Union of India and Ors. v. Adani Exports Ltd. and Anr.

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6320-6321 of 2000. From the Judgment and Order dated 17.2.2000/3.4.2000 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C. Application No. 3282 and 3279 of 1999. Mukul Rohtagi, Additional Solicitor General, Jaideep Gupta, Tara Chand Shanna, S.N. Terdol and B .K. Prasad for the Appellants. F.S. Nariman and Ashok Desai, Vikram Nankani, Subhash C. Sharma, Ms. Vanita Bhargava, Ms. Rakhi Roy and Ms. Bina Gupta, for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANTOSH HEGDE, J. These_'civil appeals are prefeired by the Union of India and Others challenging the judgment and order of the High c.ourt of Gujarat at Ahmedabad made in Special Civil Application Nos.3282/99 and 3279/99 wherein the High Court allowed the said civil applications and granted "the relief as prayed for by the petitioner therein.

Though in these appeals, principal co11tention involved pertains to the entitlement of tl1e i'espondents herein to the benefit of the Pass Book Scheme found in paragi:aph 54 of t11e Import Export Policy introduced by the appellants herein w.e.f. 1st April, 199.5in1'elation to certain credits to be given on export of Shrimps, the appellant firstly challenges. before us the territorial jurisdiction of the Bigh Court of Gujar~t at Mun~dabad to entertain "the civil applications· and grant relief in favoµr of the respondents.· Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Soiicitor G~neral of India anq · • Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned counsel appearing for-the aprellants, cont~nded : that the High Court at Ahrned~bad did not have' the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the special civil applications since!!9--part offue caus~ of action ?ased on which. th~ applications were filed ai:ose witliirr the territorial jurisdiction of fue High Comt at Alrmedabad.

They contended that though d1is ground was specifically urged, the High Court ~rongly placing relianc'e on a judgment cif this Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. OswalWoollen Mills Ltd. & Ors., [1984] 2 sec 646 rejected the said objection of the appellants and granted the relief which, of course, the aiJpell~ts:contend even on merits is U.O.I. v. ADANI EXPORTS LTD. [HEGDE, J.] not liable to be granted. They contend that since the question of jurisdiction in this case goes to the root of the matter, this issue should be first decided and if it is held in favour of the appellants, then ipso facto the judgment under appeal is liable to be set aside as having been delivered by a court of no jurisdiction. Per contra, Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, contended that it is inc01Tect to say that no part to the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Ahinedabad.

According to the learned counsel, a substantial pmt of the cause of action has arisen withiµ the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Ahmedabad, hence, the judgment in question cannot be invalidated on this preliminary ground. He placed strong reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Navinchandra N. Majithi'a V. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2000] 7 sec 640. Having considered the arguments addressed oh behalf of the parties and . having peruseq the records, we are of the considered opinion that the question of jurisdiction should be first decided by us before going into the merits of the case in hand. As a matter of fact, we feel it would have been more appropriate on the facts _of the.se ~ases if the High Court had proceeqed.under Order XIV Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code by deciding the question of jurisdiction as a preliminmy issue.first instead of deciding the case on merit.

For deciding the above issue, it is necessary to first notice the contentions raised in the special civil applications 'to establish the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Contentions regarding the ca~se of action and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court are pleaded in the applications at para 16 which , . read thus: "The petitioners c;uTy oil business of export and import from . -Ahmedabad. The orders for export and i~port are placed from and executed from Ahmedabad. The documents anc;t payments for exp6rt and imports (lre.sent/made at Alunedabad. The credit of duty claimed in.respect of exp01ts were handled frorp. Ahmedabad since export orders were received at Ahmedabad and payments also received at Ahmedabad. The non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the said Pass Book shall effect the business of the Petitioners at Ahmedabad. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have regional offices at Ahmedabad.

A substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction ~f this Honourable Court. This Honourable Court has SUPREI\JE COURT ~EPORTS . therefore, jurisdictimi to entertain, try and 9"ispose of this Petition." · ·The appellants herein whifo opposing die civil.applicati9i1s lia.d specifically pleaded. that the courts at Ahrnedabad did not have the tenitorialjurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claims of the teS'pondents $ince ·no P<l!t of the cause of action has arisen within the ten"itorial jurisdiction of the High eourt at Ahmedabad.

