Nelapatla Ramaiah & Ors. . v. Kamatam Bikshamaiah & Ors.

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Civil) No. 24089 of 2005. From the Judgment & Order dated 20.9.2005 of the High 0 Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in S.A. No. i 648 of 2004. WITH Conmt. Pet. (C) No. 110 of 2006. P.S. Narasimha, M. Srinivas R. Rao, John Mathew, Abid Ali Beeran, P. Paramshwar, Roshmana for the Petitioners. Chava Badri Nath Babu, Renu Tyagi, Bimal Roy Jad for Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1This SLP is directed against the judgment and order dated 20th September, 2005, passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Second Appeal No.648/ G 2004, allowing the same and setting aside the judgment and decree dated 29.3.2004, passed by the 2nd Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court-I), Khammam in A.S. No.17/2002. By its judgment, the First Appellate Court had reversed the judgment and decree dated 21.8.1999 passed by the Senior SUPREIV'E COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A Civil Judge, Kothagudam, being O.S. No.54 of 1991, dismissing the suit. 2. lnitial~e suit was filed for injunction simpliciter before the learned • istrict Munsif, Yallandu. Subsequently, the plaint B was amended to include the relief for declaration of title and delivery of poS'session of the plaint schedule property. During the pendency of the suit the first plaintiff died and his legal representatives were brought on record as the plaintiff Nos. 2 to 9. Subsequently, the plaintiff No.9 also expired.

3The case made out in the plaint by the plaintiff was that he was the owner and possessor of the suit scheduled lands and the defendants had no right, title and interest therein, nor did they have any right to demand that they be allowed to cultivate the land on a crop-sharing basis. The dispute which had arisen regarding the cultivation of lands in question resulted in the filing of the suit.

4From the facts as disclosed, it appears that on 25.5.1961 the original plaintiff agreed to sell 3.01 acres in Survey No.87 and 92 and 3.13 acres in Survey No.3.08 to one Bathula Veeraiah and Enika Pitchaiah under an agreement for sale and made over physical possession of the lands in question to the said two persons. Subsequently, on 15th April, 1962, the original plaintiff also sold another portion of the plaint schedule property to the said two persons under another agreement for sale and made over physical possession of the I said lands to them. Consequently, from the said two dates, the original plaintiff was out of possession of the plaint schedule property.

5On 5th February, 1968, Bathula Veeraiah and Enika Pitchaiah agreed to sell 0.37% acres of land in Survey Nos.284 and 292, 3 01' acres out of Survey No.87 and 92 and 3.13 acres out of survey No.308, forming item Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the suit schedule ;Jroperty to Mis Yedlapalli Ramaiah and Royalla Laxmaiah under an agreement for sale and made over physical BIKSHAMAIAH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.] possession of the suit lands to the intending purchasers who took p9ssession of the suit properties. On 15.8.1969 Yedlapalli Ramaiah and Royalla Laxmaiah agreed to sell item No.1 of the plaint schedule property to the 2nd defendant, the respondent No.8 herein, under an agreement for sale and delivered physical possession of the suit lands to him. On the same day, the said Yedlapalli Ramaiah and Royalla Laxmaiah also agreed to sell 2.27 acres in Survey No.92 and 0.14 acres in Survey No.87, in favour of the 1st defendant the appellant No.1 herein, under an agreement for sale and delivered physical possession of the lands to him. Since then the 1st appellant is in c possession of the 1st item of the plaint schedule property. By yet another agreement for sale Yedlapalli Ramaiah and Royalla Laxmaiah agreed to sell 1.22 acres in Survey No.308 to the wife of the defendant No.3, the appellant No.2 herein, under an agreement for sale. The defendant Nos. 4 and 5, namely, the appellant No.5 and respondent No.9, are in possession of the remaining 1.22 acres in Survey No. 308.

6As indicated hereinabove, the suit was initially dismissed, but was decreed by the 1st appellate Court on the finding that all the various transactions were hit by Sections 47 and 50B of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1950 Act"). It was held that the plaintiffs continued to be in possession of the lands in question through the defendants who had not acquired any right to the lands and their possession therein was merely permissive possession.

