L. Janakirama Iyer and Others v. P. M. Nilakanta Iyer and Others

Judgment

IHl Oct#nll. !06 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1962] SUPP. L. JANAKIRAHA IYER AND OTHERS P. M. NILAKANTA IYER AND OTHERS (B. P. Sm11&, C. J., P. B. GA.JXNDR4GA.DIUR and R.A.GJIUJIAB DAYAL, JJ.) 'l'rwt-Dtblor1 cr.n"'lli11f P""]Wly to thru tnutu1 /or repayment of ddi11--.A4minillraUon suit by debtor• dinniut4 o" 111ilhdra111<1/,-Sul>ltqiunt suit on bthal/ of gttural body of crdilor1--I/ barred by res judicata-Limilalion claim /or pos1twta-Mairil4'nability-Sak <lui tucuttd by llPO of tM thm lruatu1-Validilg-A1Mrtdmtnl of ckcru by High Court afttr admiuion of "'PpuU by S11prt- Court-A11>1Jrd of "'' projJt ID tnut utalt eflll intuut to morlgagtt-Adjuslmenl of tquilit•-01111rl'• power-Validity of alit11ation in /aoour of pt.1'809 inltrmtddli11g with tnut ulaft-Truslu de son tortlftdian Trust~ Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), u. 48, 63-Cod• of Civil Proctd111·e, 1908 (Act Y of 1908), 88. 11, 161and162-lndian Limi~1 Act, 1908 (IJC of 1908), Arta. JIU, 120.

ThCJC appeals arose out or a representative sult filed on ~half of the crediton of defendants I to 6 who had executed a trust deed on August 26, 1936, conveying their properties to three trustees with authority to dispose of the same and distribute the sale proceeds rateably amongst the credlton. The tru1t deed required "the three trustees to act accordfn~ to the decision arrived at either unanfmonsly or by m&Jority." The trustees accepted the trust and conveyed all the properties e•cept the family house in admini1tralion of the trust. Two of the 'ale dteds in favour of tt.>o of the creditors,. defendants 13 and I 4, a mortgagee creditor, In the 111it were executed by only two of the trustees. In a suit bronght by the said defendants I to 6 for adminiJtratlon of the trust, the trial court passed a preliminary decree. The High Court on appeal remanded the matter to the trial court (or a finding aa to the market value of the lands sold. The trial court submitted its finding.

At this stage defendants I to 6 withdrew the suit which was dismisoed. The preoent suit under 0. I, r. 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed on October 29, 1947, before such withdrawal. The claims made therein, inler 11/ia, were for a declaration that the properties In question were still impressed with the trust, for the removal the Rll'Vivin1 trustee and appointment of an admini.trator to l'Cll!iae the amounts, recover possession of the properties and re-sell them. Tbe trial Judge paued a decree in favour of the plalntilra. The Hi1h Court In substance confirmed that decree but modified It by awarding aimple interest (I} s.c.R, ins~ad of compound Interest decreed in favour of defend· !\nt 14. The two sale deeds, executed by only two of the trustees, were declared in valid and it was found that the third trustee did not give his consent to it.

The sale deed in favour of defendant 12 was declared imalid on the ground that he had intcrmeddled with the trust estate and had thus became a trustee dt 1ou tort. The courts below also rejected the picas of limitation and res j1'dicata raised on behalf of the defendants. Some of the creditor defendants appealed. After the appeals had been admitted by this Court the High Court amended the decretal ·order by substimting the word• 'mesne profits' by 'net profits' under ss. 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Held, that the question whether Art. 120 or Art. 134 of Indian Limitation Act applied to a case bad to be decided on the case made in the plaint, read as whole and properly construed. Since the present suit was not one for a mere declaration but for possession of property, having been valued and framed as such, deliverable to the adminis· trator, it was governed by Art. 134 and not by Art. 120 of the Act and was thus within time. It was not correct to say that 1.

63 of the Indian Trust Act was exhaustive as to the remedies available to a beneficiary under a private trust or that a claim for constructive possession, such as was made in the present suit, was prohibited under that section. Rani Chhatm K umari Devi v. Prince Mohan Bikram Shah, (1931) I. L. R. 10 Pat. 851, distinguished. Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mohammad M"stapha Mara· chayar, (1923) L. R. 50 I. A. 295, A Subramania Iyer v. P. Nagarathna Naick.r, (1910)20 Mad. L. J. 151 and Masjid Shahid Ganj v. 8hiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Amrit~ar, (1940) L. R. 67 I. A. 251, referred to. Nor could the suit be said to be barred by r.s j"dicata since it did not fall within the scope of s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit being one under 0. 1, r. 8 of the Code, it could not be said that defendants l to 6, plain· tiffs in the earlier suit, and the creditors, plaintiffs in the present suit, were the same party or parties claiming through each other.

Clause 23 of the trust deed, properly construed, con· formed to the provision of s. 48 of the Trusts Act that where there are more trustees than one, they must all join in the execution of the trust, and did not provide for an exception to that rule, even though it provided that decisions by the trustees need not a ways be unanimous but could be by majority aa well. Such sale deed• a• had been executed by IHI L. J,111kirmw IJ't.' P. M. Nilck•nra l:1rr L. ,flfltOkirau IJ" P. JI. NiJak.,,1a ~rer two of the trustees only must therefore fail. The alterna· tive case of consent given by the third trustee to the trans· actions could be of no avail since it could not be substantiatc:l by evidenc•. Lala Man Mohan D<u v. Jallki Pr<Mad, (1944) L. R. 72 I. A. 39, referred to. The High Court had jurisdiction under ss. 151 and 152 of the Code of Ci' ii Proctdure to correct the obvious error in the decn:tal order even though the appeals from the said decree had already been admitted by this Court.

Nor could the amendment be challenged on merits. Although a success· ful plaintiff would not normally be entitled te> mesne profits for more than three year; in view of Art. 109 of the Limita· tion Act, the court had jurisdiction in tlie case of a tru•t to make appropriate directions in the decree, while awarding net profits to the tru'it and interest to the mortgagee, in adjustment of the equities between them. Satgur l'ra•ad v. flar Narain Daa, (1932) L. 59 !. A. 147, Rhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu, (1908) L. R. 35 I. A. 48 and ./aganna:h Prasad Siftgh Clll>uvlhury v. 8urajmal Jalal, (1926) L. R. 54 I. A. I, reforred to. F.ven slight intermcddling with the trust estate is sufficient to make a person trustee dt aoft tori. Since in the instant case, the acts of intermeddling hy one of the defen· dant covered a fairly long period, the courts below were right in holdin~ that the sale in his favour must he '°t aside as one in favour of a tmstee de "°n tor!.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 62 and 77 of 1959. Appeals from the judgment and decree dated March 25, 1953, of the Madras High Court in A. S. Nos. 731 and 720 of 1950. Jf. C. Setdvad, Atwrney-General for India and M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellantll Nos. 2 to 8 1>nd also for legal Representatives of appellant No. I in C. A. No. 62 of 1959. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, ill. K. Ramammthi and B. T. Venkataraman, for respondenta Nos. 2 and lO(in C. A. No. 62 of 59) and respondents Noe. 2 and 15 (ID C. A. No. 77/59). R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalalcrishnan, for appellant No. 2 and also for legal Representative of appellant No. 1 (in C. A. No. 77 of 1961). C. R. PaUabhi Raman and G. Gopalakrishnan, for appellant No. 3 in (C. A. No. 77/59). 1961. October 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by L. J anakirama Iyer P. M. Ni/a/cant• Iyer GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two appeals Gajmdragadkor J, have been brought to this Court by two sets of defendants with a certificate of the Madras High Court and they arise out of a suit instituted under 0.

