prasad Mehata (PW-12) was the informant while PW-24 was another eye witness of the occurrence. They are sons of the deceased and had sustained injuries-in the incident.

23According to PW-12 on the date of occurrence he had MD. RAFIQUE@ CHACHU v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL 539 [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.] carried food for his father and elder brother as usual around 11.30 p.m. He was talking to his f{lther and his father asked him to feteh drinking water from the fubewell. Shortly thereafter while he was standing in front of the counter of the shop room, one Ambassador car stopped iri front of the shop room from which six persons alighted and two persons remained inside the car. All the six persons were armed with various weapons out of which two were armed with revolvers. They trespassed to the shop room and demanded keys of the almirahs and when PW-24 stated that he did not have the same, one of them assaulted his elder brother with the butt of the gun four times, c thrice on the head and one near the eye side as a result of which he received blood injuries. He tried to save his elder brother. At that time the present appellant shot at his father. To the similar effect is the evidence of PW-24. The doctor PW-22 had stated that death was due to the effect of the gun shot injury. 0

24Above being the position there is no merit in the plea that the offence is not covered by Section 302 IPC . .

25The appeal fails and hence dismissed . .' K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.