7The High Court allowed the Second Appeal upon holding that the possession of the beneficiaries of the various transactions involving the land was adverse to the interest of G the plaintiffs and the said transfers were not effected by the · provisions of Sections 47 and 50B of the 1950 Act.

8The High Court took note of the fact that Section 47 of the Act had been repealed from the statute book even before 1969 and even otherwise the provisions of the Act are A applicable between landlord and tenant and have no application insofar as third parties are concerned. Accordingly, the High Court held that the transactions were hit by Section 47 of the 1950 Act and consequently Section 508 was also not required to be invoked. The High Court observed that the 8 original plaintiff had lost his possession in the land on 25.5.1961 when he executed the agreement for sale and made over possession of the lands in question to the intending purchaser. Thereafter, possession changed hands several times. It was observed that had the defendants claimed directly c through the original plaintiff No.1 under the agreement of sale dated 25.5.1961, it could always be said that they were in permitted possession and not in adverse possession which was, however, not thA r.ase as far as the suit properties were concerned, since possession had changed lands at l&ast twice D and at least from 15.8.1969 till the date of filing of the suit it could be contended that the defendants were in adverse possession of the properties as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.

9The substantial question of law framed in the Second E Appeal as to whether the transactions in question were hit by Sections 47 and 508 of the 1950 Act and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree as prayed for, were, therefore, answered by the High Court in the Second Appeal in the negative.

10On behalf of the petitioners, it was sought to be pointed out that the High Court had erred in reversing the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court on the erroneous premise that the possession of the defendants in the suit were adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs, since all the transferees derived their claims to the lands through the petitioner. It was urged that it was on account of the first Agreement to Sell dated 25.5.1961 that the subsequent occupants of the land acquired possession thereof. Their claim, therefore, had to be traced from the said Agreement for Sale dated 25.5.1961 and not on the basis of BIKSHAMAIAH IALTAMAS KABIR, J.] the Agreements for Sale executed in their favour subsequently. It was urged that the High Court had committed an error of law in holding that the possession of the defendants was adverse to that of the plaintiffs and permissible in nature.

11Even on the question of the applicability of Sections 47 and 508 of the 1950 Act to the transactions relating to the suit lands after the initial agreement for sale, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners that since the defendants derived i the right, if any, to possess the suit lands from the original plaintiff, the question of a third party interest did not arise, and, c accordingly, the High Court was wrong in holding that the transactions were not hit by Section 47 of the 1950 Act.

12It was, therefore, urged that the judgment and decree of the High Court was liable to be set aside.

13Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other {hand, strongly supported the decision of the High Court and submitted that the same did not warrant any interference. It was submitted that there was no dispute that the suit property changed hands at least twice after the initial Agreement for Sale dated 25.5.1961, which in itself was an indication that such possession was hostile and adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs. The High Court, could not, therefore, be faulted in arriving at the finding that the possession of the defendants was adverse to that of the plaintiff and not permissible as submitted 'on behalf of the plaintiffs.

14It was also submitted that the High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 47 of the 1950 Act in their application to the facts of the instant case and did not call for any interference.

15We have carefully considered the submissions made 1-0n behalf of the parties and are unable to accept the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. That there were a series of transactions involving the suit lands after the A original plaintiff executed the Agreement for Sale on 25.5.1961 and lost possession thereof, is not disputed. It is also not disputed that the plaintiffs had not at any point of time objected to the Agreements for Sale entered into after 25.5.1961 despite the same being adverse to their interest. The High B Court, in our view, correctly held that the. possession of the defendants was adverse to the interests of the plaintiff.

16As to the question of the applicability of Section 47 of the 1950 Act to the several transactions which had taken place C with regard to the plaint schedule property, it is difficult to accept the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner that since possession of the lands could be traced back to the original agreement for sale dated 25.5.1961, it must be held that all the subsequent occupants, claimed possessory rights under the original Agreement for Sale dated 25.5.1961.

17Such being the case we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed, but without any orders as to costs. Consequently, the notice issued on the Contempt Petition is discharged and the Contempt Petition is also dismissed. R.P. Special Leave Petition and contempt petition dismissed.