I, r. 8 on behalf of the genera.I body of creditors for administration against the trustees and alienees of the properties which belonged to their debtors. Defendant 14 and his sons defendants 18 to 24 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959 while defendants 12, l3 and 16 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959. Defendants 1 to 6 are the debtors. They were members of an undivided Hindu family known as Kalakkad Pannayar family in Tirunelveli District. The family was doing commission agency business in petrol, kerosene , and crude oil. It had secured agency rights from the Burmah-Shell Company. The members of the family became heavily indebted by about June, 1936, and as a result there was a. pressure from their creditors. In order to meet the said pressure a deed of composition was executed (Ex. B. 2) on July 8, 1936. As a result of this composition 56 out of the creditors of the family agreed to a scheme for settlement of their debts.

Under this deed defendant 7 was constituted as a trustee and as such was empowered to take over the assets of the debtors, sell them to the best advantage and distribute the proceeds ratea.bly amongst all creditors. It appears that before the scheme under the composition could be successfully or effectively worked out one of the creditors, Ayyah Ayy&r, filed an insolvency petition, No. 25 of 1936, in the Sub-Court at Tirunelveli on July 30, l ll36. By thia L. Janal·irawra l;·f" P. lf. Nilakanta r.Jn petition the creditor wanted defendants I to 6 to be adjudged insolvnnt. Dmin1; tho pcndeney of these proceedings, on August 2{i, I !:136, defendants I to tl executed a deed of trnst, (Ex . .B. 7); by t.his document they com·c\·ed all their movable and immovable properti~s incl11iling t.he outstandings due to them to thrc<~ trustreg. These were defendant 7 Subbarayalu Reddiar, Vcernbahu Pillni and Narayana Pillai.

Tho trustePs wt re authorised to dispose of the a~scts of defendants l to 6 ancl distribute the proceeds r•1tcably amougst the creditors. Narayana l'illai died in February, 1938. Veerabahu Pillai died sometime before the present suit was instituted. Defc1Hlants 8, 9 and 10 are the undivided eons of defendant 7, whereas defendant 11 is th(' widow and defendants 12 and 13 are the stcp-brothns of V eerabahu Pillai. The truiltccs accepted the trust and entered upc.n their duties. They took poseession of the immovable properties covered by the trust. They paid off tho secured creditors, and in regard to unsecured creditors they arranged to pay 50% of their dues by selling the immovable properties either to the creditors themselves or to third parties directing them to discharge the secured debts, and the unsecured debts to the extent of 50% of their value.

It is common ground that except their family house in which defendants I to 6 resided all other immo,·able properties bclongi11!! to them were conveyed under the trust deed. Defendant 14 was a secured creditor in whose favour a mortgage of the first schedule properties had bern executed for a sum of Rs. 30,000 on .Jum• 3, l!l35 (Ex. B-95). This mortgage carried 10~';,, compound interest. It appears that he had also lent a sum of Rs. 3,000 on a promiBSory note on ,July 17, 19:15 [Ex. B-95(a)J. This note canie<l interest at 12%. The promissory note was supported bv the pledge of the mort1:age deed. In ordrr to pay off the debts thus duo to defendant 14 the trustees conveyed to him schedule I mortgaged prouerties for Rs. 42,000 on !'lfay 22, 1937 (Ex. B.94). (1) S.C.R . Out of the said consideration the amount due under the mortgage as well as the amount due under the promissory note were satisfied leaving a balance of Rs. 3,030 in the hands of the purchaser.

He was directed to utilise this balance for repaying 50% of t.he dues of plaintiffs 2 and 3 who have brought the present suit. The sale deed in favour of defendant 14 was executed by only two out of the three trustees, defendant 7 and Veerabahu Pillai. Defendants 18 to 24 are the sons of defendant 14. As we have already seen defendant 14 and his sons are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959. Defendant 7 who was one of the trustees was a creditor of the estate to the extent of Rs. 6,000. His daughter-in-law was a creditor to the extent of Rs. 2,000. In satisfaction of 50% of the debt due to these two persons the trustees conveyed schedule III properties to defendants 8, 9 and 10 who are the undivided sons of defendant 7 (Ex. B. 8). TJ1is document was executed on December 16, 1936, for Rs. 4/'00. The purchasers in their turn sold tho properties to defendant 17 on May 30, 1947.

Defendant 12 is the step-brother of the trustee Veerabahu Pillai and he purchased schedule V properties on November 7, 1941, for Rs. 2,000 (Ex. B-90). Defendant 13 who is the brother of defendant 12 purchased schedule II properties for Rs. 15,000 on August 29, 1937, iEx. B. 37). This document was executed only .by two out of the three trustees. Another sale deed was passed in favour of defendant 13 in respect of schedule VIII properties (Ex. B. 79) on February 6, 1942, for Rs. 2,000. Defendant 16 who is the son-in-law of defendant 13 purchased two sets of properties schedule VII and schedule VII-A on May 7, 1943, and June 4, 1943, (Exs. B-10! and B-105) for Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 600 respectively. The properties thus conveyed to the respective purchasers were put into their possession. It is with the sale deed3 executed in favour of defendant 14 and those executed in favour of L. Janakirama ly1r· P. M. Ntlakonta Ip Gaj~ndragatlkar J. L. JllNlltirama Ip P . .If.

NilokanJa l]·tr Gajmd1•:a1/l:ar J. defendants 12, 13 and 16 that we are conoemtd in the present appeal9. Defendants 12, 13 and 16 are the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959. In 1943 defendants I to 6 brought a suit, 0. S. :N" o. 30 of I 943 in the Sub Court at Tirunel veli for the administration of the trust creatccl by them, for account from the trustees and for recovery of the trust properties. To this snit they implca.ded the surviving trustees and the alienee11 as defendants. In thid suit a preliminary decree for account was paBBed by the Sub Court. Their claim, however, for the recovery of immovable properties was not granted. This decree gave rise to three appeals before the Madras High Court, one by defendants l to 6 and the others by the trustees and the alienees respectively. These appeals were appeals A. S. Nos. 473, 510 and 544 of 1944. The three appeals were heard together and on December 20, 1946, a common judgment was delivered.

The High Court oonfimed the finding of the trial court that the trustE:ea were liable to rendtir account for the management of the trust, and it remanded the suit for a finding a11 to the market value of the lands covered by the respective sale deeds which had been challenged by clefondants 1 to 6. The High Court thought that in determining the validity of the claim made by defendants 1 to 6 it was neoeBSary to find out the proper value of the properties at the relevant time for that alone would enable the Court to decide whether ·the alienations had been effected by the trustees for groBBly inadequate price as alleged by defendants I to 6.

In the course of ita judgment the High Court observed that it was not open to the authors of the trust to challenge the validity of the transaction which was permitted by them by the instrument of trust, for it was clear that under the said trust deed the trustees were empowered to convey properties to the creditors in the discharge of tl.eir dutiea. After rem&Dd the Subordinate Judge took evidence, made his findings and submitted them to the High Court. It was at th1t stage that defendants l to 6 filed a petition for withdrawal of the litigation. This petition was allowed on December 12, 1947, with the result that the suit filed by defendants l to 6, O.S. No. 30 of 1943, was dismissed with costs throughout.

Whilst the proceedings in the said three appeals were pending in the High Court and before defendants l to 6 were allowed to withdraw the litigation the present suit was filed on October 29, 194 7, by the three plaintiffs who are the creditors of defendants l to 6 and who purported to act on behalf of the general body of creditors. Leave was granted to the plaintiffs under 0. 1, r. 8 and the suit has, therefore, been conducted as a representative suit. In the suit the plaintiffs ask for an account from defendant 7 and defendants 11 to 13 who are the legal representatives of Veerabahu Pillai on the allegation that the trustees have been guilty of wilful default.

They also claim a declaration that the properties described in schedules I to VII-A and VIII are still impressed with the trust and they ask for an order for the administration of the trust by removing defendant 7 and appointing an administrator to realise the amount due from the trustees on such account and to recover possession of the properties mentioned in the said schedules, re-sell them and distribute the sale proceeds rateably amongst the unsecured creditors. Several defences . were raised to this suit by the several defendants. It was denied that the trustees were negligent in the matter of collecting the outsta.ndings and that the alienations effec~d by them were for inadequate considerations and otherwise improper and unjustified. It was urged that the present suit was barred by res judic.ata as a result of the withdrawal of 0. S. No. 30 of 1943. It was further alleged that the suit was not maintainable, that it was bad for non-joinder of L. J anakirama Iyer P. M. Nilakant• Iyer GajenJragadkar J, l.