In their statement of objection rebutting the pleading~ of the· respondents, the appellants had contended tlms :- "With reference to para 16 of ilie 1'>etition, I say that since the Pass · Book Licence w~s issued at Chennai by ilie designatect authority at Chemiai and the ti:ansactions concerning tl1e said pass book wer~ made ·from Chennai port and cause of action is lying atChennai, it is in order that tl1e case is transfe1Ted to the jlllisdiction of tl1e Hon'ble High Court of Madras at Chemiai notwithstanding tlie petitioners having their office at Ahmedabad from where the export import plam1ing worlc was · being executed".

From the above, it is seen that the. appellants had taken a. serious objec~ ti on as to the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court at Ahmedabad, contending that·it is the .High Court at Chennai which alone h~d the jmisdiction to entertain the applications as no part of tl1e cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of ilie High Court at Ahmedabad. Hence, the appel" lants had prayed for transfer of the case to the High Court at C11enna~. · We witl now consider how the High Court dealt with this issue. Having noticed the objection filed by the appellants in regard to its territorial jurisdic~ ti on, the High Court following ·tlle judgment of this Court in the· ".ase of Union of India v. Osival Woollen (supra) held that in view of the observations of thi~ Court in the said.case, a civil application can be filed ~t the place where ili~ registered office of the Company is situated and having regard to tl1e fact that die registered office ·of the respond.ent-Company is situated.at Ahm:edabad,- i( accepted the argument of tl1e learned counsel for the respondent iliat it is not necessary to discuss ·this issue any furtl1er, meaning thereby it accepted tlle contention of the respondent's counsel that the High Court at AJu:nedabad had tlle territorial jurisdiction to decide the application.

We are unable to accept this finding of the High Court. The view ·of the High Court that this Court in ilie case of Oswal Woollen.(supra) had held tl;lat the existence of the registered office of a Company would ipso facto give a I U.0.1. v. ADAN! EXPORTS LTD. [HEGDE, J.] cause of action to the High Com1 widiin whose jurisdiction the registered office of such Company is situated, is not correct. As a matter of fact, in the case of Oswal Woollen (supra), the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sense with which we are concerned now, did not arise at all. In that case, the observations of the Court were as follows : '\Having regard to the fact that the registered office of die Company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents against whom die primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would have expected the writ petition to be filed eidier in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court.

The writ petitioners, however, have chosen the Calcutta High Court as the forum perhaps because one of die interlocutory reliefs which is sought is in respect of a consigmnent of beef tallow which has arrived at die Calcutta Port... We do not desire to probe further into die question whether the writ petition was filed by design m accident in die Calcutta High Court when the office of the Company is in die State of Punjab and all the principal respondents are in Delhi." It is in that context of noticing dle motive of the parties concerned in that case in choosing a forum, die above obse1vation as to die place of the registered office of the Company was incidentally made in die judgment. Having perused the judgment in Oswal 's case (supra), we are of the opinion diat that judgment is no authority to decide as to the requirement of law in regard to establishing the territ01ial jurisdiction of a court. We must say in all fairness, Mr. Desai, learned senior counsel, has not placed any reliance on this judgment nor on the basis of die finding of the High Court in this case in regard to its territorial jurisdiction.

He, however, contends that from the facts naITated in the civil applications, more so in Paragraph 16 of the application, it is crystal clear iliat a substantial part of the cause of action has arisen within die jurisdiction of die High Court at Ahmedabad. He pointedly refeITed to the bundle of facts mentioned in Paragraph 16 of the application as also die additional fact pleaded in Paragraph 7 of the application in regard to the respondents having furnished a bank guarantee as also a Bond in favour of the appellants. He pointed out that the bank guarantee and die Bond were executed by die respondents at Ahmedabad, hence, at least on diis count a part of the cause of action has arisen at Ahmedabad.

We will now examine whether any of the facts mentioned in Paragraph 16 of the applications or for iliat matter in the entire special civil applications would give rise to any part of the cause of action at Ahmedabad, at least for the pmpose of confeffing tenito1ial jmisdiction on the High Court at Ahmedabad. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that it is an admitted fact that none of the respondents in the civil applications (Appellants herein) are stationed at Abmedabad. It is also an admitted fact that the pass-book in question, benefit of which the respondent is seeking in the civil applications, is issued by an authority who is stationed at Chennai. The Designated Authority who is the competent person in respect of the matters concerning the Pass Book Scheme and who discharges various functions under the Scheme is also stationed at Chennai. The entries in the pass-book under the concerned Scheme are to be made by the authorities at Chemiai.