Janakirama lyn P. M. Nilakan!a !)·tr Oajentiragadl;ar .} , parties a.nd was barred by time. Tho respectivo aliences pleaded that the tran8fers in their favour were valid and bindin~. Dofl.'nd;;nt 7 specifically urged that he was not guilty of any br<)ach of trust; and a plea was also raised that the creditors who had filed thu present suit bad acqui('seed in some of the dealiHg.;. Defendant 12 resisted the plaintiffs' case that he had intermeddled in tho management of the trust csta.te and was therefore liable as a trustee de sun tort. An object.ion was raiBed about the proper valuation of tho suit and it was urged that the proper court fee ha.d not been paid. It was denied that sale deeds executed by only two out of the three trustees were invalid. On these pleadings twenty nine issues were framed by the learned trial judge.

In substance the trial judge rejected the plaintiffs' claim for account, but he passo<l a decree declaring that the properties described in schedules I to III, V, VII, VII.A and VIII continued to be impressod with the trust imposed upon them by the truatces. The decree directed the removal of defendant 7 and the appointment of two ad. voeates inst(ad as administrators. It further directed defendants 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 to deliver posseseion of the properties in their respective poseessi<>n and asked the administrators to re-sell the said properties and distribute the proceeds amongst the creditors and to pay the surpluB, if any, to defendants l to t3. Under the decree defendants 12, 13, 14 and 16 were held entitled to receive the respective consideration of the sales and mortgages together with interest and they were also liable to render accoWlt for profits of the properties in their poeseseion. Thie decree gave rise to three appeals before the High Court. Appeal A. S. No. 720 of 1949 was filed by defendant 14 and his sons defendants 18 to 24.

Appeal A. S. No. 731 of 1949 was filed by defendants 12, 13 and 16; and Appeal A. S. No. 21 (lJ S.C.R. of 1950 by defendants 8,9,JOand 17. Insubstance the High Court has confirmed the decref' passed by the trial court and dismissed all the three appeals. The High Court has, however, modified the trial court's decree in regard to the interest which the decree had ordered to be paid to the alienees. The High Court took the view th1tt in adjusting equities between the alienees, the alienations in whose favour were found to be invalid, and the trust, the contract rate of interest need not be awarded. Subject to the modifications made in regard to the payment of interest thP rest of the decree has been confirmed. Defendants 8, 9 and 10 and the legal representative of defendant 17 who died pending the proceedings before the High Court have not challenged the decree passed by the High Court in their Appeal A. S. No. 21 of 1950.

Defendants 14 and 18 to 24 as well as defendants 12, 13 and l6 have, however, challenged the decision of the High Court and have obtained a certificate from the said High Court in that behalf. It would thus be seen that in t\10 two appeals before this Court we are concerned with six transactions-Ex. B-94 which is executed in favour of defendant 14, Ex. B-90 which is executed in favour of defendant 12, Exs. B. 37 and B. 79 which are executed in favour of defendant 13 and Exs. B-104 and R-105 which are executed in favour of defendant 16. Broadly stated both the Courts below have found that all these alienations were effected for inadequate consideration. It has also been found that Exs. B-94 and B-37 are invalid for the reason that they have been executed by only two out of the three trustees, whereas the transfers under Exs. B-12, B-13 and B-Hl are held to be invalid as they are transfers in favour of the relations of one of the trustees Veerabahu.

It has further been found that defen· dant 12 intermeddled with the estate of the trust and must therefore be regarded as trustee de son tort and therefore the transfer made to him is L. J anakirama Iyer P. ft!, Nilakanta Iyer Gajendraga.dkar J. 19''il L. J onol:irama /;'tr P. M. Nilakc.n112 lyt' Gajen.Jr12ttull:dr J. 216 SUPREME OOURT ItEPOHTS [1962) SUPP. 1 invalid as a matt-er of law. Hoth the Courts have rejected the plea of ru judicata and limitation raised by the defendants. There are some of tho points of law which are common to both the a.ppea.18 and it would be convenient to deal with them in the order in which they have been raised before us. 'l'he first point argued before us by the learned Attorney-Genera.I on behalf of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959 (defendants 14 and I IS to 24) is one of Jimitatiou. He contends that on a fair and reasonable construction the present suit attracts the application of Art. 120 and is therefore barre<l. On the other hand, Mr. V iswanatha Sa.stri, for the plaintiffs, contends that the plaint clearly shows that the plaintiffs arc not asking merely for a declaration but they are also claiming that a new administrator should be appointed and a direction should be issued that the property in question should ho delivcre<l to him.

Such & claim, according to him, obviously attracts Art. 134. It is common-ground that if Art. 120 applies the suit is beyond time, whereas if Art. 134 is applicable the suit is within time. The decision of this question would n'lturally depend upon the construction of the plaint. Is the claim ma.de in the plaint one of declaration, or is it a claim for posseB11ion of immovable properties? The plaint sets out aJl the material facts which constitute the background to the present litigation, marks material alle~ations in respect of a.II the alienations impeached m the plaint, and by paragraph :J5 it prays, inkr alia, that schedules I to VII-A and VIII should be adjudged as still impressed as trust imposed on them by the deed of August 26, 1936, and direct their re.sale. That is cl. (c) of paragraph 35. By cl.

( d) it iR prayed that the Court should order the administr"tion of the trust by removing defendant 7 if need be and appointing an administrator or officer of court ( l) to realise the I amounts mentioned in cl. (a), (2) to recover possession and re-sell the properties referred to in paragraph (c), (3) to distribute the proceeds rateably amongst the unsi>cured creditors and perform such other acts and functions as may be necessary to eft'ectuate the trust in question. The learned Attorney General contends that cl. (c) asks for adjudication or declaration that the properties in question are impressed with the trust and that is no more than a declaration, and according to him cl.( d) prays for the appointment of an administrator to realise the amounts and to recover possession of the properties and re-sell them. He suggests that on a fair construction of cl.

( d) all that the plaintiffs pray for is the removal of defendant 7 and the appointment of an administrator with power to realise the amounts specified and to recover posses· sion of the properties indicated and to re-sell them. This is not a claim that possession should be delivered to the administrator in the present suit. It may be coneeded that if read by itself alone cl.(d) may be capable of the construction which the learned Attorney-General seeks to put on it; but in construing the plaint we must have regard to all the relevant allegations made in the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form. It is significant that the plaintiffs have valued the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 23, 745 and this valuation includes several items in respect of different properties valued under s. 7(5) of the Court Fees Act. The valuation made in respect of the different items of propertiea under s.

7(5) is obviously and clearly valuation made on the footing that a claim for possession is made. In fact the plaint specifically avers that the plaintiffs va~ued the suit for possession covered by reliefs C and D-2 under s. 7(5) its indicated in the plaint. Thus there can be no doubt that the plaint has been valued on the basis that a claim for possession of the properties covered by the schedules is intended to be made. Besides, 19Sl L. Jt1Mkir.,.. /ytr P. It. N i/.Jcont• G~mb.,.sklU J. L. Jan.akirama fJ·er v P. }.f. 1''itaka'fl:i lyu Gajnulr1gadkar J. 218 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS (1962] SUPP. it is also significant that in regard to the claim made by the plaintiffs in respect of the transfer in favour of defendant 14 his sons <l<:fendant8 18 to 24 have been joined specifically on the ground that since the plaintiffs clnim poss<:ssion of the said property the said defendants arc necessary parties as it is found that they arc in possession of the said properties.

In other words, the joindcr of defendants 18 to 24 to the present suit. is based solely on thn ground that a claim for possession is made in tho plaint and defendants 18 to 24 being in possession are necessary parties to the suit. Therefore, in our opinion, reading the plaint as a whole it would be unreasonable to construe cl. (d) in paragraph 35 in the manner suggested by tho learned Attorney-General. The prayer which tho clause really purports to make is that an administrator should be appointed and that an order should be passed against the re3pective defendants asking them to deliver posession of the properties to the said administrator. If that we so the plaint cannot be construed as one in which a mere claim for declaration is made. It is a plaint in which a declaration is no doubt claimed but based on tho said declaration or adjudication a further claim for possession to the administrator is also made.

Tho result, therefore, is that the argument that the prayer made in the pla.int attracts Art. 120 must be rcjccred. The next contention urged is that the plaintiffs cannot suo for poBBession but must confine themselves only to a claim for declaration. It is not disputed by the le;une<l Attorney-General that in rngard to public charitablo trusts tho beneficiaries are entitled to sue for setting aside alienations of the trust properties improperly effected by the trust.cos, and to ask for the restoration of possession of ttie said trust properties to the trustees '1.owly appointed. Indeed, there is ample judicial 1 (I) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS authority in support of this position. In A. Subramania Iyer v. P Nagarathna Naicker (1), it was held by the Madras High Court that in a suit by the worshippers of a temple to have the alienation of the trust property by some of the defendants, trustees, to the other defendants declared invalid and for possession to the trustees, the proper decree to be made if the Court be of the opinion that the alienation is invalid is to decree possession to those defendants who are trustees.

It was further held that the trustees need not be referred to a separate suit for the purpose. In llfasjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar (2), the Privy Council has recognised this right in these words: "The right of a Muslim worshipper may be regarded as an individual right, but what is the nature of the right? It is not a sort of easement in gross, but an element in the general right of a beneficiary to have the waqfproperty recovered by its proper custodians and applied to its proper purpose. Such an individual may, if he sues in time, procure the ejectment of a trespasser and have the property delivered into the possession of the Mutawali or of some other person for the purposes of the waqf". The argument, however, is that in regard to private trusts which are governed by the Indian Trusts Act such a course is not open to the beneficiary because of the provisions of s. 63 of the Trusts Act.

Section 63 provides that where truotproperty comes into the hands of a third person inconsistently with the trust, the beneficiary may require him to admit formally, or may institute a suit for a declaration, that the property is comprised in the trust. The learned Attorney-General contends that the only remedy available to a beneficiary under a private trust is that prescribed by s.63 and no other. He can either require the alienec to admit that the property is comprised in the trust, or if the alienee refuses to make the admission the (I) ( 19IO) 20 Mad. L. 1. 151. (2) (194-0) L. R. 67 I. A. 251, 267, L. J a11akirama /ytr P . .\1. Nitakanla IJ'tr OajendragadkO.r ·J. IHI L. J 111Ukir.nt4 lytr P. M. NilW.ot• 1y,, GejtnJra1.ak4r ,T. benficiary m'.iy bring a suit for a declaration in that behalf. In support of this contention strong re- . Hance has been placed on tho deci~ion of the Privy Council in Rani Chhatra Kuroori Devi v. Prince Mohan Bikram Shah(').

In that case the respondent had claimed title to the properties as owner in various ways and had sued as the proprietor of the properties covered by the aotion. All these grounds were rejected and it was held that the respondent could claim no title as a proprietor at all. Even so, while dealing whith the question of limitation the Privy Council made certain ob· servations and it is those observations which are pressed into service by the learned Attorney· General.

Article 144 on which the respondent relied in that case, it has been held, is applicable only to a poseeseory suit by the owner of the pro· perty claimed against a per~on holding adversely to him without title, and the plea made by the respondent that he was the °'vner on several grounds was rejected; hut in the course of its judgment the Privy Council assumed that by reason of the contract pleaded by the respondent the properties wore impressed with the continuing tmst in favour of the respondent, and observed that even so their Lordships were unable to hold that "this would entitle him to sue for poseession as owner". Sir Georg6 Lowndes, who delivered the judgment of the Board, referred to the faot that "the Indian law does not recognise legal and equitable estates.

By that law, there can be but one owner, and where the property is vested in a trustee, the owner must, their Lordships think, be the trustee, and so the right of a beneficiary is, in a proper case, to ea.II upon the trustee to convey to him". It is in that connection that Sir George Lowndes further observed that "the enforoAment of this right would, their Lordships think, be barred after six yea.rs under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act, and if the beneficiary has allowed this period (l) (1931) I. L. R. lOPat. 851. SUPREME OOURT REPORT to expire without suing he cannot afterwards file a posseesory suit, as until conveyance he is not the owner. It is clear that such a trust as is relied upon in the present case would not fall within s.10 of th6 Limitation Act as it would be impossible to hold that the properties which vested in the appellant under the terms of the wills which have been proved were so vested for the specific purpose of making them over to the respondent".

It would thus be seen that these observations mean no more than this that the beneficiary under a private trust cannot claim to recover possession of the property from the trustee so as to attract the application of Art. 144 of the Limitation Act. He can make the claim for a declaration which would be governed by Art. 120. It is quite clear that the question as to whether in a proper case the beneficiary cannot apply for the removal of the trustee, for for the appoinment of a new trustee, and for the delivery to the new trustee of the property improperly alienated by the previous trustee did not fall to be considered in that case. All that the Privy Council was called upon to consider was whether a beneficiary can bring a suit for possession against a trustee and whether such a suit can be governed by art. 144; and in holding that such a suit cannot be brought by the beneficiary the Privy Council pointed out that Art. 144 postulates a suit by the owner and a beneficiary is not an owner under the Indian Law of Trusts.

We are, therefore, satisfied that the observations on which reliance is placed by the learned'Attorney- General cannot be said to amount to a decision that in no case C!ln a beneficiary claim that the trustee appointed under the trust should be removed anti new trustee should be appointed anQ. the trust properties improperly alienated by the previous trustee should be ordered to be delivered into the possession of the new trustee. Section. 63 no doubt provides for the two remedies which are avaliable to the benetlciary, but in our opinion lllfJ L, J anakir""'4 ly" P. M. Nil•k..,ta 1,,, IJ'fientlra:dku J, IllOI !.. JanukiT111n~ lnr P .• \1. Nit11kanta /;·tr Gajt"IJra.rodkar .T. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. s. 63 ca.nnot bo treated as exhaustive on tho l'Ubject and so it cannot be urged that a claim for constructive possession like the one made in the present suit is prohibited bys. 63. Prima facie s.

IO of the Limitation Act seems to contemplate an action by a beneficiary under a true.t to which s. 10 applies and provide• that in such an action the beneficiary may follow the property and ask for a proper order as to the delivery of the said property to the new trustee. If that be so, the provisions of s. IO would suggest that the remedies pr<'.seribcd by s. 63 are not exhaustive. Besides, it would be relevant to observe that if s. 63 is held to be exhaustive 11s to the remedies available to r. beneficiary it would lead to very anomolous result,<i. If a trustee improperly alienates the trust property the only remedy which would on that view be available to the beneficiarv is to obtain a declaration. How wou Id this declaration be effective to bring back to tho trust the property improperly alienated? Strictly and literally contsrued s. 63 docs not refer to the remrdy for tho appointment of a new trustee either, so that on a litenl construction of s.

63 even that remedy may be outside its purview; but assuming that a beneficiary can ask for a declaration that the property alienated is comprisecl in the trust and also add a prayer for the appointment of a new trustee that only means that after the new trustee is appointed he will have to sue the alienee for possession and very often this suit would be <ll'foa.ted by the alieneo's plea of adverse posses~ion. It is hardly neceBSary to emphasise that wh•~n the beneficiary sues for a declaration as required by s. 63 and the alieneo resists the said suit the adverse possession of tho alieneo is emphatically brought out and the pendency of the beneficiary's suit wonld not affect that position so that on tho view that s. 63 is exhaustive more often than not tho beneficiary's claim would in subetanco be defeated by the adverse posse88ion of the ahenee. In Subbaiya Pandaram v. MahamadMustapha Mara· wyar (' ), this is exactly what happened.