The export of prawn made by the respondents and the import of the inputs benefit of which the respondents are seeking in the applications, also will have to be made through i:he same Port i.e. Chennai. Inspite of the above admitted facts, tl1e respondents herein plead that as per tl1e plea raised by them in paragraph 16 of the special civil application, the following facts give rise to the cause of action confen"ing te~Titorial jmisdiction on the Court at Ahmedabad. They are :- the respondents call"y on their business of export and impo1t from Abmedabad; (ii) their orders of export and imp01t are placed from and are executed at Abmedabad ; (iii) documents and paym@nts for export and import are sent/made at Alunedabad ; (iv) the credit of duty claimed in respect of expo1ts were handled from Alnnedabad since export orders were received at Abmedabad and payments also received at Ahm<:dabad ;

(v) non-granting and denial of utilisation of the credit in the passbook will affect the business of the respondents at Alnnedabad; (vi) respondents have executed a bank guarantee tlU"ough their battleers at Ahmedabad as well as a Bond at Alunedabad. Though it is also contended in para 16 of tl1e application that the appellants have their office at Ahme~abad, that contention has not been pressed since I it is clear from the records that none of these appellants have their office at Ahmedabad. De hors this fact, if we take into consideration the other facts enumerated hereinabove in suppo1t of the cause of action pleaded by the respondents, it is seen that none of these facts is in any way com1ected with the relief sought for by the respondents in their civil applications so as to constitute the cause of action at Ahmedabad.

Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which speaks of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court reads : - "The power confened by clause (1) to issue directions, orders 9r writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the_ territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." It is clear from the above constitutional provision that a High Court can exercise the jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in-part, arises. This provision in the Constitution has come up for consideration in a number of cases before this Comt. In this regard, it would suffice for us to refer to the observations of this Comt in the case of Oj,/ and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors., [1994]

4 SCC 711 at 713) wherein it was held : "Under Article 226 a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of l'llly of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said tenitories. The expression "cause of action" means that bundle of facts which the petitioner must prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour by the Court. Therefore; in determining the objection of lack of tenitorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the conectness or otherwise of the said facts.

Thus the question of tetTitorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition, the truth or otherwise of the averments made in the petition being immaterial." It is seen from the above th~t in or_der to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a :vrit petition' or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower. the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in-part, arisen within its jurisdiction. It is clear ~rom the above judgment that each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that th'Ose facts gi"'.e rise to a cause of action within the comt' s tenito1ial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a ne:Xus ot relevance with the lis that is involved in the case.

Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer tetTitorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. If we apply this principle then we see that none of the facts pleaded in Paragraph 16 of the petition, in our . opinion, fall into the category of bundle of facts which would constitute a cause of action giving rise to a dispute which could confer tenitorial jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad .. As we have noticed earlier, the fact that the respondents are carrying on the business of export and import or that they are receiving the export and import orders at Ahmedabad or that their documents and payments for exports and imports are senUmade at Ahmedabad, has no connection whatsoever with the dispute that is involved in the applications.

Similarly, the fact that the credit of duty claimed in respect of exports that were made from Chennai were handled by the respondents from Alunedabad have also no connection whatsoever with the actions of the appellants impugned in the application. The nongranting and denial of credit in the pass-book having an ultimate effect, if any, on the business of the respondents at Alunedabad would not also, in our opinion, give rise to any such cause of action to a court at Alunedabad to adjudicate on the actions complained against tlie appellants. Mr. A.shok Desai, however, pleaded that the respondents have executed a bank guarantee and a Bond at Ahmedabad which in law the r~spondents are entitled to get cancelled through the intervention of tl1e courts at Ahmedabad.

This fact having been specifically pleaded in the application and a relief being sought for that purpose, would definitely give rise to a part of caus:e of action at Alunedabad, but on behalf of the appellants, it is pointed out to us that the subject-matter involved in the applications pertains to the denial of the benefit of the impmt-expmts scheme which ended w.e.f. 31.3.1997 while the bank guarantee and the Bond in question were not part of the Pass Book Scheme which is the subject-matter of the special civil applications with which we are concerned now. Execution of the bank guarantee was not with reference to the demand of the respondents to give it due credit in the pass book but the same was executed much later than 31.3 .1997 in regard to certain disputes pending with the custmns authorities in regard to the valuations made by the said authorities as to the value of the export and import of prawn and its inputs.