In the presence of the purchaser it was declared that the trust had been valirlly created and that the property was in fact a trust property. Their Lordships pointed out that "at the moment when the said decree. was passed the possession of the property was adverse and the declaration that the property had been properly made subject to the trust disposition, and therefore ought not to have been seized, \lid not disturb or affect the quality of hie poaaession; it merely emphasised the fact that it was adverse. No further step was taken in consequence of that declaration until the present proceedings were instituted when it was too late." We would like to add that if for bringing back to the trust the properties improperly alienated by the trustees two suits are required to be filed we apprehend that the second suit by the newly appointed trustee for obtaining possession of the properties would almost always be too late, and so s.

63 cannot be read as exhaustively dealing with all the remedies available to the beneficiary. We must, therefore, reject the argument that the suit for possession in the form in which the prayer has been made by the phintiffs is incompetent. That takes us to the question of re.• judiwta. The argument is that on general grounds of res judicata the dismissal of the .suit (0. S. No. 30 of 1943) filed by defendants 1 to 6 should 'preclude the trial of the present suit. It has been fairly conceded that in terms s. 11 of the Code cannot apply because. the present suit is filed by the creditors defendants 1 to 6 in their representative character and is conducted as a representative suit under O. 1, r. 8; and it cannot be said that defen. dant~ 1 to 6 who were plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the creditors who have brought the present suit are the same parties or parties who claim (I) [1923] L.R SO I.A. 295. 1961' L .. Jan'lkirama Iyer P. M. Nilakan:.. l_rtr Gajtnd .. egatlkar J. L.J-"0--{1« I'.

N. Nil•bnt• SUP)E~IE COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP. through each other. Where 11. 11 is thus inapplicable it would not be penniseible to rely upon the general doctrine of res judicata. We are dealing with a suit and the only ground on which res jwU- cata can be urged against such a suit can be the proTiaions of 11. 11 and no other. In our opinion therefore, there ill no 1ub11t&nce in the ground that the present auit i1 barred by re1 jwlicata. The next question which falls to be considered is the most important question in these appeals. We have already seen that three trustees were appointed under the trust deed executed by defendants l tQ 6 and two of the impugned sale deeds hr.ve been executed by only two out of the said three trustees. The Courts below have held that two out of the three trustees could not convey a valid title and so on that ground alone the two transfers are invalid.

It is urged before us that this conclusion is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of cl. 23 of the trust deed. Before considering this point it is neressa.ry to state the legal position in the matter under the Trusts Act. Section 48 of the Trusts Act provides that. when there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the trust, except where the instrument of trust otherwise provides. It is thus clear that all acts which the trustee~ intend to take for exer.uting tha trust must he taken by all of tht-m acting together. Therefore, there can be no doubt that if the validity of the alienations efferted by the trustees falls to be considered only in the light of a. 48 the fact that out of the three trustees only two have executed the i.ale deeds would by itself make the transactions invalid and would not convey title to the alienees. Thie position i1 not in doubt. Lewin on "Trusts" hu observed that "in the case of co-tru1tee1 the office is a joint one.

Where tbe administration of the trust ia vested' in (1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REroRTS co-trllSteeti they all form as it were but one collective trustee, and therefore mUBt execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. It is not uncommon to hear one of several trustees spoken of as the acting trustee but the Court knows no such distinctions, all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If anyone refuses or be incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, but the administration of the trust must in that case devolve upon the Court. However, the a.ct of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be strictly proved (')". If one of the trust,ees refuses to join in the exe. cution of the trust, under the Indian law s. 34 of the Trusts Act provides for the remedy. The. other ~rustees can apply to the Court as contemplated by s.

34 and the trust may accordingly be executed. As we have seen s. 48 contemplates that its provisions will.not apply where the instrument of trust otherwise provides. In other words, if a trust deed under which more trustees than one are appointed expressly provides that the execution of the trust may be carried out not by all but by one or more then o_f course the matter would be governed by the special provision of the trust deed. The argument urged by the learned Attorney· General is that cl. 23 of the trust deed in suit makes such a provision. Both the Courls below have rejected this plea but it is. urged that tlie said conclusion is based on a misconstruction of the relevant clause. Clause 23 has been thus translated by the High Court: "In all the proceedings to be taken in connection with this estate, you three, either unanimously or according to the decision of. the majority, shall act". In the earlier litigation stated by defendants I to 6 this clause was thus translated: (I)

Lewin on trusts, 15th ed., p. 190. J961 L, J anakirama IJ•er P;, M. Nilukanta Iy1r GoJendragadkar J. 19G1 l. Ja111l·i1a·n~ Tytr P. \{ . .Vi(at:J Ua !;1tr 226 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP. "All the steps to be taken in connection with this estate should bo :>ccording to tho unanimous opinion of ·a.II the threo of you or all decided by tho ma.jorty". The learned trial judge has made this translation of the clause in the present proceedings: "In all the proceedings to be ta.ken in connection with the" estate all the three should act either unanimously or according to the decision of the majority". The learned Attorney-General has supplied us with the literal translation of the clauso which readR thus: "In connection with this estate, in all proceedings to be taken you three unanimously or according to the decision of the majority shall act".

We have carofolly compared all the trnnslations, and we feel no difficulty in holding that the translation supplied in tho earlier . litigation is somewhat inaccurate, whereas all the three translations made in tho present proceedings substantially agree. Taking tho tra.nslat.ion supplied by the learned Attorney-General it is cfoar that what this clause requires is that tho three trnstces shall act, and it provides that they shall act according to the decisic•n which may be reached either unanimously or by majority. "Yon three," thqt is to say the three trustees, is the subject of the predicate "shall act"; and the words between tho subject and the predicate indicate how the decision has hcen reached. Reading the clause as a whole it is difficult to accept the argument that this clause allows two of the three trustees to act without joining the third trusteo in the actual action to be taken in the ·execution of tho trust.

It is not neces!!ary under tho clause that in the ma.tt<>r of executing the trust ovory decision must be unanimous. The cJquse recognises that in somn matters decision may be by majority; but nc\·crtholess it requires that once a decision is reached either un· a.nimously or by majority, in gh·ing effect to the dcoision and in taking any given action in the execution of tho trust all the three must act. Thus read this clause conforms to the statutory provision I r contained in s. 48 of the Indinn Trusts Act and is not intended to provide for an exception to the said provisions at all. It is urged that if no departure was intended to be made from the principles laid down in s. 48 the clause need not have been added at all. This argument is wholly inconclusive. There are several other clauses in the trust deed which also bring out provisions corresponding to the relevant provisions of the Trusts Act and this argument may apply to the said clauses as well.

The authors of the trust, while creating the trust, have made elaborate provisions in respect of the trust, while creating the trust, have made elaborate provisions in respect of the several matters concerning the execution of the trust, and the whole scheme of the trust deed is consistent with the operative cl. 23 in that it seems to require all the trustees to act together even though the decisions which they seek to give effect to may have been majority decisions and not unanimous decisions. Therefore, in ·our opinion, the Courts below were right in holding that cl. 23, like the main provision of s. 48, requires that all the trustees should have joined in the execution of the sale deeds in question. That being so, Exs. Il-94 and B-37 which are respectively executed in favour of defendant 14 and defendant 13 are invalid and can pass no title to the alienees on the ground that only two out of the three trustees have executed them [Vide : Lala Man lrfohan Das v, Janki Prasad (')].

In support of the validity of these transfers an alternative argument has been urged before us. It is pointed out that according to Lewin on Trusts, if the act to the two trustees has been done with the sanction and approval of the third trustee then it may be regarded as an act of the three trustees, and it is urged that in the present case the third trustee had.consented and shown his approval to the transactions in quest.ion. The two sale deeds have been executed by defendant 7 and Veerabahu (61 [1944] L, R. 72 I. A. 39. 1.61 L. J11naldrarna ly1r P. M, Ni/akanta lytr Gajendragadkar J. 111111 L. JonUirmna lrtt P. JI. Nilal.anla /ytr Goj111tlrqailk~ J. Pillai, and.they do not bear the eigne.tureof Nara.ya. na Pillai but this alternative contention proceeds on the aeeumption that though Narayan& Pillai did not sign the document (Ex. B-94) he had in fact consented to it and had shown hie approval to the transaction.

This argument, however, cannot be accepted having regard to the concurrent finding recorded by the Cou~te below on this point. Dealing with this question the trial court has referred to the liscrepant versions given for Narayan& Pillai not joining in the execution of the sale deed. He points out that no mention is made in the sale deed as regards the circumstances under which the third trustee did not join. Then he examines the evidence given by defendant 7 and points out the infirmities in the said evidence. He compares the evidence given by defendant 13 in the previous suit. and observes that the explanations given are inconsistent. One of the explanations was that Narayan& Pillai declined to come to the Sub-Registrar's office as he was heavily involved and that people would think that he W&8 selling his property. The other explanation was that Na.rayana Pillai wanted some accommodation, and when his co-trustees refused to agree he declined to jointhe execution of the document.

The trial court has observed that there was nothing to show that Narayana Pillai W&8 financially involved at the relevant time, and he points out that in fact Na.rayana Pillai had gone to the Sub-Registrar's office near about that time in connection with another transaction. That is how the trial court bas rejected the argument that Narayana Pillai was a consenting party to the transaction in question. The High Court has concurred with this conclusion. In dealin~ with this question the High Court has preferred to believe the evidence of the first defendant that Narayan& Pilla.i conRidered the prices fixed for Ex. B-!M as very low and for tha.t reaaon refused to be a party to it. It has contrasted this reason with the other reasons given on behalf of the alienees, and it has recorded its conclusions in these words :

"Whatever may be the reason it is certain that Narayana Pillai was not a consenting party to the transaction and there being no ·other evidence by way of minutes of any meeting of the trustees had decided with the knowledge of Narayana Pillai, though he had dissented, we are unable to hold that there has been such a decision of the majority as would bind the dissenting trustee". It does appear the original draft of Ex. B·94 was made on the assumption that all the trustees would join in the . execution of the document but the hope and anticipation formed by the two trustees was believed and so the doucument was ultimately executed by two of them without Naraya.na Pillai joining.

We have considered the evidence to which our attention was invited in this connection, and we see no reaton to interfere with the concurrent conclusion recorded by the Courts below that Narayana Pillai was not a consenting party to the transfer in q11estion. '.rhat being so, the alternative ground made in suppnrt of Ex. B-94 fails. If the transfers in favour of defendant 14 (Ex. B-94) as well as Ex. B-37 in fa:Your of defendant 13 fail o~ this ground it is really not necessary to consider the further question as to whether both the said tran.~fers were effected for grossly inadequate consideration. The next question which has been raised on behalf of defendant 14 is In regard to the amendment ma.de by the High Court in its decretal order. It is urged that this amendment was made after the appeals to this Court had been admitted and so it is without jurisdiction.

It appears that the certificate was granted by the High Court to the respective defendants who have come to this Court as appellants on November 26, 1954, and the appeals were admitted on December 4, 1955, whereas the amendment has been made after the appeals were admitted. The application for the amendment in question was made under ss. 151 and 152 of the Code; and it became necessary because the decretal order drawn in the High Court referred to the profits l. Janal;iram• lyer P. M. Nilakanta rwr Gq::ndtagatlkar J. I-Jantzkirama Iyer P. M. -Nilakanta Iyer of which . aCCO)lnts •Were ·directed as mesne profits. The use of the words.<'mesne, profits" would .. have inevitably brought in the period of three . year~ beyond which acccounts could not be claimed.

By . their application the plaintiffs alleged that the use of '.'mrsne ·profits'.' in the decretal order was inconsistent with the judgment which had directed accounts :.of the net profits ·and so they claimed that the decretal order should be corrected in cl. III, sub-cl.(3). According to .the prayer thus made it was sug- .; gested that the clause. should read as. follows "that ·,the defendants 12, 13 and 14 are liable for the net , profits of the properties purchased by them under . schedule V, schedule II and schedule. I respectively". , , The .. word·· "net profit'.'. ·was used· in , the place of ,, "mesne profits":originally introduced ,in the .order. · . : When this application for ·amendment was argued .. before the High Court the defendants pleaded· that ,, .. the use of the words ·~mesne, profits" was proper - : ·and should not be changed. · It .was urged on· their . behalf that in' its judgment the High Court had . ;•.introduced· the words ..

"mcsne. profits'.' deliberai.tely and.· so the: decretal :order was· perfectly :· correct. . This, contention has •been nrgatived by : the High Court, . and. in ; our· opinion ·rightly. It appears that in the earlier portion..of.. his judgment Krishnaswami Naidu, J., summarised . in one para- · '. graph the. effect of the' decree' passed ' by the trial 'court; and in giving this sunimary' he' observed that ~.under the decree.defendants 12, 13, 14 and 16 were ' 'held entitled to be paid the respective considerations \',of the sales and ·_mortgagestogether with interest ··'they being liable to. accoun~ for mesne profits as · per the terms of the decree. Tw:o 'things are clear. , Th' .l part of the judgment does not cont1in the decision of the High Court . at all.

It is. really concerned with the narration of the relevant facts and it purports to summarise the effect "of the decree ··and nothing.more. _·Besides, the use of the words '.'mesne profits" in _the context is obviously the ·result of inadvertence -because the decree of the I trial court had in the relevant clause used the words "net profits" and not "mesne profits". Thus, there can be no doubt that the decretal order drawn in the High Court through error introduced the words "mesne profits" and such an error could be corrected by the High Court under ss. 15 l and 152 of the Code even though the appeals may have been admitted in this Court before the date of correction. But apart from this technical argument about tho jurisdiction of the High Court to make the correction the point in question has been raised on the merits before us; and it is urged that the plaintiffs are not entitled to anything more than three years' profits from the respective defendants. The argument is that Art. 109 of the Limitation Act applies to such a claim and the claim is confined to three years under that article.

Article 109 deals with claims for profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiffs which have been wrongfully receiv· ed by the defendants and it prescribes three years' period of limitation commencing from the time when the profits were received. Normally there is no doubt that a successful plaintiff would be entitled to mesne profits for three years and not more; but in the present case we are dealing with a claim made by the plaintiffs on behalf of the trust and the decision in their favour has rendered it necessary to adjust equities batween the trust and the respective alienees · alienations in whose favour have been. set aside as invalid. We have already seen that having set aside the alienations in favour of defendant 14 and others the Courts below have direuted that the alienees should get the amounts due to them from the trust. It bas also been directed that interest at the rate awarded by the decree should be paid to them on the said amounts.

This clearly is an equitable relief granted to the alienees. Having held that the alienees should get interest on the amounts due to them from the dates of their respective mortgages or L. J anakiram• /ytr P. M. Nilakanta Iyer Gaj1ndragadkar J, i. Jon.akirama l.J11 P. M. NiUzlc01tla 1.,., '1ajtml•qaikar J. sales the Courts in fairness have directed that the alienees in turn should give an account of the net profits of the properties which were wrongfully in their. possession commencing with the date when they got possession. If the technical argument based on Art. 109 is upheld as a matter of law there would be no scope for giving equitable relief to the alienees at all and they may b~ driven to file fresh actions ta recover their claims and such actions would have to face the possible plea of limitation.

That is why the High Court has observed that the question about the net profits awardable to the trust and interest awardable to the alienees involves considerations of equitable adjustment, and it is by way of an equitable adjustment that the relevant directions have been issued by the decree. It is not disputed that the Court had jurisdiction to make such. an equitable adjustment. Indeed, in many cases of this type Courts have made equitable adjustments between rival parties [Vide: Satgur Prasad v. ll ar Narain Das ( 1 ); Bliagu-at Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu (')]. The principal and interest ordered to be p:tid to defendant 14 and the profits ordered to be paid by him are thus iuteJr11.l parts of an equitable adjustment between the plaintiffs and defendant 14. It is also urged on behalf of defendant 14 that the High Court was in error in modifying the decree passed by the tri11J Court by changing 10i% interest at compound rate to IO!% simple interest in favour of defendant 14.