It was also pointed out that these customs authorities, as a matter of fact, are not even parties to these special civil applications. Thus, it is contended that the factum of the respondents having executed a bank guarantee and a Bond at Ahmedabad will have no direct nexus or bearing on the disputes involved c in these applications. It is pointed out to us by learned counsel for the appellants that in regard to the conectness of the valuation, separate proceedings have been initiated and against the findings in those proceedings, sepa_rate appeals are pending in this Court, therefore, the bank guarantee and the Bond executed by the respondents, as a matter of fact, have nothing to do with the cause of action that may arise to challenge the denial of the benefit of the Pass Book Scheme. Inclusion of this totally extraneous claim in the present writ petition cannot be construed as being a factor giving rise to a cause of action.

In the case of ONGC (supra), this Court negatived the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents therein that either the acquisition of knowledge made through media at a particular place or owning and having an office or property or residing at a particular place, receiving of a fax message at a particular place, receiving telephone calls and maintaining statements of accounts of business, printing of letterheads indicating branch offices of the firm, booking of orders from a particular place are not the factors which would give rise to either wholly or in part cause of action confening tenitoriaJ jurisdiction to courts. In the said case, this Court also held that the mere service of notice is also not a fact giving rise to a cause of action unless such notice is an integral part of the cause of action. Mr. Desai, however, placed reliance on a recent judgment of this Court in Navinchandra v. State of Maharashtra (supra) wherein this Court had held t that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.

It is to be noted that in the said petition, among other reliefs, the writ petitioner had prayed for a writ of mandamus to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police as also allegations of mala ft.des were made as to the filing of the complaint at Shillong. It was (2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. also averred in that case that the petitioner was primarily agg1ieved by the criminal complaint filed at Meghalaya because the bulk of the investigation was canied on at Bombay. 111e said writ petition was dismissed by the Bombay High Court solely on the ground that since the complaint in question was filed in Shillong in the State of Meghalaya and the petitioner had sought for quashing of the said complaint, such a writ petition was not maintainable before the High Court of Bombay.

According to this Court, that finding was given without taking into consideration the other altemative prayers in the writ petition to which.we have made reference hereinabove, which prayers according to this Cciurt, gave rise to a·cause of action to move the High Courtat Bombay for relief. Therefore, in our opinion, this judgment does not help the writ petitioner to justify its action in filing a writ petition before the Gujarat High Court. "fl1at apart, we must notice that the said judgment is delivered in a matter involving criminal dispute and consequences of such dispute have a direct bearing on the personal freedom of a citizen guaranteed under Article 2l of the Constitution~ Therefore, the consideration that arises in deciding the question of tenitorial jurisdiction iri cases involving criminal offences may not always apply to cases involving cl.vii disputes like the special civil applications with. which we are concerned. Mr. Desai then urged that since the High Comt has elaborately dealt with the merits of the case and given a finding in favour of the respondents · in the interest of justice, we should not interfere with the said finding and uphold the same.

We are not inclined to accept this argument of the learned counsel because the appellants herein had taken objection to the entertainment of the special civil applications by the Gujarat High Court on the ground oflack of teITitorial jurisdiction in the fitst instance itself and the same was rejected, according to us, wholly on unsustainable grounds. As a matter of fact, the appellant on the entertainment of the civil application and grant of inte1im order, had challenged the said order on the ground of want of jurisdiction by way of a civil appeal in this Court which appeal is pending consideration by this Court, therefore, the objection having been taken at the first instance itself and the comt having not proceeded to decide this question of tenitorial jurisdiction as contemplated under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, we think we cannot deny relief to the appellant solely on the gromid that the High Court has chosen to proceed to decide the case on me1it.

This being a judgment of a court having no tenitorial jurisdiction, the judgment has to be set aside. However, the special civil applications cannot be dismissed on this ground because it has been the contention of the appellants themselves in the objections filed by them before the High Comt, that these applications ought to be transfeITed to the High Comt at Chennai, in the interest of justice, we agree with this plea. For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed and the same are hereby allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. We further direct that Special Civil Application Nos. 3282/99 and 3279/99 filed by the respondents are hereby directed to be transferred to the High Court of Madras at Chennai forthwith and on receipt of the papers, we request the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras to place them before an appropriate Bench for disposal in accordance with law.

We are also of the opinion that since the parties have already undergone one round of litigation before the High Cowt at Ahmedabad and thereafter in these appeals before us, it is appropriate to request the High Court to dispose of these appeals as early as possible. The appeals are, accord-~ ingly, allowed. A.K.T. Appeals allowed.