The aontention is that under the mortgage executed in favour of defendant 14 (Ex. B-95) the contract rate was lot% compound interest and as mortgag_ee defendant 14 was entitled to that rate. In support of this argument reliance is placed on the decision of the Privy Council in Jagannath Prasad Singh Chowdhury v. Surajmal Jalal ('). In that case the Privy Council has held (I) (1932) L.R.59 1..1.147. (2) (1908)L. R.351.A.48,59. (1~261L.R.54 I. A. 1. 23S that on a preliminary decree for foreclosure or sale under 0. XXXIV, rr. 2, 4 of the Code, a mortgagee is entitled to interest at the rate and with the rests stipulated in the mortgage, down to the date fixed for redemption by the decree. This position cannot be disputOO.; but the answer to the plea is that the present decree is not passed in an action instituted by defendant 14 as a mortgagee.

The present decree is passed while adjusting equities between defendant 14 the alienation in whose favour is set aside; his rights as mortgagee aFe equitably recognised and thereby fm·ther litigation is avoided. Since the decree by which defendant 14 is allowed to recover his mortgage dues has been passed for giving him equitable relief it was open to the High Court to consider whether compound interest should be paid to him or not. As the High Court has pointed out, while adjusting equities between the parties the mortgage does not become revived as such but the relief granted to the 14th defendant is based on equity and justice, and so the High Court thought that the interests of justice would be met if he is paid out of the sale proceeds the principal amount of the mortgage with simple interest 'l,t 10!%.

We have carefully considered the contention raised .by the learned Attorney-General in this behalf but we do not think that we would be justified in interfering with the modification made by the High Court in the decree passed by the trial court. In the result Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1959 filed by defendants 14 and 18 to 24 fails and is dismissed with costs. We now turn to Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959 fi,led by defendants 12# 13 and 16. We will take the case of defendant 12 first. We ha.ye already seen that in favour of defendant 12 a sale deed has been executed on November 7, 1941 (Ex. B-90). This sale deed has been set aside on two groundsone that it is executed in favour of a person who by intermeddling with the estate of the trust has L. J anokir«na l.>·er P. M. Nilallanta Iyer Gajendr•gadlcar J. Iffl L, JanaAiramo ~w P. M. Nilakanta 1;-v Gaj mdr•tadkar J, become trustee de son tort, and second that the properties covered by the document have been sold for idadequate consideration.

It is conceded by Mr. Ganapathy Iyer that if we confirm the finding recorded by the Courts below against defendant 12 on the first point that itself would invalidate the transfer in his favour. He has, however, argued that the said finding is erroneous. Having carefully considered the relevant material we see no reason to interfere with the finding in question. In this connection it would be enough if we briefly refor to the relevant evidence bearing on this point. Defendant 12 wrote to Pichu Ayyar Avergal, defendant 15, who was a clnk of the trust estate on August :20, 1936, in these words: "I request you that Pathai properties may be checked, that Piramanayakam Pillai coming (there) may be consulted with regard to all matters and settlement made and that you may also come here on Monday morning and render necessary assistance". The tone of the communication and its contents are significant. It is not the language of a person who is merely assisting the trustee.

He is issuing directions to the clerk of the trust. Defendant 12 was a creditor of defendants 1 to 6. It is, however, common-ground that when sale deed (Ex. B-12) was executed in favour of def.indant 13 on December 19, 1936, defendant 13 who is no other than the brother of defendant 12 had undertaken to satisfy defendant 12's debt and so as from that date defendant 12 had ceased to be a creditor of the estate. Even so, he was intermeddling with the estate throughout. On October 14-, 1938, he wrote to the Agent of the Travanoore National and Quilon Bank suggesting that he would pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 for the entire amount pa.ye.hie to the bank by the clebtors and he requested the Bank to have the debt discharged in that manner. Then he added that "na the price of the lands have gone down very much owing to conditions at the present time" he requested that the sum of Rs, 10,000 may (1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOUH.T REPORTS be received and that the entire debt should thus be discharged.

It. would be noticed that at this date defendant 12 was not a creditor of the estate and he had, therefore, no business to write to the Bank. This letter, like the earlier one which we have already seen, clearly indicates that defendant 12 had taken it upon himself to administer the tsust.. To the same effect is another letter written by him to the Official Liquidator of the said Bank ,on January 9, 1939. In this letter defendant 12 says that "the trustees are arranging for several settlements in deference to the wishes of Mr. Ayyah Sastri, but owing to the nature of time the matter stands unsettled even though both are agrAed willingly'". Then he refers to the proposal to settle all the debts and promises that "the matter will be finally settled if the trustees meet you personally". "!, therefore, request you". says defendant 12, to kindly excuse the little delay and pray to fulfil the great task", and ho adds "I am also coming there''. Then followed a suit by the Bank, No. 12 of 1939, to which defendants 12 and 13 were impleaded; and in this suit defendants 12 and 13 entered into a compromise with the plaintiff Bank and obtained a compromise decree.

It is unnecessary to refer to the terms of the compromise decree. What is material is the conduct of defendant 12 in entering into compromise with the Bank. Defendant 13 may have been justified in entering into tlie compromise but defendant 12 could have done so only as an intermeddler. This decree was passed on February 14, 1941. Ex. P-7 is also relevant on this point. This is a notice issued to defendant 12 by one of the creditors of the estate. It appears that this creditor had given to defendant 12 a receipt signed by him in order to enable defendant 12 to draw the amount.from defendant 14 to be paid to the said creditor. The notice furj;her recites that "it now transpires that about the middle of July, 1937, you drew the said amount of Rs.425 from the said Janakirama Iyer and have L. J anokirama I) e P. M. JVilak•nla Iyer Gajendrogatlkar J :. J .,,.i,;,.,.. 1,,,. P. M. Nilakanla lajtntlragadUr J. failed till now to account for the same to my client".

In other words, this notice shows that defendant 12 had promised to pay to the creditor Rs.425 due to him from the estate and had failed to do so. The result was the suit by the creditor (Small Cause Suit No. 58 of 1940). This suit again was compromised by defendant 12. There is yet another document Ex-121 which shows how defcndaDt 12 was intermeddling with. the estate. This is a receipt paBBed hy the clerk of the estate to one Subbayyar Avergal on March 9, 1937. It reads thus: "According to the order directed by defendant 12 I have received from you on this date Rs. 400 from the sale of the current Pisanam paddy produce from the estate of M. R. Ry. P.S. KrishnaswamiAyyar Avergal vagaira, Kalakkadu Pannai". It is clear that the clerk of the estate Pichandi Ayyar who passed the receipt had been directed by defendant 12 to receive Rs.400 from Subbayyar Avcrgal. He had accordingly recived that amount and passed . a receipt in that behalf.

Now, if defendant 12 directed the clerk of the estate to receive a certain amount for and on behalf of the C8tate it clearly amounte to intermedding with the estate and it makes him trustee de son wrt. Defendant 12 had given evidence in the earlier litigation in which he had stated that he, defendant 13 and Veerabahu Pillai were members of an undivided family. In the present proceedings defendant 12 has gone back upon his admiBBion that he and his brothers constituted an undivided family. The trial court has accepted this latter plea and the High Court has not differed from it; but that apart, the several statements made by defendant 12 in the said evidence clearly show that he was taking as mn~h active part in the affairs of the trust as his brother Veerabahu. There is yet another fact to which reference may be made. As the High Court has pointed out, the sale in favour of defendant 12 was executed on (l) S.C.R. November 7, 1941, and yet the properties covered by the said document appear to have been put in his possession as early as 1937.

In other words, defend· ant 12 entered into possession of the properties nearly four years before the sale was executed in his favour. It is in the light of these facts that the .Courts below have held that defendant 12 is a trustee de son tort. As is observed in •'Williams on Executors and Administrators" (1) "a very slight act of intermeddling with the goods of the deceased will make a person executor de son toft". In the present case the acts of intermeddling by defendant 12 spread over a fairly long period and cannot in any sense be regarded as minor and insignificant. We would accordingly hold that defendant 12 is in the position of trustee de son tort and so the sale deed executed in his favour (Ex.B-90) is bad on that account alone. In regard to defendant 13 there are two transactions in his favour, Ex. B-37 and Ex.B-79. Ex. B-37, as we have already seen, is invalid for the reason that it has, been executed by two out of the three trustees. That leaves E;x.

B-79; but before we deal with that transaction it would be relevant to refer to a general consideration which applies to all the transfers in favour of defendants 12, 13 and 16. Defendants 12 and 13 are the stepbrothers of Veerabahu and defen<lant 16 is the sonin-law of defendant 13. It is quite clear that under s. 52 of the Trusts Act "no trustee whose duty it is to sell trust-property, and no agent employed by such trustee for the purpose of the sale, may, directly or indirectly, buy the same or any interest therein, on his own account or as agent for a third person". This position is thus stated by Lewin on Trust: "A trustee is absolutely and entirely disabled from purchasing the trust property whether it be. real estate or a chattel personal, land, or a ground rent, ill . reversion or possession, whether the p11rchase be made in the trustee's own name or (I} Williams of Executars and Administrators, 14th ed., Vol. I, P. 28. L. ,J,,nakirama 1)-,r P. M. Nilakanta Iyer Gajerid1agadk'lr J. !Kl I ..

J nnakiTama l,Jtr P. M . .Vi/ali,.ta ly1r Gajtnt!razat!kar .T. in the name of a trustee for him, directly or indirectly, as to a purchaser upon a contract or understanding (amounting to more than mere expectation) that the purchaser shall re-sell to the trustee, by private contract or public auction, from himself as the single trusteo, or with the sanction of his cotrustees( 1 )". Thus, the alienations by the trustees in favour of the near-relatives of one of the trustees would be bad for this reason. Besides, under s. 47 of the Indian Trusts Act a trustee cannot delegate his office or any of his duties either to a co· trustee or to a stranger, unless the instrument of trust so provides, or the delegation is in the regu Jar course of business, or the delegation is nece88ary, or the beneficiary, being competent to contract, consents to the delegation.

The trust did impose upon the trustees the obligation to sell the properties of the trust at the highest price recoverable and to distribute the sale proceeds amongst the creditors of the authors of the tru it. Tho documonts in favour of defondants 13 and HJ seem t-0 leave it to the respective purchasera to pay tho d.:bts and that may be another infirmity in t.hc transaction. Going back to Ex. B-79 which is a transfer in favour of defendant 13 it is evident th'l.t this transaction is inevitably conneted with another transact.ion Ex. B-25. Ex. B.79 has been executed for a consideration of Rs. 2,000 and odd and it relates to 3 acres and 14 cents of schedule VIII property. It appears that defendant 13 had obtained another sale deed Ex. B.25 on April 19, 1937. This sale deed consisted of 51 items of property belonging to the trust which had spread over five villages. These items consisted of housesitcs and lands. The sale deed was for Rs. 5,000.

D(·fcndant 13 in his turn prooeeded to sell the said property by different lots to respective buyers. Amongst the creditors of the estate was Lak8hmi (I) Lewin on Trusts, llth ed., p. 797. (1) s.c.R. Ammal to whom Rs. 800 was payable on the basis of 50% of return of debt. Defendant sold to Lakshmi Ammal 6i cents out of the lands purchased by him under Ex. B.25. . It, however, appears that in respect of the 3 acres and 14 cents which was the subject-matter of Ex. B-25. Original Suit No. 32 of 1941 was instituted Ly persons who claimed title to the said property. To that suit Lakshmi Ammal was impleaded as to defendant and so was defendant 13. Ultimately the said suit was decreed and the property in question was held to belong to the plaintiffs in that suit and not to the estate of defendants 1 to &. It was as a result of this decree that Ex. B-79 came to be passed in favour of defendant 13.

This document purports to convey 3 acres and 14 cents of another property to make good the loss to him by reason of the decree in Suit No. 32 o{ 1941. Thus, it would be seen that tl:.e transaction evidenced by Ex. B-79 can stand only if the transaction by evidenced by Ex. B-25 is valid and not otherwise. The Courts below have held that this latter transaction is obviouslv and patently invalid. In our opinion, this conciusion is right. It is true that Ex. B-25 is not directly challenged in the present suit because the properties covered by it have been sold to different purchasers by d"lfendant 13 and they have not been impleaded. Even so, since Ex. B-25 is the very foundation of Ex. B-79 it is open to the plaintiffs to contend that the validity of Ex. B-25 Rhould be considered for determining the validity of Ex. B-79, and that is what the Courts below have done. Now, one has merely to look at the broad features of Ex. ~-25 to be satisfied that it is an invalid transaction.

It is patent that no attempt was made to value the properties individually. The properties numbering 51 and spread over five villages were all grouped together and sold for Rs. 5,000 without making any serious efforts to determine the value L. Jonakirama IJtT P, M. Ni/akanfa /;·er Oajt1ulragadkar J. JIBJ L. J auAirama lyv P. M. Jri/akan14 lytt GajtttJratatl1ar J. 24.0 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SuPP. of the l'lt. The purchaser was told to sell the proper· ties to the respective creditors of the estate e.nd thus satisfy them. Th~ in subste.noe is delegation of the functions of the trustees which they could not delegate to defendant 13. The stamp paper for the so.le deed Ex. B-25 stands in the name of Veerabe.hu Pillai e.nd defendant 13 was unable to explain how the stamp paper came to be in that name. Defendant 13 admitted that he did not inspect the proper· ty before its purchase and that he had no idea a.bout its value.

As the trial court he.d observed, the transaction cannot be regarded "as e. bona fide sale because the property consists of odd a"8ortment of punj:i. lands e.nd house sites in Pe.thi, Pe.dmaneri and Sivalpuri villages". Therefore, we have no difficulty whatever in agreeing with the conclusion of the Courts below that Ex. B-25 was invalid; if that be so Ex. B-79 must be held to be invalid for that reason alone. Incidentally, we may refer to the fact that defendant 13 admitted in the earlier suit that he had not refunded the purchase money to Lakshmi Ammo.I and that substantially destroys the be.sis of Ex. B-79 because defendant 13 not he.v· ing paid anything to Lakshmi Ammal had no right to rote.in the property conveyed to him. The le.st transactions which have yet to be examined a.re those in favour of defendant 16.

In regard to these transactions the trio.I court has found that evidence adduced by the plaintiffs shows that the consideration for which properties were sold were grossly inadequate. The vendee, defen· dant 16, did not care to examine himself. Besides, e.s we have already pointed out he is e. close relation of defendants 12 and 13. The High Court has concurred with the trial court's conclusion. The only point which was attempted to be me.de by Mr. Pattabhire.man in challenging the correctness of this concurrent conclusion is that the Courts appear to have e.ssumed that the agricultural lands conveyed to defendant 16 were all dou hie crop lands. On this assumption he suggested that the calculation made about the true value of the said properties errs on the side of overstatement. It is not disputed that of the lands conveyed 3 acres and 24 cents are single crop while approximately 3~ acres are double crop.

On looking at the judgments of both the Courts below, however, we are satisfied that the argument is misconceived because neither. judgment proceeds on the assumption that the whole of the agricultural property is double crop land. In fact the discussion in the judgment of the trial court on Issue No. 27 quite clearly negatives the assumption made by Mr. Pattabhiraman. that being so, as the Courts below have observed, evidence led by the plaintiffs in support of their case that the transfers were efi'ected for grossly inadequate price has -remained unrebutted. The quest;on about the value of the property has been determined on the evidence, documentary and oral, led in the case, and both th'3 Courts have found in favour of tb.e plaintiffs and against the alienees. Incidentally, we may point out that Mr. Viswanatha Sastri appears to be right when he suggests that schedule VII refers to the properties both at Thirukurunkudi as well as Padmaneri though the heading of the schedule refers only to.

Thirukurunkudi. In the result Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1959 preferred by defendants 12, 13 and 16 fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed. L. J arurkirama. IJI' P. M. Nilakanta Gajerrdragadkar J.